Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality Subsumes Superrationality On Symmetric Games
This paper shows that, for symmetric games in normal form, strategy profiles that satisfy Hofstadter's Superrationality criterion also satisfy both of Halpern's and Pass's criteria under Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality: minimax-rationalizability and individual rationality.
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| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
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| Zusammenfassung: | This paper shows that, for symmetric games in normal form, strategy profiles
that satisfy Hofstadter's Superrationality criterion also satisfy both of
Halpern's and Pass's criteria under Common Counterfactual Belief of
Rationality: minimax-rationalizability and individual rationality. |
|---|---|
| DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.1707.01816 |