The phenomenal basis of intentionality

Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once w...

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1. Verfasser: Mendelovici, Angela A. 1982- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: New York, NY Oxford University Press 2018
Schriftenreihe:Philosophy of mind
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Datensatz im Suchindex

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series2 Philosophy of mind
spelling Mendelovici, Angela A. 1982- Verfasser aut
The phenomenal basis of intentionality Angela Mendelovici
New York, NY Oxford University Press 2018
txt rdacontent
c rdamedia
cr rdacarrier
Philosophy of mind
Previously issued in print: 2018
Includes bibliographical references and index
Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Phenomenology
Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd rswk-swf
Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd rswk-swf
Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 s
Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 s
1\p DE-604
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780190863807
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext
1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk
spellingShingle Mendelovici, Angela A. 1982-
The phenomenal basis of intentionality
Includes bibliographical references and index
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Phenomenology
Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd
Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)4027264-3
(DE-588)4045660-2
title The phenomenal basis of intentionality
title_auth The phenomenal basis of intentionality
title_exact_search The phenomenal basis of intentionality
title_full The phenomenal basis of intentionality Angela Mendelovici
title_fullStr The phenomenal basis of intentionality Angela Mendelovici
title_full_unstemmed The phenomenal basis of intentionality Angela Mendelovici
title_short The phenomenal basis of intentionality
title_sort the phenomenal basis of intentionality
topic Intentionality (Philosophy)
Phenomenology
Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd
Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd
topic_facet Intentionality (Philosophy)
Phenomenology
Intentionalität
Phänomenologie
url https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001
work_keys_str_mv AT mendeloviciangelaa thephenomenalbasisofintentionality