Dlouhé stíny Mnichova mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo
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| Sprache: | Czech |
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2011
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| Ausgabe: | Vyd. 1. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Edice 20. století
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1819628236948111360 |
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| adam_text | OBSAH
Úvod
...................................................................................................9
I. Cestou
к
Mnichovu
.....................................................................13
Vývoj česko-německých vztahů v Československu
od nástupu Hitlera
k moci
do anšlusu Rakouska
(leden 1933-březen
1938)...........................................................14
Cesta
к
mnichovskému řešení (březen
-
září
1938)..........................26
II.
Mnichovská konference a její důsledky
........................................45
Příprava a realizace mnichovské konference
.................................46
Sovětský faktor v mnichovské krizi
............................................62
Mnichov a Polsko
...................................................................67
Mnichov a Maďarsko
..............................................................75
Konečná podoba nových hranic? Berlínská konference velvyslanců
.... 81
Vnitropolitický a ideový vývoj v českých zemích
v období druhé republiky
.........................................................95
Hospodářské a sociální důsledky Mnichova
a pomnichovská půjčka
...........................................................111
III.
Cesta
k oduznání
Mnichova
za druhé světové války
...............................................................135
Počátky druhého odboje a mnichovská dohoda
............................136
Churchillovo prohlášení
к
Mnichovu
........................................146
Uznání československé exilové vlády
de
iure a mnichovská dohoda
.. 152
Velká Británie „definitivně odčiňuje Mnichov
.............................167
De Gaullova
Francie oduznává Mnichov
.....................................189
Italské prohlášení
к
Mnichovu
.................................................193
Mnichov a příprava obnovy Československa
...............................196
Příprava na mírovou konferenci v londýnském exilu
....................201
IV.
Poválečné návraty mnichovské otázky
........................................215
Reflexe Mnichova:
1945-1948..................................................216
Mírová konference v Paříži
......................................................228
Mnichovská dohoda a československé požadavky
na mírovou smlouvu
s
Německem
............................................233
Edvard Beneš a retrospektivní vzpomínky na Mnichov
................238
V.
S
železnou oponou
....................................................................243
Po únorovém převratu
-
Mnichov jako nástroj propagandy:
1948-1968.............................244
Postoj britské diplomacie
к
Mnichovu
po únorovém převratu
1948.....................................................250
Mnichovská dohoda a Německá demokratická republika
(NDR)......256
Mnichovská dohoda a Spolková republika Německo (SRN)
.............259
Velká Británie a její postoj
к
mnichovské dohodě v
60.
letech
..........291
Britský pohled na mnichovskou dohodu v době pražského jara
........308
Británie a československo-západoněmecká smlouva
.....................321
Epilog?
...............................................................................353
Resumé
:
Lasting shadows of Munich
.........................................360
Literatura a prameny
.............................................................376
Jmenný rejstřík
....................................................................385
RESUMÉ
Lasting shadows of Munich
The atmosphere in international relations during September
1938
deteriorated
as a result of the Hitler s war threats to launch war on Czechoslovakia. On
September
29, 1938,
the international conference was called to the Bavar¬
ian capital Munich to settle the so-called Czechoslovak crises and to save
European peace. Czechoslovakia was not asked to participate. The Munich
Agreement concluded on September
30,1938
by Germany (Adolf Hitler)
,
Italy
(Benito
Mussolini), Great Britain (Neville Chamberlain) and France
(Eduard
Daladier)
forced Czechoslovakia to cede almost one third of its territory inhab¬
ited by large proportion of German minority to Nazi Germany (the so-called
Sudetenland
section of Czechoslovakia)
.
According to the Agreement, there were four zones which were gradually
occupied by Germany and the final boundaries were to be decided by an inter¬
national committee formed by representatives of four parties to the Agreement
and one of Czechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement included an immediate
guarantee of the remaining Czechoslovak territory by two of the four signatory
powers (Great Britain and France)
,
and a promise of guarantee by the other two
signatories (Germany and Italy) contingent upon the fulfillment of Polish and
Hungarian demands concerning the Czechoslovak territory.
