Family altruism and incentives
In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, DC
World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth
[2000]
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| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
2505 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-12 DE-521 DE-523 DE-573 DE-Re13 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
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| Zusammenfassung: | In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding |
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| Beschreibung: | "December 2000"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38) Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |