Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930)
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| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: British diplomacy towards Germany's policy in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in Geneva (1926 - 1930) | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | SUMMARY
British Diplomacy towards Germany s Policy
in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament
Conference in Geneva (1926-1930)
Germany s policy in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference
(PCDC), which held its sessions in Geneva from 1926 to 1930, aimed at securing equal-
ity in armaments. The agenda for the Preparatory Commission (List of Questions adopt-
ed by the Council of the League of Nations on the 12th December, 1925) included only
laying down the principles and methods of reduction and limitation of armaments. It did
not however provide for establishing detailed armaments level for a future disarmament
convention as that was to be the task for a subsequent Disarmament Conference. In that
situation Germany sought to include principles and methods similar to those imposed
on her by Part V of the Treaty of Versailles into the disarmament convention.
While demanding to be put on an equal footing regarding armaments, Germany
pointed out to treaty obligations of the victorious countries, such as those included
in the introduction to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, Article 8 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, a note by G. Clemenceau dated June 16, 1919 — a response
to German objections to peace conditions, — and final protocol from the Locarno
Conference (of October 16, 1925). All those documents formulated the basis for Ger-
many s claims that her disarmament depended directly on introduction of general disar-
mament. For tactical and propaganda reasons the German delegate on the Preparatory
Commission pushed for disarmament of all other countries. Despite the pressure from
the Ministry of Defence (Reichswehrministerium), especially in the final stage of PC-
DCs work, he did not directly demanded Germany s rearmament right. The German
Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt), first under Gustav Stresemann and then under
Julius Curtius, wanted thus to avoid accusations of pursing revision of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. The fact that the count Johann H. von BemstorfF, the president of a German paci-
fistk: organisation Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund (the German League for the League
of Nations), had become a head of the German delegation was also symptomatic. All
attempts by the President of Germany Paul von Hindenburg to replace Bernstorffwith
a retired general Hans von Seeckt were successfully blocked by the Auswärtiges Amt.
Summary
425
Berlins first goal was to eliminate the disproportions in land armaments between
Germany on the one side and France and her allies — Poland and the Little Entente —
on the other. The Auswärtiges Amt counted on the support from Britain and the Unit-
ed States, and therefore did not demand equal rights for the expansion of the German
Navy (Reichsmarine) at that stage. Throughout PCDCs proceedings the German del-
egation did not engage in disputes over naval disarmament principles and methods be-
tween Britain and France, or Britain and the United States. Wilhelmstrasse was reacting
negatively to the German Naval Commands (Marineleitung) suggestions that Germa-
ny should initiate a mediation process in the dispute over the principles and methods
of naval disarmament as well as its proposals that German delegations should partici-
pate in conferences on reduction and limitation of naval armaments in Geneva (1927)
and London (1930).
From Berlins point of view, the Soviet Unions participation on the Preparatory
Commission was important. Moscow représentatives’ absence at the first three sessions
was used by her neighbouring countries to voice their concern, the so-called „Russian
clause”. Poland, Finland, and Romania in their own capacity, as well as on behalf of Es-
tonia and Latvia, said they would have fulfilled the provisions of the disarmament con-
vention if the Soviet Union had signed it on equal terms.
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the British government took a decision to
disarm Germany. The move was not planned as a unilateral disarmament. For British
politicians led by Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Germany’s disarmament was
meant as an introductory step to general disarmament. Destruction of „Prussian mili-
tarism” was to become the beginning of destroying „militarism” on the European con-
tinent as well as a basic element for a „lasting peace”. That is why the British pushed
for prohibiting compulsory conscription not only in the defeated countries. At the Bri-
tish initiative the connection between Germany’s disarmament and general disarma-
ment was emphasized in the preamble to Part V of the Versailles Treaty and the note
by G. Clemenceau, dated June 16, 1919.
At the beginning of PCDS’s proceedings British diplomacy agreed with Germa-
ny’s thesis out of political and moral reasons. It was believed impossible to maintain
disarmed Germany without a progress in general disarmament. British diplomacy un-
der Austen Chamberlain pushed for normalisation of relations between Britain, France
and Germany, which was expressed in signing the Locarno Pact in October 1925.
