Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets

There are two main sources of confusion in the public corporate governance debate. One is the confusion about the role of public policy intervention. The other is a lack of empirical knowledge about the corporate landscape where rules are supposed to be implemented and the functioning of today'...

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1. Verfasser: Isaksson, Mats (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Çelik, Serdar (MitwirkendeR)
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Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Paris OECD Publishing 2013
Schriftenreihe:OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers
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series2 OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers
spellingShingle Isaksson, Mats
Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets
Finance and Investment
Governance
title Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets
title_auth Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets
title_exact_search Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets
title_exact_search_txtP Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets
title_full Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets Mats Isaksson and Serdar Çelik
title_fullStr Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets Mats Isaksson and Serdar Çelik
title_full_unstemmed Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets Mats Isaksson and Serdar Çelik
title_short Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today's Equity Markets
title_sort who cares corporate governance in today s equity markets
topic Finance and Investment
Governance
topic_facet Finance and Investment
Governance
url https://doi.org/10.1787/5k47zw5kdnmp-en
work_keys_str_mv AT isakssonmats whocarescorporategovernanceintodaysequitymarkets
AT celikserdar whocarescorporategovernanceintodaysequitymarkets