Advances in financial economics Vol. 15
This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to converg...
Gespeichert in:
Weitere Verfasser: | , , |
---|---|
Format: | E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Bingley, U.K.
Emerald
2012
|
Schriftenreihe: | Advances in financial economics
|
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000Ia 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | ZDB-55-ELD-bslw08948220 | ||
003 | UtOrBLW | ||
005 | 20121129143538.0 | ||
006 | m d | ||
007 | cr un||||||||| | ||
008 | 121129s2012 enka o 000 0 eng d | ||
020 | |a 9781780527895 (electronic bk.) : | ||
080 | |a 658 | ||
245 | 0 | 0 | |a Advances in financial economics |n Vol. 15 |c edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija |
264 | 1 | |a Bingley, U.K. |b Emerald |c 2012 | |
300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 238 Seiten) |b Illustrationen | ||
336 | |b txt | ||
337 | |b c | ||
338 | |b cr | ||
490 | 1 | |a Advances in financial economics |x 1569-3732 | |
520 | |a This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. | ||
700 | 1 | |a Ferris, Stephen P. | |
700 | 1 | |a John, Kose | |
700 | 1 | |a Makhija, Anil K. | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9781780527888 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |l TUM01 |p ZDB-55-ELD |q TUM_PDA_ELD |u https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2012)15 |3 Volltext |
912 | |a ZDB-55-ELD | ||
912 | |a ZDB-55-ELD | ||
049 | |a DE-91 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
DE-BY-TUM_katkey | ZDB-55-ELD-bslw08948220 |
---|---|
_version_ | 1818768364292538368 |
adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author2 | Ferris, Stephen P. John, Kose Makhija, Anil K. |
author2_role | |
author2_variant | s p f sp spf k j kj a k m ak akm |
author_facet | Ferris, Stephen P. John, Kose Makhija, Anil K. |
author_sort | Ferris, Stephen P. |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | localTUM |
collection | ZDB-55-ELD |
doi_str_mv | 10.1108/S1569-3732(2012)15 |
format | eBook |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01884nam a2200289Ia 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ZDB-55-ELD-bslw08948220</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">UtOrBLW</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20121129143538.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m d </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr un|||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">121129s2012 enka o 000 0 eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781780527895 (electronic bk.) :</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="080" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">658</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Advances in financial economics</subfield><subfield code="n">Vol. 15</subfield><subfield code="c">edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Bingley, U.K.</subfield><subfield code="b">Emerald</subfield><subfield code="c">2012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (viii, 238 Seiten)</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Advances in financial economics</subfield><subfield code="x">1569-3732</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ferris, Stephen P.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">John, Kose</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Makhija, Anil K.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781780527888</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">TUM01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-55-ELD</subfield><subfield code="q">TUM_PDA_ELD</subfield><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2012)15</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-55-ELD</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-55-ELD</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | ZDB-55-ELD-bslw08948220 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-18T09:04:36Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781780527895 (electronic bk.) : |
issn | 1569-3732 |
language | English |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-91 DE-BY-TUM |
owner_facet | DE-91 DE-BY-TUM |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 238 Seiten) Illustrationen |
psigel | ZDB-55-ELD |
publishDate | 2012 |
publishDateSearch | 2012 |
publishDateSort | 2012 |
publisher | Emerald |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Advances in financial economics |
spelling | Advances in financial economics Vol. 15 edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija Bingley, U.K. Emerald 2012 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 238 Seiten) Illustrationen txt c cr Advances in financial economics 1569-3732 This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. Ferris, Stephen P. John, Kose Makhija, Anil K. Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781780527888 TUM01 ZDB-55-ELD TUM_PDA_ELD https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2012)15 Volltext |
spellingShingle | Advances in financial economics |
title | Advances in financial economics |
title_auth | Advances in financial economics |
title_exact_search | Advances in financial economics |
title_full | Advances in financial economics Vol. 15 edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija |
title_fullStr | Advances in financial economics Vol. 15 edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija |
title_full_unstemmed | Advances in financial economics Vol. 15 edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija |
title_short | Advances in financial economics |
title_sort | advances in financial economics |
url | https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2012)15 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ferrisstephenp advancesinfinancialeconomicsvol15 AT johnkose advancesinfinancialeconomicsvol15 AT makhijaanilk advancesinfinancialeconomicsvol15 |