The Foreign Office on the other hand rejected the legal basis for Germany’s demand
of proportional disarmament to the level of Germany’s and in accordance with the prin-
ciples and methods set out in the Versailles Treaty. Lord Robert Cecil, head of the Bri-
tish delegation to the Preparatory Commission, was the only one showing a greater
understanding of Germany’s stance in the first stage of PCDCs works. His proposal
to take Germany’s level of armaments of that time as a datum level for disarmaments
of other countries was nonetheless blocked by the Foreign Office. Germany’s demand
to be put on equal footing had the support in Britain from the opposition Labour Party
426
Summary
and supporting Liberal Party as well as pacifist organisations led by the League of Na-
tions Union. Stanley Baldwins second Conservative cabinet did not intend to suggest
a radical land disarmament for French forces, because it hoped that the French would
soon voluntarily reduced their army and armaments as a result of normalisation of in-
ternational situation and pressed by the economic situation and public opinion.
The discussion about technical aspects of disarmament was held during the 1st
and the 2nd PCDC s session and in sub-commissions A and B (May-November 1926).
It revealed similarities between German and British opinions on principles and me-
thods of land disarmament. In spite of opposition from France and her allies, Berlin
and London wanted the disarmament convention to include not only a limitation of ef-
fectives with the colours, but also trained reserves and direct limitation of war material
in use and reserve. The limitation of trained reserves and war material was important for
Germany, because those factors determined the military supremacy of France. It was
the result of differences in French and German military systems. France had a conscript
army, prohibited in Germany by the Versailles Treaty, and therefore had bigger reserves.
Contrary to the German Army (Reichswehr), the French army could be equipped with
heavy military equipment, artillery, tanks and air force.
The German delegation initially tried to tactically avoid an open argument with
the French. It was made easier by the fact that French proposals of disarmament super-
vision and increasing security by clarifying Article 16 of the League of Nations Con-
vent, unacceptable to Germany, were criticised primarily by the representatives of Brit-
ain and the United States.
Germany’s admission to the League of Nations (September 10,1926) had strength-
ened the position of Berlin just before the next round of disarmament negotiations be-
gan. She could therefore insist more strongly on being treated in the same way as other
member countries, for example during annual meetings of the League of Nations As-
sembly. A German called Marc A. Nolda became an official in the Disarmament Section
of the Secretariat of the League. Additionally, the closing of the Inter-Allied Military
Commission of Control of Germany (January 31,1927) made it possible to argue that
Germany had fulfilled disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty. Wilhelmstrasse
counted also on further support against the „French block” from the British and Ame-
rican delegations.
The discussion about the List of Questions adopted by the Council on December
12,1925 — the foundations of previous PCDC s works — was broken off at the initia-
tive of Lord Cecil during the 3rd PCDCs session (21 March-26 April 1927). Instead,
the talks on developing a disarmament convention began. Two opposing projects were
the subject of the debate, one presented by the British delegation and the other —
by the delegates from France. Germany did not put forward any comprehensive coun-
terproposal and limited her activity to a critique of the British and French projects.
Both proposals were unacceptable because they assumed upholding disarmament pro-
visions of the Versailles Treaty that were binding to her, but did not provide for similar
Summary
427
principles and methods of disarmament for other signatories of the convention. They
were based on a concept of „limitation” of armaments and not the „reduction”, mean-
ing the disproportion in armaments between Germany and other European countries,
created by the Versailles Treaty, would be uphold. Some parts of the British proposal
corresponded with Germany s interests, such as the limitation of trained reserves. How-
ever, due to the War Office s resistance, there was no mention of limiting war equip-
ment, neither directly (preferred by Germany), nor indirectly (limitation of budgetary
expenditures) suggested by France. The head of the British delegation during the 3rd
PCD Cs session aimed at establishing a joint compromise draft of a disarmament con-
vention with the French delegation. He was ready to abandon the demand of limiting
trained reserves in exchange for some French concessions on the limitation of naval
armaments. A compromise offer by Joseph Paul-Boncour was rejected by the British
Admiralty. The 3rd session culminated with an adoption of a provisional draft of a dis-
armament convention, largely a collection of mutually exclusive demands. Germany’s
delegation raised a range of objections, including to the article upholding previous dis-
armament treaties.
