Consciousness, color, and content
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
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Cambridge, Mass.
MIT Press
2000
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Schriftenreihe: | Representation and mind
Bradford book |
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100 | 1 | |a Tye, Michael |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Consciousness, color, and content |c Michael Tye |
264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b MIT Press |c 2000 | |
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490 | 0 | |a Representation and mind | |
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500 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 187-192) and indexes | ||
500 | |a 1 - Knowing what it is like : the ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument -- - 2 - The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion -- - 3 - Representationalism : the theory and its motivations -- - 4 - Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities : new problems for representationalism? -- - 5 - On moderation in matters phenomenal : shoemaker and inverted qualia -- - 6 - Swampman meets inverted earth -- - 7 - On some alleged problems for objectivism about color -- - 8 - The problem of simple minds : is there anything it is like to be a honey bee? | ||
500 | |a Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive matter, something more widespread in nature than higher-order or reflective consciousness, it is deeply puzzling. In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee | ||
650 | 7 | |a PSYCHOLOGY / Personality |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 7 | |a Color (Philosophy) |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Consciousness |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Mental representation |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO) |2 larpcal | |
650 | 4 | |a Consciousness | |
650 | 4 | |a Color (Philosophy) | |
650 | 4 | |a Mental representation | |
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650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wissensrepräsentation |0 (DE-588)4049534-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1819295398908395520 |
---|---|
any_adam_object | |
author | Tye, Michael |
author_facet | Tye, Michael |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Tye, Michael |
author_variant | m t mt |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV043093580 |
collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)61744932 (DE-599)BVBBV043093580 |
dewey-full | 126 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 126 - The self |
dewey-raw | 126 |
dewey-search | 126 |
dewey-sort | 3126 |
dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
discipline | Philosophie |
format | Electronic eBook |
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id | DE-604.BV043093580 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-24T04:41:35Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0262201291 0262285312 9780262201292 9780262285315 |
language | English |
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physical | 1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 198 pages) |
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series2 | Representation and mind Bradford book |
spelling | Tye, Michael Verfasser aut Consciousness, color, and content Michael Tye Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 2000 1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 198 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Representation and mind Bradford book "A Bradford book." Includes bibliographical references (pages 187-192) and indexes 1 - Knowing what it is like : the ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument -- - 2 - The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion -- - 3 - Representationalism : the theory and its motivations -- - 4 - Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities : new problems for representationalism? -- - 5 - On moderation in matters phenomenal : shoemaker and inverted qualia -- - 6 - Swampman meets inverted earth -- - 7 - On some alleged problems for objectivism about color -- - 8 - The problem of simple minds : is there anything it is like to be a honey bee? Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive matter, something more widespread in nature than higher-order or reflective consciousness, it is deeply puzzling. In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh Color (Philosophy) fast Consciousness fast Mental representation fast CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO) larpcal Consciousness Color (Philosophy) Mental representation Farbe (DE-588)4016443-3 gnd rswk-swf Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd rswk-swf Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd rswk-swf Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 s Farbe (DE-588)4016443-3 s Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 s 1\p DE-604 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=138578 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Tye, Michael Consciousness, color, and content PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh Color (Philosophy) fast Consciousness fast Mental representation fast CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO) larpcal Consciousness Color (Philosophy) Mental representation Farbe (DE-588)4016443-3 gnd Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4016443-3 (DE-588)4049534-6 (DE-588)4006349-5 |
title | Consciousness, color, and content |
title_auth | Consciousness, color, and content |
title_exact_search | Consciousness, color, and content |
title_full | Consciousness, color, and content Michael Tye |
title_fullStr | Consciousness, color, and content Michael Tye |
title_full_unstemmed | Consciousness, color, and content Michael Tye |
title_short | Consciousness, color, and content |
title_sort | consciousness color and content |
topic | PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh Color (Philosophy) fast Consciousness fast Mental representation fast CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO) larpcal Consciousness Color (Philosophy) Mental representation Farbe (DE-588)4016443-3 gnd Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd |
topic_facet | PSYCHOLOGY / Personality PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body Color (Philosophy) Consciousness Mental representation CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO) Farbe Wissensrepräsentation Bewusstsein |
url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=138578 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT tyemichael consciousnesscolorandcontent |