A learning agent that acquires social norms from public sanctions in decentralized multi-agent settings
Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms: collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are underpinned...
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Zusammenfassung: | Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms:
collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and
free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where
potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are
underpinned by sanctioning, we introduce a training regime where agents can
access all sanctioning events but learning is otherwise decentralized. This
setting is technologically interesting because sanctioning events may be the
only available public signal in decentralized multi-agent systems where reward
or policy-sharing is infeasible or undesirable. To achieve collective action in
this setting we construct an agent architecture containing a classifier module
that categorizes observed behaviors as approved or disapproved, and a
motivation to punish in accord with the group. We show that social norms emerge
in multi-agent systems containing this agent and investigate the conditions
under which this helps them achieve socially beneficial outcomes. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2106.09012 |