The situation in the Preparatory Commission was further complicated by a fail-
ure of the Geneva Naval Conference of three Powers: the United States, Great Bri-
tain and Japan (20 June-4 September, 1927), and averted the perspective of adopting
a disarmament convention. Up until that point in the dispute on principles and me-
thods of naval limitation the French stood for the limitation of total tonnage, whereas
the British and the Americans opted for a more precise method of limitation by classes
of naval vessels. At the conference initiated by President Calvin Coolidge, the British
government did not agree a parity between the US Navy and Royal Navy cruisers, at
the level suggested by Americans and perceived by the British Admiralty as too low to
secure strategic imperial interests. As a sign of protest against that decision Lord Cecil
resigned.
Ignoring the discrepancies between the Powers, Bernstorff demanded an immediate
second reading of the disarmament convention draft at the 4th and 5th PCDC s sessions
(30 November-3 December 1927 and 15-24 March, 1928 respectively). He called for
culminating the works on the technical aspects of disarmament and convening a Disar-
mament Conference. He also partly backed the Soviet proposal for an immediate, com-
plete and general disarmament. It was difficult for Bernstorff to practically reconcile in-
structions from the Auswärtiges Amt to keep the discussions about disarmament going
without a delay while simultaneously avoiding suspicions of aiming at breaking the ne-
gotiations off. A new head of British delegation, Lord Cushendun, fiercely criticised
Germany’s demands during the 5th session of the Preparatory Commission. Entering
into discussions of disarmament at a time of no perspectives for reaching an agreement
between the Powers was doomed to failure.
The Foreign Office pointed out that if the Preparatory Commission had failed,
it would have opened the doors to Germany’s rearmament, but that would also put
428
Summary
the blame mostly on Britain. Hie dispute over principles and methods of land and naval
disarmament between the British and the French and over naval disarmament between
the British and the Americans continued.
After the Locarno Treaties, German diplomacy defended the argument that the se-
curity problem had already been solved and favourable conditions existed to conduct
general disarmament. The British government accepted that point of view, because
it did not want to make further military commitments in Europe. During the 8th ses-
sion of the League of Nations Assembly in September, 1927, Germany did not mange
to block the French initiative to study the issues of security and arbitration further. At
the request of Germany that task was not allotted to PCDC, but to the Committee on
Arbitration and Security. The British agreed on setting the Committee, because they
wanted to gain time as the disarmament talks had reached deadlock. Britain and Ger-
many promoted solutions in line with their political interests, London avoided taking
on new security and arbitration related commitments. Berlin, on the other hand, did not
want to allow a new system of collective security based on mutual assistance and sanc-
tions that would make any future redrawing of the borders more difficult. Both delega-
tions agreed with each other on that point as they were not satisfied with the Central
and Eastern Europe territorial status quo based on the peace treaties. The Germans did
not intend to respect it and Britain did not intend to guarantee it. However, the British
reacted negatively to the German concept of peaceful settlement of international dis-
putes and her proposal to strengthen the means of preventing war. On the other hand,
the Germans feared the British proposal to create regional agreements based on the Lo-
carno model in other parts of Europe, without British guarantees. All in all, the arrange-
ments made by the Committee remained theoretical and did not directly influence
the works of the Commission.
The German-Soviet cooperation in the Commission as well as the fear of the bur-
den of responsibility for the failure of Commissions’ works led to tightening the rela-
tions between Britain and France. On the 9th of March, 1928, Chamberlain confiden-
tially presented a disarmament compromise proposal to the French foreign minister
Aristide Briand. The suggested compromise would secure French interests regarding
the army (the British withdrew their demand of limiting trained reserves) while also
securing French support for Britain in her dispute with the United States over the fleet.
It suggested that the French would withdraw their demand to limit the total tonnage
and opt for limiting the tonnage by classes instead, divided, as sought by the Admiralty,
into light and heavy cruisers.
The Anglo-French compromise was formally settled by exchange of notes signed
July 20 and 28, 1928. In the following negotiations process, the British government
committed to drop its demand to Ümit trained reserves. In return, the French govern-
ment agreed on the British concept to limit navy tonnage by classes. The compromise
assumed that the disarmament convention would include only capital ships, aircraft
carriers, surface vessels with a displacement of 10.000 tones or less, armed with guns
Summary
429
larger than 6 inches (heavy cruisers), and submarines with a displacement larger than
600 tones. Therefore light cruisers with 6-inch guns, destroyers and small submarines
were not included. The British made the compromise with the French due to two basic
reasons. First of all, they wanted to deprive the Germans of the argument that there was
no progress in the League of Nations disarmament negotiations and therefore make
it more difficult for Berlin to renounce Part V of the Versailles Treaty. Secondarily, they
were afraid of a French-American deal based on a compromise formula on naval arma-
ments limitation presented by Paul-Boncour.
