The Rhetoric of Prudence in Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski’s De vanitate consiliorum

The article aims to present a new interpretation of Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski’s De vanitate consiliorum by discussing the way the Latin notion of prudentia and the two-fold argument (disputatio in utramque partem) are employed in the dialogue. The first part of the article briefly discusses the origin and meanings of prudentia as it was employed in the Ciceronian tradition. The notion of prudence as practical judgement in relation to affairs of state is linked here to the Ciceronian mode of arguing in utramque partem, allowing a careful examination of different aspects of any given issue before taking political action. The second part of the article outlines the ways the notion of prudence is used throughout De vanitate consiliorum. Prudentia is referred to by the characters of the dialogue as a faculty that allows the statesman to make the best of contradictory forces influencing the course of political affairs – a faculty which does not ensure success, but allows one to achieve the best possible result in the contingent sphere of human affairs. The third and final part of the article discusses the two ways the image of ‘two-headed prudence’ is invoked in De vanitate consiliorum, either in reference to the prudent judgement which carefully examines different aspects of the issue at hand or to the council’s indecisiveness which hinders the possibility of consensus necessary to take political action. An interpretation of the dialogue as a rhetorical exercise in prudence is proposed in this part, arguing that the way Lubomirski employs rhetorical deliberation in utramque partem invites the reader to constantly exercise his own practical judgement in relation to affairs of state.