Exploiting Untrustworthy Agents in Team Formation
This paper presents a trust-based mechanism for team formation wherein agents selectively pursue partners of varying trustworthiness. The mechanism is tested by using a market-based simulation to determine how pursuing partners with different trust ratings affects an agent's utility. Results fr...
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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Format: | Tagungsbericht |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: |
Computing methodologies
> Artificial intelligence
> Distributed artificial intelligence
> Cooperation and coordination
Computing methodologies
> Artificial intelligence
> Distributed artificial intelligence
> Multi-agent systems
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This paper presents a trust-based mechanism for team formation wherein agents selectively pursue partners of varying trustworthiness. The mechanism is tested by using a market-based simulation to determine how pursuing partners with different trust ratings affects an agent's utility. Results from these experiments show that for jobs with few subtasks, an agent profits by selecting less trustworthy partners, rather than more trustworthy partners. |
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DOI: | 10.1109/IAT.2007.53 |