The Czechoslovak Government and President
Beneš
accepted the Munich
agreement under protest, because the settlement was made without and
against us . Therefore the Agreement is usually depicted by the Czechs as the
Munich Dictate . Germany occupied all zones of the territory granted to them
by the Munich Agreement despite stipulations in the agreement providing for
plebiscites in certain zones vitally important for Czechoslovakia. Even these
boundaries were exceeded and further protests of the Czechoslovak govern¬
ment were disregarded. The final settlement of the Czechoslovak-German
frontiers was even more in German favor than the initial Hitler s proposals in
September
1938.
Also the Czechoslovak Government was not given the prom¬
ised guarantees of its new post-Munich frontiers and it was left defend-less in
the sphere of the most basic interests of the Reich .
The Munich Agreement dealt also with the position of other national
minorities in Czechoslovakia and as a direct consequence of the Agreement
a part of the Czechoslovak territory was ceded to Poland and in November
1938
also to Hungary. The pretext for the Agreement was the solution of the Czecho¬
slovak minority problems, especially the problem of the Sudeten German
minority. In the first chapters the book deals with both internal and interna¬
tional causes, which led to the Munich Agreement from the beginning of the
1930th although it is obvious that the problems of political, social, culture and
economic relations between the Czechs and Germans in the territory, which in
1918
constituted Czechoslovakia is one which had existed for many centuries.
The internal causes were closely connected especially with the developments
within the Sudeten German society and policy, which led to the establishment
of the Sudeten German Party chaired by
Konrad Henlein.
This party, with the
support from Nazi Germany, gradually became the leading political repre¬
sentation of the German minority in Czechoslovalda. Especially during
1938
it presented far reaching proposals for self-determination, first in the form of
autonomy. The most severe conditions for Czechoslovakia to accept were set in
the so-called Karlsbad program. The Czechoslovak Government tried to react
and prepared the Statute for Nationalities, Language Bill and Administrative
Reform Bill. It was also prepared to accept the mediation offered by the British
Government in the form of the Lord Runciman s mission. Runciman arrived
in Czechoslovalda at the beginning of August
1938
and his activity led to the
report addressed on September
21
to the British Prime Minister Chamberlain
advocating the transfer of a part of the Czechoslovak territory to Germany.
The international causes which led to the Munich Agreement could be
361
found especially in the violent and aggressive nature of the international policy
of Nazi Germany. The aim of this policy was to crush Czechoslovalda and to see
the Czech lands as a sphere of vital German interests. This was followed by
the changes in the French policy towards Central Europe. The French were
-
from the very beginning- the main allies of the Czechoslovak state. In
1935
the alliance was declared also by the French-Soviet and Soviet-Czechoslovak
Treaties on mutual assistance in the case of an unprovoked attack by the third
party. Especially after the so called
Anšlus
of Austria and after the fall of the
last Government of the Popular Front, the French Government led by E. Dala-
dier became more and more dependent on the British policy. The Chamber¬
lain s policy is usually depicted as a policy of appeasement. Although there is
a lengthy discussion about the reasons for such a policy, it is important that as
a result of this policy the Czechoslovak Government was forced at first to yield
the pressure from the Sudeten German party and in
1938
from Hitler. As early
as September
19, 1938
France and Great Britain demanded Czechoslovalda to
transfer a part of its territory, where majority of German population lived, to
Germany. The negotiations between Hitler and Chamberlain in
Godesberg
and
Berchtesgaden followed by the mission of Chamberlain s aid Horace Wilson
formed the prologue to the Munich conference.
Thousands books have been written so far on the above
-
mentioned aspects
of the Munich Agreement, its roots or various causes. Usually the story of
Munich is followed up to the outbreak of the Second World War. The Munich
Agreement therefore acquired the stigma of capitulation. J. W. Bruegel wrote
quite rightly the following: Whenever and wherever the fear arises, that the
democracy might retreat before the forces of
totalitarism,
the Ghost of Munich
is conjured up as a warning... . There are never ending discussions also on the
feasibility of the Soviet assistance or on the possibility to defend Czechoslova¬
lda on its own. Our book therefore tries to come with some new perspectives.
