Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity

We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well as team games in which the members have limited communication capabilities. In the framework of extensive-form games with...

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Hauptverfasser:	Tewolde, Emanuel, Zhang, Brian Hu, Oesterheld, Caspar, Zampetakis, Manolis, Sandholm, Tuomas, Goldberg, Paul W, Conitzer, Vincent
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence Computer Science - Computational Complexity Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
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