Auction theory

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1. Verfasser: Krishna, Vijay (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: San Diego Academic Press [2008]
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505 8 |a Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory 
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Datensatz im Suchindex

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author Krishna, Vijay
author_facet Krishna, Vijay
author_role aut
author_sort Krishna, Vijay
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building Verbundindex
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contents Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
ctrlnum (ZDB-4-ENC)ocn213298431
(OCoLC)213298431
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dewey-full 519.3
dewey-hundreds 500 - Natural sciences and mathematics
dewey-ones 519 - Probabilities and applied mathematics
dewey-raw 519.3
dewey-search 519.3
dewey-sort 3519.3
dewey-tens 510 - Mathematics
discipline Mathematik
format Electronic
eBook
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spelling Krishna, Vijay Verfasser aut
Auction theory Vijay Krishna
San Diego Academic Press [2008]
1 Online-Ressource (xi, 303 Seiten) Illustrationen
txt rdacontent
c rdamedia
cr rdacarrier
Das Online-Erscheinungsjahr wurde der Titelliste vom Verlag entnommen
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
2003
Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques
Jeux, Theorie des
MATHEMATICS / Game Theory bisacsh
Auctions / Mathematical models fast
Game theory fast
Speltheorie gtt
Veilingen gtt
Leilao (modelos matematicos) larpcal
Teoria dos jogos larpcal
Auctions Mathematical models Game theory
Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf
Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd rswk-swf
Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd rswk-swf
Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd rswk-swf
Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 s
Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 s
Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s
1\p DE-604
Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 s
2\p DE-604
Elektronische Reproduktion von Krishna, Vijay Auction theory San Diego : Academic Press, 2003 0-12-426297-X 978-0-12-426297-3
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780124262973 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk
2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk
spellingShingle Krishna, Vijay
Auction theory
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques
Jeux, Theorie des
MATHEMATICS / Game Theory bisacsh
Auctions / Mathematical models fast
Game theory fast
Speltheorie gtt
Veilingen gtt
Leilao (modelos matematicos) larpcal
Teoria dos jogos larpcal
Auctions Mathematical models Game theory
Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd
Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd
Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd
Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)4056243-8
(DE-588)4140474-9
(DE-588)4732699-2
(DE-588)4125859-9
title Auction theory
title_auth Auction theory
title_exact_search Auction theory
title_full Auction theory Vijay Krishna
title_fullStr Auction theory Vijay Krishna
title_full_unstemmed Auction theory Vijay Krishna
title_short Auction theory
title_sort auction theory
topic Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques
Jeux, Theorie des
MATHEMATICS / Game Theory bisacsh
Auctions / Mathematical models fast
Game theory fast
Speltheorie gtt
Veilingen gtt
Leilao (modelos matematicos) larpcal
Teoria dos jogos larpcal
Auctions Mathematical models Game theory
Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd
Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd
Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd
Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd
topic_facet Vente aux encheres / Modeles mathematiques
Jeux, Theorie des
MATHEMATICS / Game Theory
Auctions / Mathematical models
Game theory
Speltheorie
Veilingen
Leilao (modelos matematicos)
Teoria dos jogos
Auctions Mathematical models Game theory
Spieltheorie
Unvollkommene Information
Auktionstheorie
Auktion
url https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780124262973
work_keys_str_mv AT krishnavijay auctiontheory