The phenomenal basis of intentionality
Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once w...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
2018
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| Schriftenreihe: | Philosophy of mind
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
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| Zusammenfassung: | Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles |
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| Beschreibung: | Previously issued in print: 2018 |
| ISBN: | 9780190863838 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001 |