It deals more with the consequences of the Munich Agreement and also with
the so-called repudiation of the Agreement in international law. Therefore it
concentrates on the negotiations between Czechoslovalda and the signatories
during and after the Second World War.
The book deals as well with the immediate consequences of the Munich
Agreement. The acceptance of the Agreement caused great changes not only
in the Czechoslovak foreign policy and its new orientation towards Germany
but also to the pre-Munich liberal democratic political system. The so-called
Second Republic (Czecho-Slovakia, as the country was known from October
to March
1939)
meant also the autonomy for Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian
Ruthenia.
The Munich Agreement caused severe economical losses and social
problems.
Czechoslovakia was promised an economic assistance by Great Britain
and France to sweeten the bitter pill of Munich. Not much remained of the
original British promises concerning the economic assistance, which had been
made by the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons immediately
after Czechoslovakia had been forced to accept the Munich Agreement. The
proposed loan was, following complicated negotiations, agreed as a part of the
362
trilateral Czechoslovak-British-French agreement of
27
January,
1939.
How¬
ever, it did not fulfill its original purpose
-
namely, to provide Czecho-Slovakia
crippled by Munich with funds for the reconstruction of the stricken economy
and for a solution to the complicated problems stemming, in particular, from
the inflow of refugees from the surrendered areas of Czechoslovakia. The
negotiations on the provision of the loan demonstrated that according to some
British and French diplomats the Second Republic was moving irrevocably
towards the German sphere of influence, and to strengthen Germany econom¬
ically was not in the interests of the Western democracies. Above mentioned
fact together with Hitler s military gains in the form of the Czechoslovak
fortification clearly raised the question about the strategic value of Chamber¬
lain s appeasement policy.
In January
1939
Czechoslovakia was given a
£ 8
million loan, the main
purpose of which was to create conditions for solving the plight of refugees
from the surrendered areas. Only the remainder of the loan could be used for
the reconstruction of the transport infrastructure in Czecho-Slovakia. The
loan was supplemented from the British side with grant of
£ 4
million, the
purpose of which was to provide, under strictly stipulated terms and condi¬
tions, assistance to those refugees from the areas surrendered after the Munich
Agreement who decided to emigrate from Czechoslovakia.
But what is even more important is that the Munich Dictate represents the
most important step leading towards the complete break-up of Czechoslova¬
kia in March
1939
when the German occupation began and German troops
marched into the rump Czechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement is therefore
viewed from the Czechoslovak (and especially Czech) perspective not only as
an unjust solution to disputed minority question, but also as one of the most
tragic and fateful moments of the Czechoslovak history which ended a demo¬
cratic period caused fatal blow to liberal democracy and paywed way at first to
the Nazi and later Communist dictatorship. It has to be said that this dimension
is sometimes underestimated outside the Czech Republic. According to Vaclav
Havel the Munich Agreement was Hitler s final test to democracy and its abil¬
ity to defend itself . For Czechoslovakia and the present Czech Republic the
Munich Agreement represents a theme with profound moral and emotional
aspects. It is also a question which was several times reflected from a philo¬
sophical point of view and was widely reflected in Czech poetry and literature.
According to the leading Czech sociologist Vaclav
Houžvička,
there is still the
latent presence of the syndrome of the Munich Agreement within the Czech
society. While it may have directly affected only that generation whose lives it
directly touched the experience of being forced to accept a loss of sovereignty
and national identity has come to hold a place in the social consciousness of
later generations
The Munich Agreement is very closely connected with the process of legal
and actual re-establishment of the Czechoslovak state within its pre-Munich
borders during and after the Second World War. The process is also known
as repudiation of Munich by its signatories. The aim of the book is to show
how closely the struggle against the Munich Agreement is connected with the
question of the existence of the independent Czechoslovak state as well as with
the future fate of the German national minority within Central Europe.
For those Czechoslovak politicians who came after the break-up of Czecho¬
slovakia into exile, the Munich Agreement was void and not binding for
Czechoslovakia from the very beginning because it was imposed on Czechoslo¬
vakia under threat of launching an aggressive war and because it represented
other serious violation of international law. The leading role in the struggle to
repudiate the Munich Agreement was played by the Czechoslovak President
Edvard Beneš
(who resigned under German pressure after Munich on Octo¬
ber
5, 1938).