The Anglo-French „naval compromise” put an end to the two basic foundations
of Germany’s policy on general disarmament. Berlin could no longer count on Britain’s
support for the land disarmament. Neither could it further assume that other countries
would fail to agree on a draft of disarmament convention, and therefore would not pro-
vide Germany with a good pretext for rearmament. The Anglo-French „naval compro-
mise” confirmed the trend that could have been already observed during the 3rd session
of the Commission. It was also at that time when Lord Cecil pushed for a compromise
deal with the French that would ignore Germany’s demands.
Although the United States resistance blocked the adaptation of the principles to
limit the navy as suggested in the Anglo-French „naval compromise”, the delegations
from the United States and Britain supported France in her dispute with Germany on
the principles of land disarmament during the first part of the 6th session of the Com-
mission (15 April-6 May 1929). The majority of the Commission decided at that time
that the disarmament convention would not include the trained reserves and war ma-
terial (directly as well as indirectly). Representatives of London and Washington gave
in to the French, because they did not want the deadlock to prevail. It was resolved at
the cost of abandoning the disarmament principles and complete disregard of Germa-
ny’s demands. BernstorfF replied in a declaration of May 4, 1929. He distanced himself
from the arrangements agreed by the majority in the Commission that contradicted
the idea of the reduction of armaments. In an oblique way the declaration pointed out
that if the Disarmament Conference had confirmed the above mentioned decisions
the German delegation would not have signed such a convention. Wilhelmstrasse de-
cided not to withdraw their delegation from Geneva. Such form of protest was treated
as a last resort and reserved for Disarmament Conference.
The formation of the second British Labour government in June 1929 led
by the Prime Minister James Ramsey MacDonald raised hopes in Germany for a re-
vision of the Commission’s arrangements on land disarmament adopted in May 1929.
Both Labour and Liberals, who supported Labour’s government, had criticised a pro-
tracted unilateral disarmament of Germany. Due to political, economic and ideological
reasons they were in favour of a general reduction of armaments. At the 10th Assembly
of the League of Nations in September 1929, Lord Cecil, who once again represented
Great Britain, submitted a draft resolution including a proposal on rules of disarmament
that were contradictory to the arrangements from the last session of the Commission.
430
Summary
It appeared that Britain would once again demand setting a limit on trained reserves
and direct reduction of war material to be included in the disarmament convention.
The attempts to break the deadlock on naval disarmament — the London Con-
ference (21 January-22 April 1930) and American and British mediation in a parity
dispute between France and Italy — had a big influence on postponing the completion
of Commissions works. The 2nd part of the 6th session was held in Geneva from No-
vember 6 to December 9,1930 and the final draft of disarmament convention was then
decided. Against a previous announcement of the head of the Foreign Office, Arthur
Henderson, made at the 11th Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1930,
the British did not support Germany s proposal in the last stage of the contest. Because
of French stance, Lord Cecil, who represented Britain in the Commission, withdrew
the demand to include the limitation of trained reserves. Cecil could not support
the principle of direct (quantitative) limitation of army s war material because the War
Office opposed it. Against Germany s stance and together with France he pushed for
a budgetary rule for limiting armaments. He also opposed Bernstorff s proposal to call
a Disarmament Conference in 1931. He publicly accused him of lack ofwill to cooper-
ate constructively in the disarmament talks. In his reports for the Foreign Office, Cecil
was very critical of Germany s tactics in Geneva, especially in the fight of her cooper-
ation with the Soviet delegation.
Germany refused to accept PCDC s disarmament convention adopted on Decem-
ber 9, 1930 as a basis for works by Disarmament Conference. Bernstorff claimed that
the declaration of May 4, 1929 was still the basis for her position. His objections to
the convention were included in the report on the Preparatory Commission. Auswär-
tiges Amt found it inadvisable to present a separate „minority report”. German diplo-
macy still did not publicly push for a direct demand to put armament s equality into
effect by rearming the Reichswehr. However, in direct contact with British diplomats
they used the threat of Germany s rearmament in case Germany s requests were not
complied with and if the extremist parties led by NSDAP had came to power.
