No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism

It is becoming increasingly apparent that Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), long known as a student, friend and translator of Wittgenstein, was herself one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. No Morality, No Self examines her two best-known papers, in which she advanced her mo...

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1. Verfasser: Doyle, James 1963- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. ; London, England Harvard University Press [2018]
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520 |a It is becoming increasingly apparent that Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), long known as a student, friend and translator of Wittgenstein, was herself one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. No Morality, No Self examines her two best-known papers, in which she advanced her most amazing theses. In 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (1958), she claimed that the term moral, understood as picking out a special, sui generis category, is literally senseless and should therefore be abandoned. In 'The First Person' (1975), she maintained that the word 'I' is not a referring expression: in other words, its function in the language is not to pick out the speaker, or 'the self' - or any entity whatsoever. Both papers are considered influential, and are frequently cited; but their main claims, and many of their arguments, have been widely misunderstood. In this book James Doyle shows that once various errors of interpretation have been cleared away, the claims can be seen to be far more plausible, and the arguments far more compelling, than even her defenders have realized. Philosophers often seek attention by making startling claims which are subsequently revealed as little more than commonplaces wrapped in hyperbole. Doyle's book makes it clear that here, in her greatest papers, Anscombe achieves something vanishingly rare in philosophy: a persuasive case for genuinely unsettling and profound conclusions. The two lines of argument, seemingly so disparate, are also shown to be connected by Anscombe's deep opposition to the Cartesian picture of the mind.... 
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Datensatz im Suchindex

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adam_text NO MORALITY, NO SELF / DOYLE, JAMESYYD1963 NOVEMBER 18-YYEAUTHOR : 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS PART ONE. NO MORALITY: MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1958): VIRTUE ETHICS, EUDAIMONISM, AND THE GREEKS THE INVENTION OF MORALITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSEQUENTIALISM THE MISGUIDED PROJECT OF VINDICATING MORALITY THE FUTILITY OF SEEKING THE EXTENSION OF A WORD WITH NO INTENSION WHAT S REALLY WRONG WITH THE VOCABULARY OF MORALITY? ASSESSING MMP PART TWO: NO SELF: THE FIRST PERSON (1975): THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM FOR ACCOUNTS OF I AS A DEVICE OF SELF-REFERENCE IS THE FUNDAMENTAL REFERENCE RULE FOR I THE KEY TO EXPLAINING FIRST PERSON SELF-REFERENCE? RUMFITT S SOLUTION TO THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM CAN WE MAKE SENSE OF A NON-REFERENTIAL ACCOUNT OF I ? STRATEGIES FOR SAVING I AS A SINGULAR TERM: DOMESTICATING FP AND DEFLATING REFERENCE THE FIRST PERSON AND ABSTRACTION EPILOGUE: THE ANTI-CARTESIAN BASIS OF ANSCOMBE S SCEPTICISM DIESES SCHRIFTSTUECK WURDE MASCHINELL ERZEUGT.
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spellingShingle Doyle, James 1963-
No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism
Anscombe, G. E. M. (Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret)
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1919-2001 (DE-588)120712016 gnd
Ethics Philosophy
Self (Philosophy)
Skepticism
Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)120712016
(DE-588)4055225-1
title No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism
title_auth No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism
title_exact_search No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism
title_full No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism James Doyle
title_fullStr No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism James Doyle
title_full_unstemmed No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism James Doyle
title_short No morality, no self
title_sort no morality no self anscombe s radical skepticism
title_sub Anscombe's radical skepticism
topic Anscombe, G. E. M. (Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret)
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1919-2001 (DE-588)120712016 gnd
Ethics Philosophy
Self (Philosophy)
Skepticism
Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd
topic_facet Anscombe, G. E. M. (Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret)
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1919-2001
Ethics Philosophy
Self (Philosophy)
Skepticism
Skeptizismus
url http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030185123&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
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