Governance and the law
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Titel: Governance and the law
Autor:
Jahr: 2017
Contents
xiii Foreword
xv Acknowledgments
xix Abbreviations
1 Overview: World Development Report 2017:
Governance and the Law
2 Improving governance to meet today s development challenges
5 Drivers of effectiveness: Commitment, coordination, and cooperation
12 Levers for change: Contestability, incentives, preferences and beliefs
19 Drivers of change: Elite bargains, citizen engagement, and international influence
29 Rethinking governance for development
32 Navigating this Report
33 Notes
34 References
39 Part I: Rethinking governance for development:
A conceptual framework
40 Chapter 1: Governance for development: The challenges
40 Understanding development policy: Proximate factors and underlying determinants
43 Development objectives... and constraints
48 Governance for the bottom half
48 Notes
48 References
51 Chapter 2: Enhancing governance for development: Why policies fail
52 Diverse pathways to success: Moving beyond institutional transplants
53 Drivers of effectiveness: Commitment, coordination, and cooperation
58 Policy effectiveness in the presence of power asymmetries
65 Levers for change: Incentives, preferences and beliefs, and contestability
72 A dynamic process: Drivers of change and the role of law
73 Notes
73 References
77 Spotlight 1: Corruption
80 Spotlight 2: The governance challenges of managing risks
V
83 Chapter 3: The role of law
84 Law and the policy arena
86 Ordering behavior: The command role of law
91 Ordering power: The constitutive role of law
93 Ordering contestation: The role of law in change
95 Getting to the rule of law
98 Notes
98 References
102 Spotlight 3: How do effective and equitable legal institutions
emerge?
109 Part II: Governance for development
110 Chapter 4: Governance for security
110 Can governance solve the problem of violence in society?
111 Security, governance, and power are tightly interlinked
116 Governance can improve security in four ways
123 Conclusion
123 Notes
124 References
130 Spotlight 4: Wartime governance
133 Spotlight 5: Crime
137 Chapter 5: Governance for growth
137 How policy capture slows economic growth
138 How governance matters to growth: A microeconomic perspective
141 How policies are affected by undue influence from powerful groups
145 Policy design under risk of capture
146 How the design of public agencies mediates the influence of powerful groups
150 Finding the right approach
152 Notes
153 References
159 Spotlight 6: The middle-income trap
163 Spotlight 7: Public-private partnerships
167 Chapter 6: Governance for equity
170 Two key policy areas that matter for equity: Investing in public goods and
expanding opportunities
171 Equity and institutional functions: The role of commitment and cooperation
173 How policies to promote equity can be affected by power asymmetries
178 Leveling the playing field and making governance more responsive to all
182 Improving policy effectiveness by taking into account asymmetries in bargaining
power
183 Notes
184 References
189 Spotlight 8: Service delivery: Education and health
195 Part III: Drivers of change
196 Chapter 7: Elite bargaining and adaptation
196 Understanding elite bargains
203 Elite bargains and uneven state capacity
vi | CONTENTS
205 Broadening the policy arena to enhance elite power
207 When binding rules for accountability serve as political insurance
208 When elites adapt through rules-based mechanisms
212 Entry points for change through elite adaptation
213 Notes
213 References
217 Spotlight 9: Decentralization
220 Spotlight JO: Public service reform
225 Chapter 8: Citizens as agents of change
226 Bringing change through the ballot box
230 Bringing change through political organization: The role of political parties
234 Bringing change through social organization
239 The role of induced participation and public deliberation
241 Entry points for change: Understanding citizen agency as a collective action
problem
241 Notes
242 References
247 Spotlight 77: From transparency to accountability through citizen
engagement
252 Spotlight 12: The media
257 Chapter 9: Governance in an interconnected world
257 Transnationalism and the domestic policy arena
259 Transnational rules and regulations: Enhanced cooperation and focal points for
change
266 Foreign aid and governance
273 Notes
274 References
278 Spotlight 13: Illicit financial flows
Boxes
O.i 3 What is governance?
