Using Formal Verification to Evaluate Single Event Upsets in a RISC-V Core
Reliability has been a major concern in embedded systems. Higher transistor density and lower voltage supply increase the vulnerability of embedded systems to soft errors. A Single Event Upset (SEU), which is also called a soft error, can reverse a bit in a sequential element, resulting in a system...
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Zusammenfassung: | Reliability has been a major concern in embedded systems. Higher transistor
density and lower voltage supply increase the vulnerability of embedded systems
to soft errors. A Single Event Upset (SEU), which is also called a soft error,
can reverse a bit in a sequential element, resulting in a system failure.
Simulation-based fault injection has been widely used to evaluate reliability,
as suggested by ISO26262. However, it is practically impossible to test all
faults for a complex design. Random fault injection is a compromise that
reduces accuracy and fault coverage. Formal verification is an alternative
approach. In this paper, we use formal verification, in the form of model
checking, to evaluate the hardware reliability of a RISC-V Ibex Core in the
presence of soft errors. Backward tracing is performed to identify and
categorize faults according to their effects (no effect, Silent Data
Corruption, crashes, and hangs). By using formal verification, the entire state
space and fault list can be exhaustively explored. It is found that misaligned
instructions can amplify fault effects. It is also found that some bits are
more vulnerable to SEUs than others. In general, most of the bits in the Ibex
Core are vulnerable to Silent Data Corruption, and the second pipeline stage is
more vulnerable to Silent Data Corruption than the first. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2405.12089 |