Following the establishment of the Protectorate
Beneš
prepared
a series of official protests, which were sent to the representatives of France,
Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.
Beneš
urged them not
to recognize the Protectorate. A special protest was also sent to the League of
Nations.
Beneš
proclaimed the beginning of the Czechoslovak exile movement
for the re-establishment of independent Czechoslovakia.
Beneš
developed
a political theory of continuity of the Czechoslovak Republic. According
to
Beneš
the Czechoslovak Republic never ceased to exist as an independent
legal entity despite the Munich Agreement and the events of March
1939.
He
especially stressed that the Czechoslovak Government accepted the Munich
Agreement only under duress expressed by Nazi Germany and that Hitler
himself breached the Agreement when he occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia
in March
1939.
The goal of the Czechoslovak exile movement was thus to re¬
establish Czechoslovakia in its pre-Munich borders.
The position of the Czechoslovak state after March
1939
was very uncertain
and difficult from the international law point of view, especially because of
the existence of independent Slovakia and Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia.
The only symbols of existence of the Czechoslovak state were the Czechoslo¬
vak Envoys to France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union,
because they refused to recognize the establishment of the Protectorate by Nazi
Germany.
After the outbreak of the Second World War
Beneš
and his followers were
trying to establish a Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile. The main aim of
such a Government was not only to represent the existence of independent
Czechoslovakia but also to start a political struggle for repudiation of Munich.
France and Great Britain were not willing to support such schemes for
Cen-
trai Europe
and they allowed only the establishment of a political body
-
the
Czechoslovak National Committee.
This unsettled period ended when Winston Churchill became a Prime Mi¬
nister and also after the military collapse of France. In July
1940
the Provi¬
sional Czechoslovak Government in Exile was recognized by Great Britain. On
June
21,1940
Beneš
presented the memorandum entitled The Constitution of
the Czechoslovak Government to the Foreign Office and asked for the British
recognition of the Provisional State Apparatus in Great Britain consisting of
Dr. E.
Beneš
as the President, the Exile Government and the State Council.
During the conversation with William
Strang
on July
18,1940
Beneš
expressed
his view that the recognition of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile should
be done in such a way to cover the Czechoslovak attitude towards the validity
364
of the Munich Agreement.
Strang
presented
Beneš
the Secretary of State s let¬
ter of July
18
stating the view of H. M. Government about the recognition of
a provisional Czechoslovak Government. The letter was informing
Beneš
that
the British Government was in principle prepared to recognize the Provisional
Czechoslovak Government and to make reservations about future frontiers
and about the continuing juridical existence of the Czechoslovak Republic.
The Czechoslovak Provisional Government in Exile has been recognized
by Great Britain on July
21, 1940.
The British Government made during the
recognition of the Czechoslovak Exile Government certain reservations con¬
cerning the juridical continuity of Czechoslovak state, its future frontiers and
the authority of the Czechoslovak Government over the Czechoslovaks and
their property in Britain. It was quite clear that the British and Czechoslovak
attitudes towards the Munich Agreement and its consequences were still quite
different. The above-mentioned first international recognition of the Czecho¬
slovak Provisional Government in Exile represented also a turning point in the
Czechoslovak struggle for repudiation of Munich .
The British official view was that the Munich Agreement represents an
international treaty dealing with the Czechoslovak minority question which
was valid until March
15, 1939
when the Agreement was violated by Hitler.
Moreover, the British Government in the years
1938-1940
advocated that
cession of the Czechoslovak territory with the substantial proportion of Ger¬
man population was just the solution when the system of protection under
the auspices of the League of Nations had collapsed. First change in the British
attitude towards Munich came only in
1940,
following the recognition of the
Czechoslovak Provisional Government-in-Exile.
Beneš
asked for the British proclamation of the validity of the Munich
Agreement on the second anniversary of Munich. On September
20, 194°
he handed over a proposal to the Foreign Office. That was the proposal of
the speech which would state that Munich was destroyed by the evil intent
ot Hitler and what has been broken fully releases all parties to the Pact .
