Online Trading as a Secretary Problem

We consider the online problem in which an intermediary trades identical items with a sequence of n buyers and n sellers, each of unit demand. We assume that the values of the traders are selected by an adversary and the sequence is randomly permuted. We give competitive algorithms for two objective...

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Veröffentlicht in:arXiv.org 2020-07
Hauptverfasser: Koutsoupias, Elias, Lazos, Philip
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We consider the online problem in which an intermediary trades identical items with a sequence of n buyers and n sellers, each of unit demand. We assume that the values of the traders are selected by an adversary and the sequence is randomly permuted. We give competitive algorithms for two objectives: welfare and gain-from-trade.
ISSN:2331-8422
DOI:10.48550/arxiv.1812.11149