Jamming Detection in Low-BER Mobile Indoor Scenarios via Deep Learning
The current state of the art on jamming detection relies on link-layer metrics. A few examples are the bit-error-rate (BER), the packet delivery ratio, the throughput, and the increase in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). As a result, these techniques can only detect jamming \emph{ex-post}, i.e., onc...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
---|---|
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext bestellen |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | The current state of the art on jamming detection relies on link-layer
metrics. A few examples are the bit-error-rate (BER), the packet delivery
ratio, the throughput, and the increase in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). As
a result, these techniques can only detect jamming \emph{ex-post}, i.e., once
the attack has already taken down the communication link. These solutions are
unfit for mobile devices, e.g., drones, which might lose the connection to the
remote controller, being unable to predict the attack.
Our solution is rooted in the idea that a drone unknowingly flying toward a
jammed area is experiencing an increasing effect of the jamming, e.g., in terms
of BER and SNR. Therefore, drones might use the above-mentioned phenomenon to
detect jamming before the decrease of the BER and the increase of the SNR
completely disrupt the communication link. Such an approach would allow drones
and their pilots to make informed decisions and maintain complete control of
navigation, enhancing security and safety.
This paper proposes Bloodhound+, a solution for jamming detection on mobile
devices in low-BER regimes. Our approach analyzes raw physical-layer
information (I-Q samples) acquired from the wireless channel. We assemble this
information into grayscale images and use sparse autoencoders to detect image
anomalies caused by jamming attacks. To test our solution against a wide set of
configurations, we acquired a large dataset of indoor measurements using
multiple hardware, jamming strategies, and communication parameters. Our
results indicate that Bloodhound+ can detect indoor jamming up to 20 meters
from the jamming source at the minimum available relative jamming power, with a
minimum accuracy of 99.7\%. Our solution is also robust to various sampling
rates adopted by the jammer and to the type of signal used for jamming. |
---|---|
DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2306.10912 |