Oie
Foreign Office opposed such a far-reaching statement dealing with the
future status of the
Sudetenland
and proposed a compromise which was on
September
30,1940
presented by Winston Churchill in the Czechoslovak BBC
program The date of signature of the Munich Agreement was according to
Uiurchill a date which the world will always remember for the tragic sacrifice
made by Czechoslovak people in the interest of European peace. The hopes
which this agreement stirred in the heart of civilized mankind have been frus¬
trated. Within six months the solemn pledges given by the unscrupulous men
who control the destiny of Germany were broken and the agreement destroyed
with a ruthlessness which unmasked the true nature of their reckless ambi¬
tions to the whole world. Churchill also stressed that on March
15,1939
Hitler
had brought Czechoslovakia nothing but moral and material devastation and
that the Czechoslovaks are being persecuted with a deliberate cruelty which
has few parallels in modern history . Churchill ended with the following: It
is because we both are fighting for the fundamental decencies of human life
that we are determined that neither our struggle nor your struggle shall be in
vain. It is for this reason that we have refused to recognize any of the brutal
conquests of Germany in Central Europe and elsewhere, that we have
wel-
365
comed
a Czechoslovak Provisional Government in this country, and that we
have made the restoration of Czechoslovak liberties one of our principal war
aims. With firmness and resolution, two qualities which our nations share in
equal measure, these aims will be achieved .
Beneš
was optimistic after the Churchill s speech and interpreted it in the
Czechoslovak favour. The Foreign Office became worried about the
Beneš s
atti¬
tude. Halifax therefore on October
31,1940
issued the following statement:
...
As regards the Munich Agreement and the question of the frontiers established
as a result of this agreement, the Prime Minister s statement was to the effect
that the Munich Agreement has been destroyed by the action of the German
Government, and it seems profitless to attempt to expand or interpret this
statement...
Halifax also reminded
Beneš
about the reservations made during
the recognition procedure. The British Government did not want to commit
on recognizing or supporting the establishment of any particular frontiers in
Central Europe, and this covered also the Munich line. On November
11,1940
Bruce
Lockhart
sent a letter to
Beneš
to inform him about the Halifax s state¬
ment. The British decision regarding the Czechoslovak frontiers was thus
postponed until the end of the war. Great Britain for many reasons (status of
national minorities, position of Slovakia, position of other states in the region)
did not want simple return to the status quo ante.
Beneš
tried to change the British attitude when he asked for
de
jure rec¬
ognition of the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in spring
1941.
In the
memorandum sent to the new British Foreign Secretary Anthony
Eden Beneš
repeated all the Czechoslovak arguments against Munich and concluded that
for Czechoslovak people and the Czechoslovak Government the Munich Agree¬
ment and everything which happened as a consequence of Munich is null and
void and cannot be recognized. According to
Beneš
it was necessary to improve
the international status of the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile and to
recognize the juridical continuity of the Czechoslovak Republic. A similar
memorandum was prepared in the United States to support the Czechoslovak
bid for the recognition. It was a combination of arguments for the non-validity
from the very beginning with the arguments of
non-
validity of March
15,1939.
The majority of the Czechoslovak arguments were rejected both by the
Foreign Office and the State Department. The Central Department of Foreign
Office
especially discussed the weak legal status of
Edvard Beneš
as a President
of the Czechoslovakia as well as disputes between the Czechs and Slovaks as the
main argument against the further recognition.
Beneš
was working on another
version of his memorandum and was waiting for a suitable situation to present
it. It came on April
18,1940
when Winston Churchill visited the Czechoslovak
military forces.
Beneš
asked Churchill for improvement of the Czechoslovak
legal and political position and handed him a short memo. Churchill promised
his personal assistance. Another document entitled Political and Juridical
Relationship of the Czechoslovak Republic to Great Britain was handed over to
Anthony Eden. According to
Beneš
the Czechoslovak Government in London
and the whole Czechoslovak nation at home adopted the standpoint that the
Czechoslovak Republic continues to exist just as it existed before September
19, 1938.
