An analysis of the factors affecting the Royal Air Force's bomber force/bomber command aircrew operational training pipeline and the resulting training methodologies adopted between 1922 and 1945

This thesis examines the role that operational training played in the development of aircrew for the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Force/Bomber Command between 1922 and 1945. At the core of this operational training process was the training pipeline where untrained aircrew members entered at one end and fully trained aircrew emerged at the other that were fitted to take their place in operational squadrons. Although simple in theory, this training pipeline could be disrupted by many factors that included dysfunctional management, poor leadership, a lack of resources, changing policies, evolving or new tactics, technological developments with operational aircraft or training equipment, wastage and weather. These factors will be examined through the prisms of the RAF’s Staff College, Air Ministry organisation and Bomber Command’s training organisation. As this thesis concludes, operational training was a transformational factor in increasing the capabilities of Bomber Command as the war progressed. Significantly though, this training pipeline could not be simply switched on and off and therefore any change to policy had a major effect that resulted in aircrew shortage or surfeit. This thesis will examine the development of this training pipeline and consider how it matured to match a growing bomber force and the increasing technological complexity of four-engine bombers compared to the biplanes and light/medium bombers of the mid-1930s. This thesis aims to galvanize the debate about the importance of training and its relationship with doctrine, leadership and technology.