O.z 4 Governance for what? Achieving
the goals of security, growth, and
equity
8 The idea of power and the power of
ideas
10 Why some people see red when they
hear green growth
0,5 12 The need to strengthen incentives to
gather development data
0.6 14 Legal and normative pluralism
15 Transitions to the rule of law
18 The rules game : Paying attention to
where the action is
20 Elites and citizens: Who is who in the
policy arena?
21 Who are elites, and what do they do?
Results from a survey of elites in 12
countries
25 Direct democracy delayed women s
voting rights in Switzerland
28 Domestic resource mobilization,
foreign aid, and accountability
30 What does the WDR 2017 framework
mean for action? The policy
effectiveness cycle
31 Lessons for reformers from the rules
game : How is legitimacy ultimately
built?
41 What is governance?
1.2 43 Governance for what? Achieving the
goals of security, growth, and equity
1.3 46 Discontinuities of the state
CONTENTS | vii
53 The microfoundations of commitment,
coordination, and cooperation: A
perspective from game theory
2.2 55 Trust in institutions stems from
delivering on commitments
2-3 59 Game theory and the roots of political
power
2.4 60 Who is who in the policy arena: The
case of Bolivia s social policy
2.5 62 Transaction costs, incomplete contracts,
and political agreements: Why land
redistribution policies often fail
2.6 63 How capacity and norms influence and
are influenced by power asymmetries
2.7 64 The rules game : Paying attention to
where the action is
2.8 65 Factors that make sustaining
cooperation over time more likely
2.9 66 Voluntary compliance and the building
blocks of legitimacy
2.10 67 How an international commission
enabled a credible commitment to fight
criminals impunity in Guatemala
2.11 69 How the introduction of electronic
voting in Brazil reshaped the policy
arena and led to more pro-poor policies
2.12 71 The rules game : Lessons for reformers
3.1 84 What is law?
3.2 85 Legal and normative pluralism
3.3 87 Legal origins: Theory and practice
3.4 96 Transitions to the rule of law
3-5 97 Understanding the role of law in
context
4.1 112 How modern governance was born
offers lessons for today s fragile
countries
4.2 114 The persistent links among gender-
based violence, power, and norms
4.3 115 Several factors can cause conflicts, and
they often combine
5.1 143 Why some people see red when they
hear green growth
5.2 152 Participatory mechanisms in policy
design: The Bulldozer Initiative in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
6.1 168 What is equity?
6.2 169 A vicious cycle: How inequality begets
inequality
6.3 174 Efforts to expand and secure access to
land often lead to capture
6.4 175 Defining and measuring clientelism
6.5 181 Local elites can capture public spending
despite participatory programs
6.6 183 Designing social safety nets to account
for asymmetries in bargaining power
198 Expert survey to identify elites
7.2 202 When do elites have incentives to
introduce rules for contestability and
accountability?
7.3 204 Pockets of effectiveness in Nigeria
7.4 211 Female elites and female leaders
236 Social movements and bottom-up
pressures for reform: Right to
information legislation in India
8.2 237 The mobilization of women and
promotion of gender-based policies in
postconflict settings: The case of Sub-
Saharan Africa
262 Legitimizing the second-best:
Governance options for global public
goods and the Paris Agreement on
climate change
266 Aid as a delivery mechanism for
transnational rules and ideas
270 The impact of aid on domestic resource
mobilization: What does the evidence
say?
