Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account
Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and ag...
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| Sprache: | English |
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2016
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Free will and action explanation |b a non-causal, compatibilist account |c Scott Sehon |
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| 300 | |a XII, 239 Seiten | ||
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| 520 | |a Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is irreducibly teleological rather than causal. Part II applies the teleological account of action to free will and responsibility, arguing that the free actions-the ones for which we are directly responsible. It is then argued that this non-causal account of action undermines the appeal of incompatibilist arguments, arguments attempting to show that free will is not compatible with determinism.0Beyond this, Sehon argues that the non-causal compatibilist account works well in practice: it is in accord with our clear intuitions about cases, and it both explains and provides guidance in the cases where our intuitions are murkier | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1819767245013778432 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
1.
WHAT S
ATSTAKE
IN
THE
FREE
WILL
DEBATE?
1.1
CRITICISM
AND
PUNISHMENT
1.2
PRAISEAND
REWARD
1.3
REACTIVEATTITUDES
1.4
FREEWILLVS.MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY
PARTI.
THETELEOLOGICAL
ACCOUNTOFACTION
2.
TELEOLOGY
AND
INTERPRETATION
2.1
REASON
EXPLANATION
ASLRREDUCIBLY
TELEOLOGICAL
2.2
RATIONALIZABILITY
AND
INTERPRETATION
2.3
SOMEILLUSTRATIVE
EXAMPLES
2.4
MULTIPLE
GOALS
2.5
OMISSIONS
2.6
DEGREES
OFGOAL-DIRECTION
3.
RATIONALIZABILITY
AND
IRRATIONALITY
3.1
EMOTIONS
AND
AGENCY
3.2
IRRATIONAL
ACTIONS
3.3
IRRATIONAL
AGENTS
4.
OTHER
OBJECTIONS
TO
THE
TELEOLOGICAL
ACCOUNT
4.1
MELE SOBJECTION:
NORM
AND
THEMARTIANS
4.2
FIRSTPERSON
PERSPECTIVE
ANDTRANSPARENCY
4.3
THETRUTHMAKER
WORRY
4.4
SIMPLICITY
AND
MYSTERY
5.
RATIONALIZING
PRINCIPLES
AND
CAUSAL
EXPLANATION
5.1
THESYSTEMATIC
ANDUNAVOIDABLE
USEOFRATIONALIZING
PRINCIPLES
5.2
THENEEDFORACAUSALIST
EXPLANATION
5.3
POSSIBLECAUSALIST
EXPLANATIONS
6.
DEVIANT
CAUSAL
CHAINS
6.1
THENATURE
OFTHE
PROBLEM
6.2
ASUGGESTED
SOLUTION
FROM
MELE
6.3
SCHLOSSER
AND
CAUSATION
BYCONTENT
6.4
AGUILAR
AND
RELIABILITY
6.5
CONCLUSION
XI
7
8
13
15
20
25
25
27
29
32
34
36
39
40
42
47
56
56
63
66
70
74
74
77
79
90
90
93
98
103
107
VIII
CONTENTS
7. TBECOMMITMENTS
OFCOMMON-SENSE
PSYCHOLOGY
109
7.1
THEBASICARGUMENT
109
7.2
FIRSTPREMISE:NATUREOFTHECAUSALTHEORYOFACTION
111
7.3
THESECONDPREMISE:CAUSATIONANDREIFICATION
114
7.4
THETHIRDPREMISE:REIFICATIONANDEXISTENCE
121
7.5
THEARGUMENTREVISED
124
PART11.
THETELEOLOGICAL
ACCOUNTOFFREE
WILLANDRESPONSIBILITY
8.
APPLICATION
TOFREEWILL:NON-CAUSAL
COMPATIBILISM
129
8.1
THEBASICPROPOSAL
129
8.2
DETERMINISMANDFREEDOM
131
8.3
DEGREESOFFREEDOM
136
8.4
THEPHILOSOPHERS DISTINCTIONS
143
9.
IRRATIONAL
ACTIONS
AND
FREEDOM
145
9.1
STUPIDBEHAVIOR
146
9.2
IMMORALACTIONS
148
9.3
WEAKNESSOFWILL
152
9.4
CONCLUSION
158
10.
EXTRAORDINARY
CASES
159
10.1FRANKFURTCASES
159
10.2PSYCHOPATHS
163
10.3COERCION
167
10.4BRAINWASHING
170
10.5CONCLUSION
172
11.
HOWTHETELEOLOGICALACCOUNT
UNDERMINES
ARGUMENTS
FARINCOMPATIBLISM
174
11.1KANE S ULTIMATERESPONSIBILITY ARGUMENT
174
11.2THE COMPLETELYFIXED ARGUMENT
177
11.3THECONSEQUENCEARGUMENT
178
11.4FISCHERANDTHEBASICARGUMENT
183
11.5 COULDHAVEDONEOTHERWISE ARGUMENT
185
11.6MANIPULATIONARGUMENTS:PEREBOORN SFOURCASES
188
11.7CONCLUSION
194
12.
EPISTEMIC
PROBLEMS
FOROTHER
ACCOUNTS
OFFREEWILL
195
12.1KANE
196
12.2FISCHERANDRAVIZZA
203
12.3ANOBJECTIONCONSIDERED
207
12.4CONCLUSION
211
CONTENTS
IX
13. CONCLUDING
THOUGHTS
214
13.1
ISN TITOBVIOUS?
214
13.2
THE1RRELEVANCE
OFDETERMINISM
INORDINARY
PRACTICE
216
13.3
THEAPPEAL
OFINCOMPATIBILISM
219
13.4
WITTGENSTEIN S
FLY-BOTTLE
222
REFERENCES
225
INDEX
235
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Sehon, Scott Robert 1963- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)173951244 |
| author_facet | Sehon, Scott Robert 1963- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Sehon, Scott Robert 1963- |
| author_variant | s r s sr srs |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043383887 |
| classification_rvk | CC 7220 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)951542879 (DE-599)BVBBV043383887 |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | First edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV043383887 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-24T04:53:08Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028802491 |
| oclc_num | 951542879 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-29 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-29 |
| physical | XII, 239 Seiten |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateSearch | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Sehon, Scott Robert 1963- Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account Akt Philosophie (DE-588)4308398-5 gnd Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd Teleologie (DE-588)4059367-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4308398-5 (DE-588)4079320-5 (DE-588)4059367-8 |
| title | Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account |
| title_auth | Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account |
| title_exact_search | Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account |
| title_full | Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account Scott Sehon |
| title_fullStr | Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account Scott Sehon |
| title_full_unstemmed | Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account Scott Sehon |
| title_short | Free will and action explanation |
| title_sort | free will and action explanation a non causal compatibilist account |
| title_sub | a non-causal, compatibilist account |
| topic | Akt Philosophie (DE-588)4308398-5 gnd Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd Teleologie (DE-588)4059367-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Akt Philosophie Willensfreiheit Teleologie |
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