Large Language Models Overcome the Machine Penalty When Acting Fairly but Not When Acting Selfishly or Altruistically

In social dilemmas where the collective and self-interests are at odds, people typically cooperate less with machines than with fellow humans, a phenomenon termed the machine penalty. Overcoming this penalty is critical for successful human-machine collectives, yet current solutions often involve ethically-questionable tactics, like concealing machines' non-human nature. In this study, with 1,152 participants, we explore the possibility of closing this research question by using Large Language Models (LLMs), in scenarios where communication is possible between interacting parties. We design three types of LLMs: (i) Cooperative, aiming to assist its human associate; (ii) Selfish, focusing solely on maximizing its self-interest; and (iii) Fair, balancing its own and collective interest, while slightly prioritizing self-interest. Our findings reveal that, when interacting with humans, fair LLMs are able to induce cooperation levels comparable to those observed in human-human interactions, even when their non-human nature is fully disclosed. In contrast, selfish and cooperative LLMs fail to achieve this goal. Post-experiment analysis shows that all three types of LLMs succeed in forming mutual cooperation agreements with humans, yet only fair LLMs, which occasionally break their promises, are capable of instilling a perception among humans that cooperating with them is the social norm, and eliciting positive views on their trustworthiness, mindfulness, intelligence, and communication quality. Our findings suggest that for effective human-machine cooperation, bot manufacturers should avoid designing machines with mere rational decision-making or a sole focus on assisting humans. Instead, they should design machines capable of judiciously balancing their own interest and the interest of humans.