271 Beyond technocratic approaches:
Opening the door to considerations
of politics and power in development
policy
Figures
6 Long-term growth is less about how
fast one grows than about not tripping
along the way
9 A more even balance of power is
associated with positive security
outcomes
9 The value of political connections:
Indonesia during President Suharto s era
11 Principals, agents, and clients:
Accountability for sale
16 Recruitments of civil servants increased
exponentially in Tunisia and the Arab
Republic of Egypt in the aftermath of
the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011
17 Formal avenues for broad-based
participation in regulatory decision
making are limited in low- and middle-
income countries
19 WDR 2017 framework: Governance, law,
and development
viii | CONTENTS
21
24
26
27
30
41
45
52
56
6o
69
70
72
79
87
91
92
96
103
105
Elite actors within national ruling
coalitions vary greatly across countries
and over time
Electoral democracies are spreading, but
the integrity of elections is declining
After decades of progress, civic space is
shrinking globally
Aid is a large share of GDP and
government revenue in many
developing countries
The policy effectiveness cycle
Despite declining under-5 child
mortality rates, inequality among and
within countries is still sizable
Economic growth requires security
Despite similar rules for the
management of natural resource
revenue in Chile and Mongolia, Chile s
expenditure patterns reveal a stronger
commitment to compliance
Welfare is higher for citizens under
commitment in the lab game
Formal and actual policy networks in
Bolivia, 2010
An electronic ballot made it much easier
than a paper ballot for those with little
or no education to cast their vote in
Brazil
Electronic voting reduced the number
of invalid votes in Brazil
WDR 20t7 framework: Governance, law,
and development
Development accounts for only about
half of the variation in control of
corruption
Changes in investor protection and
creditor rights have little impact on
economic outcomes
Constitutions have become ubiquitous,
but they are often replaced or amended
In every country, there is a gap between
the laws on the books and the laws
implemented, but high-income OECD
countries generally do better than low-
and middle-income countries
The rule of law is strongly correlated
with high income
Although high-income OECD countries
generally have well-functioning legal
institutions, the relationship between
institutional quality and income varies
in developing countries
The correlation is weak between
de jure and de facto measures of judicial
independence
4.1 111 Violence inflicts a high cost on
development
4.2 111 Violent conflict is associated with a
reduction in GDP per capita
4.3 118 An even balance of power is associated
with positive security outcomes
4.4 119 Constraining state power ensures
security
4.5 121 Recruitment of civil servants increased
exponentially in Tunisia and the
Arab Republic of Egypt in the aftermath
of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011
S5.1 134 Homicide rates across Europe have
declined dramatically over the last 800
years
5.1 138 Length of time needed for firms to
obtain a constmction permit varies
widely
5.2 139 Per capita income and governance are
correlated
5-3
5-4
140 Medium-term growth and governance
are not correlated
142 In Indonesia, the stock value of
politically connected firms fell when
the connection was jeopardized
5.5 149 Formal checks and balances are weaker
in low- and middle-income countries
5.6 150 Formal avenues for broad-based
participation in regulatory decision
making are limited in low- and middle-
income countries
56.1 159 Many countries have not converged
toward higher incomes
56.2 161 Checks on corruption and
accountability institutions improve
more in countries that escape upper-
middle-income status to achieve high-
income status than in countries that are
non-escapees
S7.1 164 Private participation in infrastructure
projects in developing countries
remains limited
6.1 168 States can improve equity by
intervening in the distribution of final
outcomes through taxes and transfers
and by providing access to basic
services
B6.2.1 169 Capture is associated with lower levels
of commitment
6.2 171 When commitment is low, countries
exhibit low compliance (high shadow
economy)
6.3 172 Fear of sanctions and participation in
decision-making processes promote
cooperation
CONTENTS
6.4 175 A politician can become an agent of the
provider in clientelist settings
6.5 176 In some countries in the Middle East
and North Africa, a large proportion of
citizens believe that connections are as
important as or even more important
than professional qualifications in
obtaining a government job
6.6 177 Unofficial payments for education
and health services are widespread in
Europe and Central Asia
6.7 181 Empowering parents with school-based
management training helps lessen
capture (teacher absenteeism) in Kenya
1 7.1 198 Elite actors within national ruling
coalitions vary greatly across countries
and over time
200 Preferences of economic elites predict
policy adoption more than do citizen
preferences in the United States
201 When the cost of losing power is high,
elites are more likely to reject electoral
results that support the opposition and
are less likely to move toward rules-
based contestability and accountability
202 The interaction between political
uncertainty and the cost of losing
power
205 Horizontal and vertical accountability
become more common as party
institutionalization increases
210 Greater ideological unity among
elites is associated with greater
cohesion of the ruling coalition, as
