Governance and the law

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Veröffentlicht: Washington DC World bank group [2017]
Schriftenreihe:World development report 2017
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adam_text Titel: Governance and the law Autor: Jahr: 2017 Contents xiii Foreword xv Acknowledgments xix Abbreviations 1 Overview: World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law 2 Improving governance to meet today s development challenges 5 Drivers of effectiveness: Commitment, coordination, and cooperation 12 Levers for change: Contestability, incentives, preferences and beliefs 19 Drivers of change: Elite bargains, citizen engagement, and international influence 29 Rethinking governance for development 32 Navigating this Report 33 Notes 34 References 39 Part I: Rethinking governance for development: A conceptual framework 40 Chapter 1: Governance for development: The challenges 40 Understanding development policy: Proximate factors and underlying determinants 43 Development objectives... and constraints 48 Governance for the bottom half 48 Notes 48 References 51 Chapter 2: Enhancing governance for development: Why policies fail 52 Diverse pathways to success: Moving beyond institutional transplants 53 Drivers of effectiveness: Commitment, coordination, and cooperation 58 Policy effectiveness in the presence of power asymmetries 65 Levers for change: Incentives, preferences and beliefs, and contestability 72 A dynamic process: Drivers of change and the role of law 73 Notes 73 References 77 Spotlight 1: Corruption 80 Spotlight 2: The governance challenges of managing risks V 83 Chapter 3: The role of law 84 Law and the policy arena 86 Ordering behavior: The command role of law 91 Ordering power: The constitutive role of law 93 Ordering contestation: The role of law in change 95 Getting to the rule of law 98 Notes 98 References 102 Spotlight 3: How do effective and equitable legal institutions emerge? 109 Part II: Governance for development 110 Chapter 4: Governance for security 110 Can governance solve the problem of violence in society? 111 Security, governance, and power are tightly interlinked 116 Governance can improve security in four ways 123 Conclusion 123 Notes 124 References 130 Spotlight 4: Wartime governance 133 Spotlight 5: Crime 137 Chapter 5: Governance for growth 137 How policy capture slows economic growth 138 How governance matters to growth: A microeconomic perspective 141 How policies are affected by undue influence from powerful groups 145 Policy design under risk of capture 146 How the design of public agencies mediates the influence of powerful groups 150 Finding the right approach 152 Notes 153 References 159 Spotlight 6: The middle-income trap 163 Spotlight 7: Public-private partnerships 167 Chapter 6: Governance for equity 170 Two key policy areas that matter for equity: Investing in public goods and expanding opportunities 171 Equity and institutional functions: The role of commitment and cooperation 173 How policies to promote equity can be affected by power asymmetries 178 Leveling the playing field and making governance more responsive to all 182 Improving policy effectiveness by taking into account asymmetries in bargaining power 183 Notes 184 References 189 Spotlight 8: Service delivery: Education and health 195 Part III: Drivers of change 196 Chapter 7: Elite bargaining and adaptation 196 Understanding elite bargains 203 Elite bargains and uneven state capacity vi | CONTENTS 205 Broadening the policy arena to enhance elite power 207 When binding rules for accountability serve as political insurance 208 When elites adapt through rules-based mechanisms 212 Entry points for change through elite adaptation 213 Notes 213 References 217 Spotlight 9: Decentralization 220 Spotlight JO: Public service reform 225 Chapter 8: Citizens as agents of change 226 Bringing change through the ballot box 230 Bringing change through political organization: The role of political parties 234 Bringing change through social organization 239 The role of induced participation and public deliberation 241 Entry points for change: Understanding citizen agency as a collective action problem 241 Notes 242 References 247 Spotlight 77: From transparency to accountability through citizen engagement 252 Spotlight 12: The media 257 Chapter 9: Governance in an interconnected world 257 Transnationalism and the domestic policy arena 259 Transnational rules and regulations: Enhanced cooperation and focal points for change 266 Foreign aid and governance 273 Notes 274 References 278 Spotlight 13: Illicit financial flows Boxes O.i 3 What is governance? O.z 4 Governance for what? Achieving the goals of security, growth, and equity 8 The idea of power and the power of ideas 10 Why some people see red when they hear green growth 0,5 12 The need to strengthen incentives to gather development data 0.6 14 Legal and normative pluralism 15 Transitions to the rule of law 18 The rules game : Paying attention to where the action is 20 Elites and citizens: Who is who in the policy arena? 21 Who are elites, and what do they do? Results from a survey of elites in 12 countries 25 Direct democracy delayed women s voting rights in Switzerland 28 Domestic resource mobilization, foreign aid, and accountability 30 What does the WDR 2017 framework mean for action? The policy effectiveness cycle 31 Lessons for reformers from the rules game : How is legitimacy ultimately built? 41 What is governance? 