Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players
The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coali...
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Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1979
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| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 1979 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
169 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Rapoport, A. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players |c by A. Rapoport, J. P. Kahan, S. G. Funk, A. D. Horowitz |
| 250 | |a 1st ed. 1979 | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Berlin, Heidelberg |b Springer Berlin Heidelberg |c 1979 | |
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| 490 | 0 | |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |v 169 | |
| 520 | |a The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis | ||
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| author | Rapoport, A. Kahan, J. P. Funk, S. G. Horowitz, A. D. |
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| dewey-full | 330.1 |
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| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
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| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-642-48312-7 |
| edition | 1st ed. 1979 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:56:08Z |
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| isbn | 9783642483127 |
| language | English |
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| series2 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
| spelling | Rapoport, A. Verfasser aut Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players by A. Rapoport, J. P. Kahan, S. G. Funk, A. D. Horowitz 1st ed. 1979 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1979 1 Online-Ressource (VII, 170 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 169 The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Kahan, J. P. aut Funk, S. G. aut Horowitz, A. D. aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540092490 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642483134 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48312-7 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Rapoport, A. Kahan, J. P. Funk, S. G. Horowitz, A. D. Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players |
| title_auth | Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players |
| title_exact_search | Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players |
| title_full | Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players by A. Rapoport, J. P. Kahan, S. G. Funk, A. D. Horowitz |
| title_fullStr | Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players by A. Rapoport, J. P. Kahan, S. G. Funk, A. D. Horowitz |
| title_full_unstemmed | Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players by A. Rapoport, J. P. Kahan, S. G. Funk, A. D. Horowitz |
| title_short | Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players |
| title_sort | coalition formation by sophisticated players |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Spieltheorie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48312-7 |
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