The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928

Until now political scientists have devoted little attention to the origins of American bureaucracy and the relationship between bureaucratic and interest group politics. In this pioneering book, Daniel Carpenter contributes to our understanding of institutions by presenting a unified study of burea...

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1. Verfasser: Carpenter, Daniel (VerfasserIn)
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Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press [2020]
Schriftenreihe:Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives 173
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series2 Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives
spelling Carpenter, Daniel Verfasser aut
The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 Daniel Carpenter
Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press [2020]
© 2002
1 online resource 12 line illus., 15 tables
txt rdacontent
c rdamedia
cr rdacarrier
Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives 173
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Aug 2020)
Until now political scientists have devoted little attention to the origins of American bureaucracy and the relationship between bureaucratic and interest group politics. In this pioneering book, Daniel Carpenter contributes to our understanding of institutions by presenting a unified study of bureaucratic autonomy in democratic regimes. He focuses on the emergence of bureaucratic policy innovation in the United States during the Progressive Era, asking why the Post Office Department and the Department of Agriculture became politically independent authors of new policy and why the Interior Department did not. To explain these developments, Carpenter offers a new theory of bureaucratic autonomy grounded in organization theory, rational choice models, and network concepts. According to the author, bureaucracies with unique goals achieve autonomy when their middle-level officials establish reputations among diverse coalitions for effectively providing unique services. These coalitions enable agencies to resist political control and make it costly for politicians to ignore the agencies' ideas. Carpenter assesses his argument through a highly innovative combination of historical narratives, statistical analyses, counterfactuals, and carefully structured policy comparisons. Along the way, he reinterprets the rise of national food and drug regulation, Comstockery and the Progressive anti-vice movement, the emergence of American conservation policy, the ascent of the farm lobby, the creation of postal savings banks and free rural mail delivery, and even the congressional Cannon Revolt of 1910
In English
Cockrell Committee
Dahl, Robert
Devine, Edward
Estabrook, Leon
Farm Bloc
Fulton, Charles
Gary, James
Goff, H.
Grosh, Aaron
Hall, B. M.
Hays, Will
Hedges, Florence
Howard, Robert
Innis, Squire
Jardine, William
Johnson, Ronald
Katznelson, Ira
Kenyon, William
Knights of Labor
Lauman, George
Louisiana Lottery
Mayhew, David
McCraw, Thomas
Noble, Edwin
Scott, Roy
administrative learning;Arnold, R. Douglas;bank war;Bigelow, Willard;Brand, Charles
ecological control
narrative panel
organizational capacity
packing regulation
POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory bisacsh
Bureaucracy United States History
Executive departments United States History
Government executives United States History
Political planning United States History
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214078 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
spellingShingle Carpenter, Daniel
The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928
Cockrell Committee
Dahl, Robert
Devine, Edward
Estabrook, Leon
Farm Bloc
Fulton, Charles
Gary, James
Goff, H.
Grosh, Aaron
Hall, B. M.
Hays, Will
Hedges, Florence
Howard, Robert
Innis, Squire
Jardine, William
Johnson, Ronald
Katznelson, Ira
Kenyon, William
Knights of Labor
Lauman, George
Louisiana Lottery
Mayhew, David
McCraw, Thomas
Noble, Edwin
Scott, Roy
administrative learning;Arnold, R. Douglas;bank war;Bigelow, Willard;Brand, Charles
ecological control
narrative panel
organizational capacity
packing regulation
POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory bisacsh
Bureaucracy United States History
Executive departments United States History
Government executives United States History
Political planning United States History
title The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928
title_auth The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928
title_exact_search The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928
title_full The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 Daniel Carpenter
title_fullStr The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 Daniel Carpenter
title_full_unstemmed The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 Daniel Carpenter
title_short The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy
title_sort the forging of bureaucratic autonomy reputations networks and policy innovation in executive agencies 1862 1928
title_sub Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928
topic Cockrell Committee
Dahl, Robert
Devine, Edward
Estabrook, Leon
Farm Bloc
Fulton, Charles
Gary, James
Goff, H.
Grosh, Aaron
Hall, B. M.
Hays, Will
Hedges, Florence
Howard, Robert
Innis, Squire
Jardine, William
Johnson, Ronald
Katznelson, Ira
Kenyon, William
Knights of Labor
Lauman, George
Louisiana Lottery
Mayhew, David
McCraw, Thomas
Noble, Edwin
Scott, Roy
administrative learning;Arnold, R. Douglas;bank war;Bigelow, Willard;Brand, Charles
ecological control
narrative panel
organizational capacity
packing regulation
POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory bisacsh
Bureaucracy United States History
Executive departments United States History
Government executives United States History
Political planning United States History
topic_facet Cockrell Committee
Dahl, Robert
Devine, Edward
Estabrook, Leon
Farm Bloc
Fulton, Charles
Gary, James
Goff, H.
Grosh, Aaron
Hall, B. M.
Hays, Will
Hedges, Florence
Howard, Robert
Innis, Squire
Jardine, William
Johnson, Ronald
Katznelson, Ira
Kenyon, William
Knights of Labor
Lauman, George
Louisiana Lottery
Mayhew, David
McCraw, Thomas
Noble, Edwin
Scott, Roy
administrative learning;Arnold, R. Douglas;bank war;Bigelow, Willard;Brand, Charles
ecological control
narrative panel
organizational capacity
packing regulation
POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory
Bureaucracy United States History
Executive departments United States History
Government executives United States History
Political planning United States History
url https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214078
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