1.2 43 Governance for what? Achieving the goals of security, growth, and equity 1.3 46 Discontinuities of the state CONTENTS | vii 53 The microfoundations of commitment, coordination, and cooperation: A perspective from game theory 2.2 55 Trust in institutions stems from delivering on commitments 2-3 59 Game theory and the roots of political power 2.4 60 Who is who in the policy arena: The case of Bolivia s social policy 2.5 62 Transaction costs, incomplete contracts, and political agreements: Why land redistribution policies often fail 2.6 63 How capacity and norms influence and are influenced by power asymmetries 2.7 64 The rules game : Paying attention to where the action is 2.8 65 Factors that make sustaining cooperation over time more likely 2.9 66 Voluntary compliance and the building blocks of legitimacy 2.10 67 How an international commission enabled a credible commitment to fight criminals impunity in Guatemala 2.11 69 How the introduction of electronic voting in Brazil reshaped the policy arena and led to more pro-poor policies 2.12 71 The rules game : Lessons for reformers 3.1 84 What is law? 3.2 85 Legal and normative pluralism 3.3 87 Legal origins: Theory and practice 3.4 96 Transitions to the rule of law 3-5 97 Understanding the role of law in context 4.1 112 How modern governance was born offers lessons for today s fragile countries 4.2 114 The persistent links among gender- based violence, power, and norms 4.3 115 Several factors can cause conflicts, and they often combine 5.1 143 Why some people see red when they hear green growth 5.2 152 Participatory mechanisms in policy design: The Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.1 168 What is equity? 6.2 169 A vicious cycle: How inequality begets inequality 6.3 174 Efforts to expand and secure access to land often lead to capture 6.4 175 Defining and measuring clientelism 6.5 181 Local elites can capture public spending despite participatory programs 6.6 183 Designing social safety nets to account for asymmetries in bargaining power 198 Expert survey to identify elites 7.2 202 When do elites have incentives to introduce rules for contestability and accountability? 7.3 204 Pockets of effectiveness in Nigeria 7.4 211 Female elites and female leaders 236 Social movements and bottom-up pressures for reform: Right to information legislation in India 8.2 237 The mobilization of women and promotion of gender-based policies in postconflict settings: The case of Sub- Saharan Africa 262 Legitimizing the second-best: Governance options for global public goods and the Paris Agreement on climate change 266 Aid as a delivery mechanism for transnational rules and ideas 270 The impact of aid on domestic resource mobilization: What does the evidence say? 271 Beyond technocratic approaches: Opening the door to considerations of politics and power in development policy Figures 6 Long-term growth is less about how fast one grows than about not tripping along the way 9 A more even balance of power is associated with positive security outcomes 9 The value of political connections: Indonesia during President Suharto s era 11 Principals, agents, and clients: Accountability for sale 16 Recruitments of civil servants increased exponentially in Tunisia and the Arab Republic of Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 17 Formal avenues for broad-based participation in regulatory decision making are limited in low- and middle- income countries 19 WDR 2017 framework: Governance, law, and development viii | CONTENTS 21 24 26 27 30 41 45 52 56 6o 69 70 72 79 87 91 92 96 103 105 Elite actors within national ruling coalitions vary greatly across countries and over time Electoral democracies are spreading, but the integrity of elections is declining After decades of progress, civic space is shrinking globally Aid is a large share of GDP and government revenue in many developing countries The policy effectiveness cycle Despite declining under-5 child mortality rates, inequality among and within countries is still sizable Economic growth requires security Despite similar rules for the management of natural resource revenue in Chile and Mongolia, Chile s expenditure patterns reveal a stronger commitment to compliance Welfare is higher for citizens under commitment in the lab game Formal and actual policy networks in Bolivia, 2010 An electronic ballot made it much easier than a paper ballot for those with little or no education to cast their vote in Brazil Electronic voting reduced the number of invalid votes in Brazil WDR 20t7 framework: Governance, law, and development Development accounts for only about half of the variation in control of corruption Changes in investor protection and creditor rights have little impact on economic outcomes Constitutions have become ubiquitous, but they are often replaced or amended In every country, there is a gap between the laws on the books and the laws implemented, but high-income OECD countries generally do better than low- and middle-income countries The rule of law is strongly correlated with high income Although high-income OECD countries generally have well-functioning legal institutions, the relationship between institutional quality and income varies in developing countries The correlation is weak between de jure and de facto measures of judicial independence 4.1 111 Violence inflicts a high cost on development 4.2 111 Violent conflict is associated with a reduction in GDP per capita 4.3 118 An even balance of power is associated with positive security outcomes 4.4 119 Constraining state power ensures security 4.5 121 Recruitment of civil servants increased exponentially in Tunisia and the Arab Republic of Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 S5.1 134 Homicide rates across Europe have declined dramatically over the last 800 years 5.1 138 Length of time needed for firms to obtain a constmction permit varies widely 5.2 139 Per capita income and governance are correlated 5-3 5-4 140 Medium-term growth and governance are not correlated 142 In Indonesia, the stock value of politically connected firms fell when the connection was jeopardized 5.5 149 Formal checks and balances are weaker in low- and middle-income countries 5.6 150 Formal avenues for broad-based participation in regulatory decision making are limited in low- and middle- income countries 56.1 159 Many countries have not converged toward higher incomes 56.2 161 Checks on corruption and accountability institutions improve more in countries that escape upper- middle-income status to