Towards Scalable EM-based Anomaly Detection For Embedded Devices Through Synthetic Fingerprinting
Embedded devices are omnipresent in modern networks including the ones operating inside critical environments. However, due to their constrained nature, novel mechanisms are required to provide external, and non-intrusive anomaly detection. Among such approaches, one that has gained traction is base...
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Zusammenfassung: | Embedded devices are omnipresent in modern networks including the ones
operating inside critical environments. However, due to their constrained
nature, novel mechanisms are required to provide external, and non-intrusive
anomaly detection. Among such approaches, one that has gained traction is based
on the analysis of the electromagnetic (EM) signals that get emanated during a
device's operation. However, one of the most neglected challenges of this
approach is the requirement for manually gathering and fingerprinting the
signals that correspond to each execution path of the software/firmware.
Indeed, even simple programs are comprised of hundreds if not thousands of
branches thus, making the fingerprinting stage an extremely time-consuming
process that involves the manual labor of a human specialist. To address this
issue, we propose a framework for generating synthetic EM signals directly from
the machine code. The synthetic signals can be used to train a Machine Learning
based (ML) system for anomaly detection. The main advantage of the proposed
approach is that it completely removes the need for an elaborate and
error-prone fingerprinting stage, thus, dramatically increasing the scalability
of the corresponding protection mechanisms. The experimental evaluations
indicate that our method provides high detection accuracy (above 90% AUC score)
when employed for the detection of injection attacks. Moreover, the proposed
methodology inflicts only a small penalty (-1.3%) in accuracy for the detection
of the injection of as little as four malicious instructions when compared to
the same methods if real signals were to be used. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2302.02324 |