The development of military situation in Germany was closely followed by the Bri-
tish diplomatic and military circles. It was believed that after the Inter-Allied Military
Commission of Control was withdrawn, only German democratic parties led by SPD
and progress with general disarmament could prevent a complete remilitarisation
of Germany. The fact that Germans violated the provisions of Part V of the Treaty ofVer-
sailles was well known to the War Office as well as the details of the form and scope
of German illegal attempts to rearm. They were however perceived as strictly defensive.
It was believed that at that time Germany was not able to begin an aggressive war. Her
potential however as well as a possible threat in the future, after the Part V of the Ver-
sailles Treaty would be rejected, was emphasised.
Britain s stance on upholding the military provisions of Versailles Treaty was in-
fluenced by German criticism of PCDC s disarmament convention as well as Berlins
tactics of distancing itself from PCDC s arrangements. At the beginning of 1931, reach-
J
Summary
431
ing a compromise with Germany was deemed necessary by the Foreign Office. There-
fore a partial revision of the disarmament convention and a change of some of the ar-
rangements of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, such as setting out principles, methods
and level of Germany s disarmament, were suggested. British diplomacy assumed that
the armaments equality dispute would be solved by a reduction of France armed forces
and an agreement to a partial rearmament of Germany. The Foreign Office also con-
sidered a possibility to stop Germany s exaggerated claims on armed forces through
a revision of border between Germany and Poland.
Due to the French uncompromising stance on general disarmament and security,
clearly indicated in a note published on July 21,1931, British diplomacy had not started
talks with Paris over „settling” the German rearmament question before the Disarma-
ment Conference was opened. As a result of the deteriorating international situation
a possibility to postpone the Conference was consulted. The Conference eventually
started as scheduled on February 2, 1932 and was to emerge as the next and simulta-
neously the last stage of a diplomatic game around the contentious issue of Germany s
armaments equality.
Translated by Katarzyna Sobiepanek
SPIS TREŚCI
WSTĘP ................................................................. 7
ROZDZIAŁ 1. Miejsce Niemiec w brytyjskiej koncepcji powszechnego
rozbrojenia (1919-1925)........................................... 17
1.1. Podczas konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu (1919) ........... 17
1.2. Od Wersalu do Protokołu genewskiego (1920-1924)........... 33
1.3. Na drodze do Locarno (1924-1925) ......................... 47
ROZDZIAŁ 2. Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec kwestii równouprawnienia
Niemiec w zbrojeniach w pierwszej fazie Komisji Przygotowawczej
Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej (grudzień 1925-czerwiec 1927) ....... 58
2.1. Problem niemiecki w brytyjskich przygotowaniach do pierwszej sesji
Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej (grudzień
1925-maj 1926) ............................................... 58
2.2. Stanowisko Wielkiej Brytanii i Niemiec w trakcie obrad pierwszej
i drugiej sesji Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej
oraz na forum podkomisji technicznych (maj-listopad 1926)..... 75
2.3. Cele Londynu i Berlina na trzeciej sesji Komisji Przygotowawczej
Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej (21 III—26IV1927)................. 111
ROZDZIAŁ 3. Wielka Brytania a polityka Niemiec w sprawie powszechnego
rozbrojenia i bezpieczeństwa w okresie impasu Komisji Przygotowawczej
Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej (1927-1928)......................... 140
3.1. Londyn a taktyka Niemiec podczas czwartej (30 XI-3 XII1927)
i piątej (15-24 III 1928) sesji Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji
Rozbrojeniowej .............................................. 140
3.2. Brytyjskie oceny niemieckich propozycji w Komitecie Arbitrażu
i Bezpieczeństwa (listopad 1927-lipiec 1928)................. 184
3.3. Między Francją a Niemcami. Foreign Office w poszukiwaniu wyjścia
Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej z impasu
(lipiec-grudzień 1928)
208
6
Spis treści
ROZDZIAŁ 4. Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec niemieckiej polityki
dystansowania się od ustaleń Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji
Rozbrojeniowej (1929-1930)......................................... 239
4.1. Dyplomatyczna gra podczas I części szóstej sesji Komisji
Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej (15 IV-6 V1929).
