Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships
Threats of mass revolts could effectively constrain a dictator's public policy if it were not for the collective-action problem. Mass revolts nevertheless happen, but they follow a stochastic pattern. We describe this pattern in a threshold model of collective action and integrate it into an ag...
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| 520 | 1 | |a Threats of mass revolts could effectively constrain a dictator's public policy if it were not for the collective-action problem. Mass revolts nevertheless happen, but they follow a stochastic pattern. We describe this pattern in a threshold model of collective action and integrate it into an agency model which demonstrates how mass revolts can impact on a winning coalition's incentives to keep backing an incumbent dictator. Having observed public policy and found a sufficiently high posterior probability of the dictator to be of a "bad" character, the winning coalition's members may exploit an incidentally happening mass revolt for escaping a loyalty trap that had otherwise prevented them from switching to disloyalty. While this explains why mass revolts sometimes happen to oust a dictator, the arising policy constraints in dictatorships may nevertheless be weak in practice. | |
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| spelling | Apolte, Thomas 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)120912236 aut Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships Thomas Apolte Münster Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, CIW – Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung September 2015 1 Online-Ressource (34 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Diskussionspapier / Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung 5/2015 Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache Threats of mass revolts could effectively constrain a dictator's public policy if it were not for the collective-action problem. Mass revolts nevertheless happen, but they follow a stochastic pattern. We describe this pattern in a threshold model of collective action and integrate it into an agency model which demonstrates how mass revolts can impact on a winning coalition's incentives to keep backing an incumbent dictator. Having observed public policy and found a sufficiently high posterior probability of the dictator to be of a "bad" character, the winning coalition's members may exploit an incidentally happening mass revolt for escaping a loyalty trap that had otherwise prevented them from switching to disloyalty. While this explains why mass revolts sometimes happen to oust a dictator, the arising policy constraints in dictatorships may nevertheless be weak in practice. Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung Diskussionspapier 5/2015 (DE-604)BV037441536 2015,5 https://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ciw/sites/ciw/files/dp-ciw_05_2015.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Apolte, Thomas 1960- Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships |
| title | Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships |
| title_auth | Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships |
| title_exact_search | Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships |
| title_full | Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships Thomas Apolte |
| title_fullStr | Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships Thomas Apolte |
| title_full_unstemmed | Autocracy and the public mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships Thomas Apolte |
| title_short | Autocracy and the public |
| title_sort | autocracy and the public mass revolts winning coalitions and policy control in dictatorships |
| title_sub | mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships |
| url | https://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ciw/sites/ciw/files/dp-ciw_05_2015.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV037441536 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT apoltethomas autocracyandthepublicmassrevoltswinningcoalitionsandpolicycontrolindictatorships |