Mixed Strategy Constraints in Continuous Games
Equilibrium problems representing interaction in physical environments typically require continuous strategies which satisfy opponent-dependent constraints, such as those modeling collision avoidance. However, as with finite games, mixed strategies are often desired, both from an equilibrium existen...
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Zusammenfassung: | Equilibrium problems representing interaction in physical environments
typically require continuous strategies which satisfy opponent-dependent
constraints, such as those modeling collision avoidance. However, as with
finite games, mixed strategies are often desired, both from an equilibrium
existence perspective as well as a competitive perspective. To that end, this
work investigates a chance-constraint-based approach to coupled constraints in
generalized Nash equilibrium problems which are solved over pure strategies and
mixing weights simultaneously. We motivate these constraints in a discrete
setting, placing them on tensor games ($n$-player bimatrix games) as a
justifiable approach to handling the probabilistic nature of mixing. Then, we
describe a numerical solution method for these chance constrained tensor games
with simultaneous pure strategy optimization. Finally, using a modified
pursuit-evasion game as a motivating examples, we demonstrate the actual
behavior of this solution method in terms of its fidelity, parameter
sensitivity, and efficiency. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2402.17874 |