The theory of incentives the principal agent model

Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun...

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Hauptverfasser: Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 (VerfasserIn), Martimort, David 1967- (VerfasserIn)
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Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press [2002]
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spelling Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 Verfasser (DE-588)11006061X aut
The theory of incentives the principal agent model Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort
Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press [2002]
© 2002
1 Online-Ressource (XII, 421 Seiten) Diagramme
txt rdacontent
c rdamedia
cr rdacarrier
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General bisacsh
Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd rswk-swf
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Martimort, David 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)123364469 aut
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spellingShingle Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004
Martimort, David 1967-
The theory of incentives the principal agent model
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General bisacsh
Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd
Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd
Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)4079351-5
(DE-588)4126353-4
(DE-588)4133767-0
title The theory of incentives the principal agent model
title_auth The theory of incentives the principal agent model
title_exact_search The theory of incentives the principal agent model
title_full The theory of incentives the principal agent model Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort
title_fullStr The theory of incentives the principal agent model Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort
title_full_unstemmed The theory of incentives the principal agent model Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort
title_short The theory of incentives
title_sort the theory of incentives the principal agent model
title_sub the principal agent model
topic BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General bisacsh
Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd
Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd
Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd
topic_facet BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General
Wirtschaftstheorie
Agency-Theorie
Anreiz
url https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829453
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