When do special interests run rampant? disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises

When do special interests run rampant? disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises

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Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government de...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Keefer, Philip (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy 2001
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 2543
Schlagworte:
Bank
Mathematisches Modell
Politik
Banks and banking > Political aspects > Mathematical models
Financial crises > Mathematical models
Fiscal policy > Mathematical models
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