BRAZILIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION AND ITS ENFORCEMENT: POTENTIAL LESSONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

This paper examines the reforms and institutions that have, anecdotally and empirically, demonstrated progress in combating corruption in Brazil. Focusing specifically on the institutions charged with investigating suspected corrupt activities, we contend that institutional multiplicity – the overla...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of self-governance and management economics 2016, Vol.4 (1), p.34-71
Hauptverfasser: Prado, Mariana Mota, CARSON, LINDSEY
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This paper examines the reforms and institutions that have, anecdotally and empirically, demonstrated progress in combating corruption in Brazil. Focusing specifically on the institutions charged with investigating suspected corrupt activities, we contend that institutional multiplicity – the overlap of investigative functions among various governmental entities – has strengthened outcomes by allowing in- stitutions to collaborate, to complement one another, or to compensate for one another’s deficiencies or oversights. We further argue that our analysis of the Brazilian experience reveals the advantages in pursuing alternative institutional approaches, including institutional multiplicity combined with institutional malleability, in developing strategies to reduce corruption. pp. 34–71JEL codes: K42
ISSN:2329-4175
2377-0996
DOI:10.22381/JSME4120162