MoJE: Mixture of Jailbreak Experts, Naive Tabular Classifiers as Guard for Prompt Attacks
The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) in diverse applications underscores the pressing need for robust security measures to thwart potential jailbreak attacks. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities within LLMs, endanger data integrity and user privacy. Guardrails serve as crucial protect...
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Zusammenfassung: | The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) in diverse applications
underscores the pressing need for robust security measures to thwart potential
jailbreak attacks. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities within LLMs, endanger
data integrity and user privacy. Guardrails serve as crucial protective
mechanisms against such threats, but existing models often fall short in terms
of both detection accuracy, and computational efficiency. This paper advocates
for the significance of jailbreak attack prevention on LLMs, and emphasises the
role of input guardrails in safeguarding these models. We introduce MoJE
(Mixture of Jailbreak Expert), a novel guardrail architecture designed to
surpass current limitations in existing state-of-the-art guardrails. By
employing simple linguistic statistical techniques, MoJE excels in detecting
jailbreak attacks while maintaining minimal computational overhead during model
inference. Through rigorous experimentation, MoJE demonstrates superior
performance capable of detecting 90% of the attacks without compromising benign
prompts, enhancing LLMs security against jailbreak attacks. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2409.17699 |