Consciousness, color, and content

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1. Verfasser: Tye, Michael (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 2000
Schriftenreihe:Representation and mind
Bradford book
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Datensatz im Suchindex

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author Tye, Michael
author_facet Tye, Michael
author_role aut
author_sort Tye, Michael
author_variant m t mt
building Verbundindex
bvnumber BV043093580
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dewey-full 126
dewey-hundreds 100 - Philosophy & psychology
dewey-ones 126 - The self
dewey-raw 126
dewey-search 126
dewey-sort 3126
dewey-tens 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind
discipline Philosophie
format Electronic
eBook
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spelling Tye, Michael Verfasser aut
Consciousness, color, and content Michael Tye
Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 2000
1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 198 pages)
txt rdacontent
c rdamedia
cr rdacarrier
Representation and mind
Bradford book
"A Bradford book."
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1 - Knowing what it is like : the ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument -- - 2 - The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion -- - 3 - Representationalism : the theory and its motivations -- - 4 - Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities : new problems for representationalism? -- - 5 - On moderation in matters phenomenal : shoemaker and inverted qualia -- - 6 - Swampman meets inverted earth -- - 7 - On some alleged problems for objectivism about color -- - 8 - The problem of simple minds : is there anything it is like to be a honey bee?
Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive matter, something more widespread in nature than higher-order or reflective consciousness, it is deeply puzzling. In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee
PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh
PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh
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Consciousness fast
Mental representation fast
CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO) larpcal
Consciousness
Color (Philosophy)
Mental representation
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spellingShingle Tye, Michael
Consciousness, color, and content
PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh
PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh
Color (Philosophy) fast
Consciousness fast
Mental representation fast
CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO) larpcal
Consciousness
Color (Philosophy)
Mental representation
Farbe (DE-588)4016443-3 gnd
Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd
Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)4016443-3
(DE-588)4049534-6
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title Consciousness, color, and content
title_auth Consciousness, color, and content
title_exact_search Consciousness, color, and content
title_full Consciousness, color, and content Michael Tye
title_fullStr Consciousness, color, and content Michael Tye
title_full_unstemmed Consciousness, color, and content Michael Tye
title_short Consciousness, color, and content
title_sort consciousness color and content
topic PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh
PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh
Color (Philosophy) fast
Consciousness fast
Mental representation fast
CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO) larpcal
Consciousness
Color (Philosophy)
Mental representation
Farbe (DE-588)4016443-3 gnd
Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd
Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd
topic_facet PSYCHOLOGY / Personality
PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body
Color (Philosophy)
Consciousness
Mental representation
CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO)
Farbe
Wissensrepräsentation
Bewusstsein
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work_keys_str_mv AT tyemichael consciousnesscolorandcontent