Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules are strategyproof, even when allowing for randomization. Ho...
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Zusammenfassung: | An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making
is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting
insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive
rules are strategyproof, even when allowing for randomization. However,
Gibbard's theorem is based on a rather strong interpretation of
strategyproofness, which deems a manipulation successful if it increases the
voter's expected utility for at least one utility function consistent with his
ordinal preferences. In this paper, we study weak strategyproofness, which
deems a manipulation successful if it increases the voter's expected utility
for all utility functions consistent with his ordinal preferences. We show how
to systematically design attractive, weakly strategyproof social decision
schemes (SDSs) and explore their limitations for both strict and weak
preferences. In particular, for strict preferences, we show that there are
weakly strategyproof SDSs that are either ex post efficient or
Condorcet-consistent, while neither even-chance SDSs nor pairwise SDSs satisfy
both properties and weak strategyproofness at the same time. By contrast, for
the case of weak preferences, we discuss two sweeping impossibility results
that preclude the existence of appealing weakly strategyproof SDSs. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2412.11977 |