The Economics and Regulation of Digital Markets

The Economics and Regulation of Digital Markets

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Presenting new findings and perspectives from leading international scholars on three critical areas of developing government policies: Digital markets and their regulation, the divergence of expert and public views on European democracy, and the effects of firing notification procedures on wage gro...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Fagan, Frank (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Leeds Emerald Publishing Limited 2023
Ausgabe:1st ed
Schriftenreihe:Research in Law and Economics Series v.31
Schlagworte:
Computer networks-Law and legislation
Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts
Aufsatzsammlung
Online-Zugang:DE-2070s
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Inhaltsangabe:
  • Front Cover
  • THE ECONOMICS AND REGULATION OF DIGITAL MARKETS
  • RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
  • THE ECONOMICS AND REGULATION OF DIGITAL MARKETS
  • Copyright
  • CONTENTS
  • LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
  • 1. The Economics and Regulation of Digital Markets
  • 2. Is the Digital Markets Act the Cure for Europe's Platform Ills? Evidence From the European Commission's Impact Assessment
  • Abstract
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Background: Static and Dynamic Competition
  • 3 The Costs and Benefits Considered in the Impact Assessment
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 The Benefits Considered in the Impact Assessment
  • 3.2.1 GDP Growth
  • 3.2.2 Employment
  • 3.2.3 Innovation
  • 3.2.4 Benefits from Investment in R&amp
  • D
  • 3.2.5 Consumer Surplus
  • 3.2.6 Competition
  • 3.2.7 Internal Market Fragmentation
  • 3.2.8 Cross-Border Trade
  • 3.3 The Costs Considered in the Impact Assessment
  • 3.3.1 Costs to the Commission
  • 3.3.2 Costs to National Authorities
  • 3.3.3 Costs to Platforms
  • 3.3.4 Costs to Ecosystem Users and the Broader Economy
  • 3.3.5 Technology Transfer
  • 3.3.6 Impacts on Small and Medium Enterprises
  • 4 Concluding Comments
  • Notes
  • References
  • 3. Data, Power, and Competition Law: The (Im)possible Mission of the DMA?1
  • Abstract
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 The New Challenges of Competition Law: Power Imbalances and Consumer Sovereignty
  • 3 The Issue of "Data Power" in Competition Law and Beyond
  • 4 The Digital Markets Act Thresholds: Overview, Ratio, and Critic
  • 5 The Digital Markets Act: Critical Optimism
  • 6 Conclusive Remarks: Lock-In Effect as the Guiding Principle for the Interpretation of Gatekeeping Power
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • 4. Rethinking Remedies for the Attention Economy
  • Abstract
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Attention Economy in Social Media Markets
  • 3 Structural Remedies for the Attention Economy
  • 3.1 Efficiency of Structural Remedies
  • 3.2 Sustainability of Structural Remedies: Natural Selection at Work
  • 3.3 The Paradox of the Attention Monopoly
  • 4 Behavioral Remedies for the Attention Economy
  • 4.1 Quantity-Based Behavioral Remedies: Attention Caps
  • 4.2 Price-Based Behavioral Remedies: Attention Taxes
  • 4.3 A Modified Attention Tax: Compensating Users for Attention Costs
  • 4.4 The Informational Problems of Behavioral Remedies
  • 5 Market-Based Remedies for the Attention Economy
  • 5.1 Competing for the Monopoly
  • 5.2 Social Media as a Vickrey Common
  • 6 The Distributive Effects of Legal Intervention
  • Notes
  • References
  • (A) Data
  • (B) Articles and Books
  • 5. With the Naked Eye - Diverging Perspectives on the Evaluation of Democracy in the European Union
  • Abstract
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 The Data
  • 2.1 The Indexes of the Quality of Democracy
  • 2.2 The General Public's Satisfaction With Democracy
  • 3 The Overlapping (To Some Extent) of Perspectives
  • 4 The Significant Changes of the Democratic Assessment
  • 5 Conclusions
  • Notes
  • References
  • 6. Firing Notification Procedures and Wage Growth
  • Abstract
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Literature Review
  • 2.1 Theoretical Literature
  • 2.2 Empirical Literature
  • 2.3 How Should the Firing Notification Procedures Impact Wage Growth?
  • 3 Data
  • 3.1 Variables
  • 3.2 Summary Statistics
  • 4 Empirical Analysis
  • 4.1 Estimating Wage Growth
  • 4.2 Treatment of the Labor Market Features
  • 4.2.1 Wage Bargaining Involvement
  • 4.2.2 Minimum Wage Growth and Firing Notification Restrictions
  • 4.2.3 Vocational Training and Firing Notification Restrictions
  • 4.2.4 Employment Distribution by Education and Temporary Employment
  • 4.2.5 Severance Pay and Firing Notification Restrictions
  • 4.3 Changes in the Firing Notification Restrictions
  • 4.4 Treatment of Endogeneity
  • 5 Conclusions
  • Acknowledgments
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index

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