The Anglo-French plan of September
19, 1938
which demanded the
cession of Czechoslovak territory to Germany was forced upon Czechoslovalda
by the French threat that if it were rejected by Czechoslovakia and if it were
to lead to a German invasion and war, France would regard Czechoslovalda
responsible for the war and therefore would not participate in it. The Munich
Agreement, however, was not an application of the Anglo-French plan, the
scope of which it far exceeded. The Czechoslovak Government was neither
consulted about the Munich decision nor even admitted to the negotiations
concerning it.
The occupation of Czechoslovalda by Germany on March
15, 1939
was
according to
Beneš
an infringement of the Munich Agreement . Under these
circumstances the only acceptable conclusion for Czechoslovak people and
the Czechoslovak Government in Exile was that, as far as international law
was concerned, nothing that happened from September
1938
onwards could
be recognized, and that in law the Czechoslovak Republic continued to exist
just as it had existed before the September crisis .
Beneš
also stated political
arguments for the recognition of the Czechoslovak Government.
According to the Foreign Office the Czechoslovak position differed from
that of the other Allies because there were separate governments both in the
Protectorate and in Slovakia. The US Government as well as Dominions or the
Polish Government also opposed further recognition. Although Anthony Eden
personally favored the recognition of the Czechoslovak pre-Munich borders
and saw similarities between the Polish and Czechoslovak cases, at the time
being he postponed the final decision and asked for a more detailed discussion.
Beneš s
position was strengthened after the German attack upon the
USSR. The Soviet Union changed immediately its relationship towards the
Czechoslovak case and was prepared not only to recognize
Beneš
and his Exile
Government in London but also to conclude an agreement on cooperation in
military matters
.
The Soviet recognition of the Czechoslovak Exile Government
in July
1941
implied the re-establishment of Czechoslovalda in its pre-Munich
borders. Britain also accorded
de iure
recognition to the Czechoslovak Exile
Government on July
18, 1941
but was not prepared to withdraw its principal
objections concerning the Czechoslovak frontiers and the authority over the
Sudeten Germans. The Czechoslovak-British relations were still influenced by
the shadow of Munich .
It was again
Beneš s
initiative to clear the Munich shadow. In January
1942
he prepared a special memorandum regarding the Question of the frontiers
of the Czechoslovak Republic . In it he argued that the Munich decision of the
Great Powers was imposed upon us and has never been approved by the nation
or ratified... Hence neither the decision of Munich nor the decision regarding
the frontiers with Poland and Hungary were binding for any Czechoslovak
Government. The memorandum is a very interesting document because
Beneš
drew a linkage between the
non-
validity of the Munich Agreement and
the final settlement of Czechoslovak frontiers, what he defined as the return
of status quo ante . Simultaneously
Beneš
also suggested the transfer of the
substantial part of the German minority from Czechoslovakia together with
the cession of the limited part of the Czechoslovak territory.
The actual negotiations on the repudiation of the Munich Agreement began
367
towards the end of January
1942.
On January
21,1942
Eden asked
Beneš
to pre¬
pare a formula to resolve the question of Munich as an acceptable compromise
between the Czechoslovak and British views.
Beneš
repeated all keystones of
the Czechoslovak standpoint: (a) any decision regarding Czechoslovakia since
September
1938
is not valid in international law because they were imposed on
Czechoslovakia under the threat of force or by violation of the international
treaties and Czechoslovak law and (b) the pre-Munich legal status of Czecho¬
slovakia should be restored and confirmed by victorious allied countries dur¬
ing official negotiations concerning the post-war organization.
For the Foreign Office the question of repudiation of Munich was closely
connected with the transfer of German minorities from Central and Eastern
Europe but also with the proposed Central European Confederation based
mainly on cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Poland. The British Gov¬
ernment was prepared to repudiate Munich and to recognize the Czechoslovak
Government s jurisdiction over the Sudeten Germans on the condition that
the agreement between
Beneš
and a representative of the Sudeten Germans in
exile
Wenzel Jaksch
was reached on the adequate representation of the Sudeten
Germans in the State Council. The official repudiation of the Munich Agree¬
ment was also difficult for Britain because of the Czechoslovak-Polish disputes
over the
Těšín
territory. The negotiations between Jaksch and
Beneš
reached
a deadlock because Jaksch refused to agree with the plans of a limited transfer
of German minority.
