À même les «choses mêmes»: La jonction de sentir et mouvement dans la phénoménologie de Jan Patočka

In this paper I would like to reconstruct PatoËka’s effort to give a faithful account of the phenomena, without betraying these phenomena with an objectivistic theory of perception. Only by remaining close to the things themselves will we be able to understand them as an appeal, as a call, while understanding ourselves as a response to this call. On the basis of this “ontological rehabilitation of the sensible”, which reveals PatoËka’s affinity with Merleau-Ponty as much as his departure from Husserl, I will criticize the idealism of Husserlian phenomenology and reconsider the a priori of correlation in a different fashion. World and subject will then find a different articulation, grounded in the ontological couple of movement and feeling. The analysis will consist of three parts: in the first part I will introduce the problematic of the opposition between phenomenological and physical space; the second part will deal with the notion of movement; the third part will concentrate on PatoËka’s new account of subjectivity, the a-subjective cogito, arising precisely from the fundamental coupling of k…nhsij and p£qoj. Embo - diment, qua original phenomenon, will be constantly present in the background of this analysis.