Скептическото зло и античното понятие за етика

The main task of this article is to expose the skeptical critique of ethical dogmatism as it's developed by Sextus Empiricus in his work Against the ethicists (11th book of Adversus mathematicos). In order to correct Plato's „intellectualism" that considers the good to be an intelligible end, Aristotle makes a distinction between „practical" and „logical" truth and creates the „ethics", i. e. the science that explores the ways of right practice. The Pyrrhonists attack the dogmatic features in post-Aristotelic ethics by criticising the existence of objective „criterion" of truth and by arguing that any knowledge shouldn't be regarded as „undoubted". According to them, the Good and the Evil are not independent substances but individual attitudes to the „phenomenal world". Thus, the main purpose of the skeptical philosophy is to refute the theoretical basis of ethics as a science and to establish morality only on the separate („unique") situations and experiences.