Advances in financial economics Vol. 15

This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to converg...

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Weitere Verfasser: Ferris, Stephen P., John, Kose, Makhija, Anil K.
Format: E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Bingley, U.K. Emerald 2012
Schriftenreihe:Advances in financial economics
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Bingley, U.K. Emerald 2012
1 Online-Ressource (viii, 238 Seiten) Illustrationen
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Advances in financial economics 1569-3732
This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.
Ferris, Stephen P.
John, Kose
Makhija, Anil K.
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781780527888
TUM01 ZDB-55-ELD TUM_PDA_ELD https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2012)15 Volltext
spellingShingle Advances in financial economics
title Advances in financial economics
title_auth Advances in financial economics
title_exact_search Advances in financial economics
title_full Advances in financial economics Vol. 15 edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija
title_fullStr Advances in financial economics Vol. 15 edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija
title_full_unstemmed Advances in financial economics Vol. 15 edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija
title_short Advances in financial economics
title_sort advances in financial economics
url https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2012)15
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