achieve high- income status than in countries that are non-escapees S7.1 164 Private participation in infrastructure projects in developing countries remains limited 6.1 168 States can improve equity by intervening in the distribution of final outcomes through taxes and transfers and by providing access to basic services B6.2.1 169 Capture is associated with lower levels of commitment 6.2 171 When commitment is low, countries exhibit low compliance (high shadow economy) 6.3 172 Fear of sanctions and participation in decision-making processes promote cooperation CONTENTS 6.4 175 A politician can become an agent of the provider in clientelist settings 6.5 176 In some countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a large proportion of citizens believe that connections are as important as or even more important than professional qualifications in obtaining a government job 6.6 177 Unofficial payments for education and health services are widespread in Europe and Central Asia 6.7 181 Empowering parents with school-based management training helps lessen capture (teacher absenteeism) in Kenya 1 7.1 198 Elite actors within national ruling coalitions vary greatly across countries and over time 200 Preferences of economic elites predict policy adoption more than do citizen preferences in the United States 201 When the cost of losing power is high, elites are more likely to reject electoral results that support the opposition and are less likely to move toward rules- based contestability and accountability 202 The interaction between political uncertainty and the cost of losing power 205 Horizontal and vertical accountability become more common as party institutionalization increases 210 Greater ideological unity among elites is associated with greater cohesion of the ruling coalition, as well as more institutionalized elite interactions 212 When economic power maps onto political power, there are fewer institutional checks on power 227 In Kenya, elections changed the incentives of the ruling elites, reducing the scope of ethnic favoritism 227 Electoral democracies are spreading, but the integrity of elections is declining 228 Although citizens value elections as an important route to economic development, less than half of respondents worldwide have confidence in the integrity of elections 228 Voter turnout worldwide from 1945 to 2015 indicates unequal citizen participation and the risk of biased representation of policy preferences 231 Although the spread of multiparty systems has increased opportunities for citizen engagement, dominant parties place de facto limits on electoral competition 8. o 231 Programmatic parties perform better than clientelist parties in improving the quality of public services, especially in competitive party systems 232 Programmatic parties tend to emerge at higher levels of development, but significant variation exists among countries at similar stages of development 233 Dominant party systems are less likely than competitive systems to introduce legal provisions for public funding, suggesting efforts to reduce contestability 234 Political parties are on average the least- trusted political institution worldwide 235 After decades of progress, civic space is shrinking globally, driven by higher government restrictions on media and CSO entry 235 Taking advantage of the digital revolution, social movements are increasingly organized across national boundaries 237 The rate of political participation of women is higher in countries emerging from conflict I . 8 2 238 In Africa, postconflict countries have been more likely to integrate women s rights in their constitutions 240 In Brazil, online voting in participatory budgeting can reinforce existing inequalities 248 Transparency is not enough: Three conditions for the effectiveness of information initiatives 9.: 258 International actors can affect the domestic policy arena by changing the dynamics of contestation, shifting actor incentives, or shaping actor norms 260 Regulations and legal agreements have proliferated across borders 264 The Rights Revolution has led to a global spread of rights-related norms, facilitated and supported by global treaties and agreements 265 Human rights treaties are spreading, but de facto changes in state performance are lagging behind 265 Gender quota laws have spread worldwide since 1990 x CONTENTS 268 Aid makes up a large share of GDP and 268 Low- and lower-middle-income revenue in many developing countries countries vary greatly in the amount of aid received and improvement in GDP per capita Maps 44 B1.3.1 46 Violence is a major problem in 37 countries State presence in Bolivia in selected intervention domains and composite density, circa 2010 267 Aid flows amounted to over US$161 billion from donor countries to recipient countries in 2014 Tables 7 Three institutional functions— commitment, coordination, and cooperation—are essential to the effectiveness of policies 0.2 29 Three principles for rethinking governance for development B2.1.1 53 Coordination and cooperation as modeled in game theory B2.2.1 55 Sources of trust B2.3.1 59 Payoffs to cooperation or noncooperation 2.1 71 Three principles for rethinking governance for development S11 249 Positive and negative outcomes of citizen engagement 9.1 261 Transnational actors, instruments, and mechanisms for influencing domestic governance through incentives, preferences, and contestability S13 279 Actions generating illicit financial flows CONTENTS I xi
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title Governance and the law
title_auth Governance and the law
title_exact_search Governance and the law
title_full Governance and the law
title_fullStr Governance and the law
title_full_unstemmed Governance and the law
title_short Governance and the law
title_sort governance and the law
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Entwicklungspolitik (DE-588)4014957-2 gnd
Governance (DE-588)4639012-1 gnd
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