well as more institutionalized elite
interactions
212 When economic power maps onto
political power, there are fewer
institutional checks on power
227 In Kenya, elections changed the
incentives of the ruling elites, reducing
the scope of ethnic favoritism
227 Electoral democracies are spreading, but
the integrity of elections is declining
228 Although citizens value elections
as an important route to economic
development, less than half of
respondents worldwide have
confidence in the integrity of elections
228 Voter turnout worldwide from 1945
to 2015 indicates unequal citizen
participation and the risk of biased
representation of policy preferences
231 Although the spread of multiparty
systems has increased opportunities
for citizen engagement, dominant
parties place de facto limits on electoral
competition
8. o 231 Programmatic parties perform better
than clientelist parties in improving the
quality of public services, especially in
competitive party systems
232 Programmatic parties tend to emerge
at higher levels of development,
but significant variation exists
among countries at similar stages of
development
233 Dominant party systems are less
likely than competitive systems to
introduce legal provisions for public
funding, suggesting efforts to reduce
contestability
234 Political parties are on average the least-
trusted political institution worldwide
235 After decades of progress, civic space
is shrinking globally, driven by higher
government restrictions on media and
CSO entry
235 Taking advantage of the digital
revolution, social movements are
increasingly organized across national
boundaries
237 The rate of political participation of
women is higher in countries emerging
from conflict
I . 8 2 238 In Africa, postconflict countries have
been more likely to integrate women s
rights in their constitutions
240 In Brazil, online voting in participatory
budgeting can reinforce existing
inequalities
248 Transparency is not enough: Three
conditions for the effectiveness of
information initiatives
9.: 258 International actors can affect the
domestic policy arena by changing the
dynamics of contestation, shifting actor
incentives, or shaping actor norms
260 Regulations and legal agreements have
proliferated across borders
264 The Rights Revolution has led to a
global spread of rights-related norms,
facilitated and supported by global
treaties and agreements
265 Human rights treaties are spreading,
but de facto changes in state
performance are lagging behind
265 Gender quota laws have spread
worldwide since 1990
x CONTENTS
268 Aid makes up a large share of GDP and 268 Low- and lower-middle-income
revenue in many developing countries countries vary greatly in the amount of
aid received and improvement in GDP
per capita
Maps
44
B1.3.1 46
Violence is a major problem in
37 countries
State presence in Bolivia in selected
intervention domains and composite
density, circa 2010
267 Aid flows amounted to over US$161
billion from donor countries to
recipient countries in 2014
Tables
7 Three institutional functions—
commitment, coordination, and
cooperation—are essential to the
effectiveness of policies
0.2 29 Three principles for rethinking
governance for development
B2.1.1 53 Coordination and cooperation as
modeled in game theory
B2.2.1 55 Sources of trust
B2.3.1 59 Payoffs to cooperation or
noncooperation
2.1 71 Three principles for rethinking
governance for development
S11 249 Positive and negative outcomes of
citizen engagement
9.1 261 Transnational actors, instruments, and
mechanisms for influencing domestic
governance through incentives,
preferences, and contestability
S13 279 Actions generating illicit financial flows
CONTENTS I xi
|
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dewey-sort | 3338.9 |
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discipline | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV044220727 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-24T05:54:11Z |
institution | BVB |
institution_GND | (DE-588)121364-7 |
isbn | 9781464809507 9781464809521 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029626703 |
oclc_num | 976427687 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-11 DE-188 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR |
owner_facet | DE-11 DE-188 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR |
physical | xxi, 281 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme, Karten |
publishDate | 2017 |
publishDateSearch | 2017 |
publishDateSort | 2017 |
publisher | World bank group |
record_format | marc |
series | World development report |
series2 | World development report |
spellingShingle | Governance and the law World development report Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 gnd Entwicklungspolitik (DE-588)4014957-2 gnd Governance (DE-588)4639012-1 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4048737-4 (DE-588)4014957-2 (DE-588)4639012-1 |
title | Governance and the law |
title_auth | Governance and the law |
title_exact_search | Governance and the law |
title_full | Governance and the law |
title_fullStr | Governance and the law |
title_full_unstemmed | Governance and the law |
title_short | Governance and the law |
title_sort | governance and the law |
topic | Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 gnd Entwicklungspolitik (DE-588)4014957-2 gnd Governance (DE-588)4639012-1 gnd |
topic_facet | Recht Entwicklungspolitik Governance |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029626703&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002569694 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT weltbank governanceandthelaw |