From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Tokyo
Springer Japan
2020
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| Schriftenreihe: | Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science Ser.
v.20 |
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Inhaltsangabe:
- Intro
- Preface
- Contents
- Editor and Contributors
- About the Editor
- About the Contributors
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Part I: Political Economy
- Chapter 1: From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance
- 1.1 Individuals in a Society
- 1.2 Reproduction View in Economics
- 1.2.1 Main Features of Reproduction
- 1.2.1.1 Trend Embedded in the Present and the Possibility of Change Based on It
- 1.2.1.2 Depersonalization of Interdependent Relations, Their Emergence as Macroeconomic Factors
- 1.2.1.3 Reproduction of Actors and Their Social Relations
- 1.2.1.4 Rationality That Corresponds to the Reproduction
- 1.2.1.5 Historical Path Dependence and Evolutionary Development
- 1.3 Evolutionary View of Social Change
- 1.4 Formation and Evolution of Governance
- References
- Chapter 2: Approval Theory and Social Contract
- 2.1 The Debate on Property and Civil Society
- 2.2 Approval Theory of Social Order
- 2.2.1 The Stable State of Civil Order
- 2.2.2 Autonomous Approval and Synchronous Approval on the Normative Domain
- 2.2.3 Solidarity and Generality of the Interest in the Substantial Domain
- 2.3 Range and Depth of Social Contract Reconsidered
- 2.3.1 Modern Questions for the Revival of Social Contract Theory
- 2.3.2 Introduction of the Dialectic of Master and Servant
- 2.3.3 Hidden Domain of the Sentiment
- 2.4 Discourse Ethics and Naturalized Social Contract
- 2.4.1 Discourse Ethics and the Kantian Imperative
- 2.4.2 Naturalized Social Contracts
- 2.4.3 Preliminary Conclusion
- References
- Chapter 3: Economic Exchange and Social Exchange
- 3.1 Social Exchange Reconsidered
- 3.2 Approval as the Precondition of Exchange
- 3.3 Micro and Macro in the Social Exchange
- 3.4 Market and Organization as the Complex of the Micro-Macro Linkage
- 3.5 Complex System of Exchange and Its Governance
- References
- Chapter 4: Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy
- 4.1 Division of Labor Generates Money and Capital
- 4.1.1 Division of Labor as the Source of Evolution
- 4.1.2 Emergence of Money as an Unintended Consequence
- 4.2 Transactions Under Capitalism
- 4.3 Voice, Exit, and Loyalty in the Industrial Relations
- References
- Chapter 5: Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism
- 5.1 Merchants and Commercial Society
- 5.2 Money and Time in Commerce and Finance
- 5.2.1 Money Is Time?
- 5.2.2 Financial Market
- 5.3 Evolution and Governance of the Financial Structure: Japanese Experience
- 5.3.1 Japanese Financial System Under the Structural Change
- 5.3.2 Institutional Reforms
- 5.3.3 Structural Changes
- 5.3.4 The Governance of National Economy
- 5.3.5 The Shift in FSA's Governance
- References
- Chapter 6: System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy
- 6.1 "Transition" Theory of Socialists Before the Fall of the Berlin Wall
- 6.2 From Institutional Economics to the Institutional Political Economy
- 6.3 Endogeneity and Exogeneity in the Transition
- References
- Part I: Appendices
- Road to Evolutionary and Institutional Economics in Japan: A Personal Memoire of the Decade of Founding the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics
- Appendix 1: Foundation of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics
- Appendix 2: Personal Recollections
- Appendix 3: General Judgment in the Early Twenty-First Century
- Part II: Further Explorations
- Chapter 7: Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.1.1 Approval Theory on Norms and Interests
- 7.1.2 Normative Domain
- 7.1.3 Practical Domain
- 7.1.4 Social State
- 7.2 Image Score as a Norm: "Individual Norm = General Norm" Model
- 7.2.1 Image Score Model
- 7.2.2 The Region of General Norm in the Image Score Model
- 7.3 Individual Norm Dynamics
- 7.3.1 Reputation and Norm
- 7.3.2 Gap Between General Norms and Individual Norms
- 7.3.3 "Leading Eight" as a General Norm and Its Region
- 7.3.3.1 Maintain a Cooperative Relationship
- 7.3.3.2 Identification of Deviant
- 7.3.3.3 Punishment and Justification for Punishment
- 7.3.3.4 Apologies and Acceptance
- 7.4 Conclusion
- References
- Chapter 8: On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher's FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe's Construction
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Rediscovery of FTNS by Fisher-Price-Frank
- 8.2.1 Examination of FTNS by G. Price
- 8.2.2 Construction by Frank
- 8.2.3 Natural Selection as an Agent Applying Statistical Inference
- 8.2.4 Into the Market
- 8.2.5 Comparison Between Biological System and Market
- 8.3 Metcalfe's Theory
- 8.3.1 Metcalfe's Key Concepts and Construction
- 8.3.2 'Fisher's Principle' as Reinterpretation of FTNS by Metcalfe
- 8.3.3 The Case of Interference
- 8.3.4 Postscript to Metcalfe's Construction
- 8.4 Discussion: Search for Dynamic Efficiency and for Evolutionary Market Analysis
- 8.4.1 Implication of 'Fisher's Principle'
- 8.4.2 FTNS and Two Frames of Reference for the Dynamical System
- 8.4.3 On the Several Norms of Efficiency
- 8.5 Conclusion
- References