Auction theory
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
San Diego
Academic Press
[2008]
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100 | 1 | |a Krishna, Vijay |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Auction theory |c Vijay Krishna |
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500 | |a Das Online-Erscheinungsjahr wurde der Titelliste vom Verlag entnommen | ||
505 | 8 | |a Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory | |
534 | |c 2003 | ||
650 | 4 | |a Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques | |
650 | 4 | |a Jeux, Theorie des | |
650 | 7 | |a MATHEMATICS / Game Theory |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 7 | |a Auctions / Mathematical models |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Game theory |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Speltheorie |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Veilingen |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Leilao (modelos matematicos) |2 larpcal | |
650 | 7 | |a Teoria dos jogos |2 larpcal | |
650 | 4 | |a Auctions |x Mathematical models |a Game theory | |
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689 | 1 | |8 2\p |5 DE-604 | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Elektronische Reproduktion von |a Krishna, Vijay |t Auction theory |d San Diego : Academic Press, 2003 |z 0-12-426297-X |z 978-0-12-426297-3 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Krishna, Vijay |
author_facet | Krishna, Vijay |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Krishna, Vijay |
author_variant | v k vk |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV045342516 |
collection | ZDB-4-ENC ZDB-33-ESD |
contents | Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-4-ENC)ocn213298431 (OCoLC)213298431 (DE-599)BVBBV045342516 |
dewey-full | 519.3 |
dewey-hundreds | 500 - Natural sciences and mathematics |
dewey-ones | 519 - Probabilities and applied mathematics |
dewey-raw | 519.3 |
dewey-search | 519.3 |
dewey-sort | 3519.3 |
dewey-tens | 510 - Mathematics |
discipline | Mathematik |
format | Electronic eBook |
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id | DE-604.BV045342516 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:15:27Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780080475967 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030729219 |
oclc_num | 213298431 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-188 |
owner_facet | DE-188 |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 303 Seiten) Illustrationen |
psigel | ZDB-4-ENC ZDB-33-ESD |
publishDate | 2008 |
publishDateSearch | 2008 |
publishDateSort | 2008 |
publisher | Academic Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Krishna, Vijay Verfasser aut Auction theory Vijay Krishna San Diego Academic Press [2008] 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 303 Seiten) Illustrationen txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Das Online-Erscheinungsjahr wurde der Titelliste vom Verlag entnommen Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory 2003 Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques Jeux, Theorie des MATHEMATICS / Game Theory bisacsh Auctions / Mathematical models fast Game theory fast Speltheorie gtt Veilingen gtt Leilao (modelos matematicos) larpcal Teoria dos jogos larpcal Auctions Mathematical models Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd rswk-swf Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 s Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s 1\p DE-604 Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 s 2\p DE-604 Elektronische Reproduktion von Krishna, Vijay Auction theory San Diego : Academic Press, 2003 0-12-426297-X 978-0-12-426297-3 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780124262973 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Krishna, Vijay Auction theory Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques Jeux, Theorie des MATHEMATICS / Game Theory bisacsh Auctions / Mathematical models fast Game theory fast Speltheorie gtt Veilingen gtt Leilao (modelos matematicos) larpcal Teoria dos jogos larpcal Auctions Mathematical models Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4140474-9 (DE-588)4732699-2 (DE-588)4125859-9 |
title | Auction theory |
title_auth | Auction theory |
title_exact_search | Auction theory |
title_full | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
title_fullStr | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
title_full_unstemmed | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
title_short | Auction theory |
title_sort | auction theory |
topic | Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques Jeux, Theorie des MATHEMATICS / Game Theory bisacsh Auctions / Mathematical models fast Game theory fast Speltheorie gtt Veilingen gtt Leilao (modelos matematicos) larpcal Teoria dos jogos larpcal Auctions Mathematical models Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd |
topic_facet | Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques Jeux, Theorie des MATHEMATICS / Game Theory Auctions / Mathematical models Game theory Speltheorie Veilingen Leilao (modelos matematicos) Teoria dos jogos Auctions Mathematical models Game theory Spieltheorie Unvollkommene Information Auktionstheorie Auktion |
url | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780124262973 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT krishnavijay auctiontheory |