Deklaracja niemiecka z 4 V1929 r.............................. 239
4.2. Londyn i Berlin w obliczu perspektywy wznowienia prac Komisji
Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej (czerwiec 1929-
listopad 1930) ............................................... 270
4.3. Brytyjsko-niemieckie rozbieżności podczas obrad II części szóstej
sesji Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej
(6X1-9 XII1930)............................................... 312
4.4. Foreign Office wobec niemieckiej krytyki projektu konwencji
rozbrojeniowej Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji
Rozbrojeniowej (1930/1931).................................... 342
ZAKOŃCZENIE........................................................... 367
BIBLIOGRAFIA.......................................................... 375
SUMMARY. British Diplomacy towards Germany s Policy in the Preparatory
Commission for the Disarmament Conference in Geneva (1926-1930) ... 424
WYKAZ SKRÓTÓW ...................................................... 432
SPISTABEL......................................................... 435
INDEKS ............................................................... 436
ILUSTRACJE ........................................................... 463
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Szudarek, Krystian Maciej |
| author_facet | Szudarek, Krystian Maciej |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Szudarek, Krystian Maciej |
| author_variant | k m s km kms |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV042418001 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)906698884 (DE-599)BVBBV042418001 |
| era | Geschichte 1926-1930 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1926-1930 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Wielka Brytania / stosunki zagraniczne / 1910-1936 jhpk Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Wielka Brytania / stosunki zagraniczne / 1910-1936 Großbritannien Deutschland |
| id | DE-604.BV042418001 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:21:02Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788371818882 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027853443 |
| oclc_num | 906698884 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 461, [3] s., [24] s. tabl. il. 25 cm |
| psigel | DHB_BSB_DDC DHB_JDG_ISBN_1 |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publishDateSearch | 2015 |
| publishDateSort | 2015 |
| publisher | Wydawnictwo DiG |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Szudarek, Krystian Maciej Verfasser aut Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) Krystian Maciej Szudarek ; Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne Warszawa Wydawnictwo DiG 2015 461, [3] s., [24] s. tabl. il. 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: British diplomacy towards Germany's policy in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in Geneva (1926 - 1930) Bibliogr. s. 375-423. Indeks Komisja Przygotowawcza Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie jhpk Geschichte 1926-1930 gnd rswk-swf Rozbrojenie / Europa / 1900-1945 jhpk Stosunki międzynarodowe / 1918-1933 jhpk Rozbrojenie / Niemcy / 1900-1945 jhpk Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd rswk-swf Abrüstungskonferenz (DE-588)4141088-9 gnd rswk-swf Wielka Brytania / stosunki zagraniczne / 1910-1936 jhpk Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd rswk-swf Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 g Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 s Abrüstungskonferenz (DE-588)4141088-9 s Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 g Geschichte 1926-1930 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027853443&sequence=000005&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027853443&sequence=000006&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Szudarek, Krystian Maciej Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) Komisja Przygotowawcza Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie jhpk Rozbrojenie / Europa / 1900-1945 jhpk Stosunki międzynarodowe / 1918-1933 jhpk Rozbrojenie / Niemcy / 1900-1945 jhpk Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd Abrüstungskonferenz (DE-588)4141088-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4012402-2 (DE-588)4141088-9 (DE-588)4022153-2 (DE-588)4011882-4 |
| title | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) |
| title_auth | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) |
| title_exact_search | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) |
| title_full | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) Krystian Maciej Szudarek ; Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne |
| title_fullStr | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) Krystian Maciej Szudarek ; Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) Krystian Maciej Szudarek ; Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne |
| title_short | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki Niemiec w Komisji Przygotowawczej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1926 - 1930) |
| title_sort | dyplomacja brytyjska wobec polityki niemiec w komisji przygotowawczej konferencji rozbrojeniowej w genewie 1926 1930 |
| topic | Komisja Przygotowawcza Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie jhpk Rozbrojenie / Europa / 1900-1945 jhpk Stosunki międzynarodowe / 1918-1933 jhpk Rozbrojenie / Niemcy / 1900-1945 jhpk Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd Abrüstungskonferenz (DE-588)4141088-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Komisja Przygotowawcza Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w Genewie Rozbrojenie / Europa / 1900-1945 Stosunki międzynarodowe / 1918-1933 Rozbrojenie / Niemcy / 1900-1945 Diplomatie Abrüstungskonferenz Wielka Brytania / stosunki zagraniczne / 1910-1936 Großbritannien Deutschland |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027853443&sequence=000005&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027853443&sequence=000006&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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