Static Pricing Guarantees for Queueing Systems
We consider a general queueing model with price-sensitive customers in which the service provider seeks to balance two objectives, maximizing the average revenue rate and minimizing the average queue length. Customers arrive according to a Poisson process, observe an offered price, and decide to joi...
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Zusammenfassung: | We consider a general queueing model with price-sensitive customers in which
the service provider seeks to balance two objectives, maximizing the average
revenue rate and minimizing the average queue length. Customers arrive
according to a Poisson process, observe an offered price, and decide to join
the queue if their valuation exceeds the price. The queue is operated first-in
first-out, and the service times are exponential. Our model represents
applications in areas like make-to-order manufacturing, cloud computing, and
food delivery.
The optimal solution for our model is dynamic; the price changes as the state
of the system changes. However, such dynamic pricing policies may be
undesirable for a variety of reasons. In this work, we provide performance
guarantees for a simple and natural class of static pricing policies which
charge a fixed price up to a certain occupancy threshold and then allow no more
customers into the system. We provide a series of results showing that such
static policies can simultaneously guarantee a constant fraction of the optimal
revenue with at most a constant factor increase in expected queue length. For
instance, our policy for the M/M/1 setting allows bi-criteria approximations of
$(0.5, 1), (0.66, 1.16), (0.75, 1.54)$ and $(0.8, 2)$ for the revenue and queue
length, respectively. We also provide guarantees for settings with multiple
customer classes and multiple servers, as well as the expected sojourn time
objective. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2305.09168 |