CCxTrust: Confidential Computing Platform Based on TEE and TPM Collaborative Trust
Confidential Computing has emerged to address data security challenges in cloud-centric deployments by protecting data in use through hardware-level isolation. However, reliance on a single hardware root of trust (RoT) limits user confidence in cloud platforms, especially for high-performance AI ser...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , , , , , |
---|---|
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext bestellen |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | Confidential Computing has emerged to address data security challenges in
cloud-centric deployments by protecting data in use through hardware-level
isolation. However, reliance on a single hardware root of trust (RoT) limits
user confidence in cloud platforms, especially for high-performance AI
services, where end-to-end protection of sensitive models and data is critical.
Furthermore, the lack of interoperability and a unified trust model in
multi-cloud environments prevents the establishment of a cross-platform,
cross-cloud chain of trust, creating a significant trust gap for users with
high privacy requirements. To address the challenges mentioned above, this
paper proposes CCxTrust (Confidential Computing with Trust), a confidential
computing platform leveraging collaborative roots of trust from TEE and TPM.
CCxTrust combines the black-box RoT embedded in the CPU-TEE with the flexible
white-box RoT of TPM to establish a collaborative trust framework. The platform
implements independent Roots of Trust for Measurement (RTM) for TEE and TPM,
and a collaborative Root of Trust for Report (RTR) for composite attestation.
The Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) is solely supported by TPM. We also present
the design and implementation of a confidential TPM supporting multiple modes
for secure use within confidential virtual machines. Additionally, we propose a
composite attestation protocol integrating TEE and TPM to enhance security and
attestation efficiency, which is proven secure under the PCL protocol security
model. We implemented a prototype of CCxTrust on a confidential computing
server with AMD SEV-SNP and TPM chips, requiring minimal modifications to the
TPM and guest Linux kernel. The composite attestation efficiency improved by
24% without significant overhead, while Confidential TPM performance showed a
16.47% reduction compared to standard TPM. |
---|---|
DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2412.03842 |