Beneš
therefore asked Eden for an explicit British procla¬
mation regarding Munich using the example of the stand of the Soviet Union.
The Foreign Office on April
21, 1942
reached an agreement on the possibility
to recognize the pre-Munich Czechoslovak frontiers but suggested not to issue
any public proclamation in this respect. The reason was the difficult political
position of the Sudeten Germans but again also the Polish-Soviet disputes and
the adverse effect on the Czechoslovak-Polish relations.
The situation changed dramatically after the assassination of Heydrich and
especially after the German retaliations to Czech civilians. The Czechoslovak
position in this respect was also strengthened with the help of Soviet diplo¬
macy. The re-establishment of Czechoslovakia in the pre-Munich borders was
expressly confirmed on July
9, 1942
by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Molotov.
The compromise on the British repudiation of Munich was found on
July
7, 1942.
It was based on the separation of controversial points. The Brit¬
ish were ready to denounce the Munich Agreement provided their different
view concerning the initial validity of the agreement was not challenged. The
question of participation of the representatives of the Sudeten Germans in
the Czechoslovak State Council was postponed until more convenient time .
The British Government also postponed the public proclamation regarding
the Czechoslovak frontiers. The British were on the other hand, willing to
improve the international status of the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile.
Eden immediately informed the British War Cabinet about the negotiations
with the Czechoslovaks. On the same occasion Eden asked the War Cabinet to
approve the principle of transfers of the German minorities from the states of
Central and South Eastern Europe.
On August
5, 1942
Anthony Eden handed over a diplomatic note to Jan
Masaryk.
According to Eden the statement made by Churchill on October
30,
1940
represented the attitude of His Majesty s Government in regard to the
arrangements reached in Munich , i.e. that the Munich Agreement had been
destroyed by the Germans . The British Government maintained its reserva¬
tion concerning the final Czechoslovak frontiers but stated that in order to
avoid any possible misunderstanding the frontiers had to be decided by the
end of the war and they will not be influenced by any changes affected in
and since
1938 .
The British Government also stated that the position of the
Czechoslovak Exile Government was the same as the position of other Exile
Allied Governments in London.
Masaryk
on the same date sent a reply to Eden in which he regarded the
British note as a practical solution of the questions and difficulties , main¬
taining of course our political and juridical position with regard to the Munich
Agreement and the events which followed it... We consider your important
note of August
5,1942,
as highly significant act of justice towards Czechoslova¬
kia and we assure you of our real satisfaction and of our profound gratitude to
your great country and nation . The Masaryk s letter ended with the following
symbolic words: Between our two countries the Munich Agreement can now
be considered as dead . British proclamation regarding the Munich Agreement
was criticized by
Wenzel Jaksch
but also by the Polish Government-in-Exile.
Beneš
and the Czechoslovak Government in Exile realized that it was the
maximum they could get from Great Britain, however the difficulties which
occurred during the process of repudiation oriented Czechoslovak foreign
policy more closely towards the Soviet Union but also towards France.
Despite the optimistic proclamations on both sides the Munich Agreement
still was not regarded as dead. It became quite obvious during the negotiations
on the Czechoslovak post-war frontiers formula which started towards the end
of
1944.
The problem was discussed by the British War Cabinet on January
8,
1945
and Eden advocated the compromise solution to concede an administra¬
tive control of the Czechoslovak Government of all areas lost by Czechoslo¬
vakia at or after Munich while there was no final commitment regarding the
post-war Czechoslovak frontiers (left for the Peace Conference). The proposal
was closely connected with the final stages of the transfer plans concerning the
German minority in Czechoslovakia.
Another party to the Munich Agreement, France, took a different approach
towards the repudiation of Munich. The reason was that France was defeated
by Germany in June
1940
and that General Charles
de
Gaulle, who was able
gradually to establish the French National Committee in exile, had to cope
with similar complications as the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile. Shortly
after the exchange of notes between Eden and
Masaryk,
de
Gaulle instructed
the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Maurice Dejean to enter negotiations
with the Czechoslovak Government on the Munich Agreement.
De
Gaulle
was prepared to recognize the pre-Munich borders but urged Dejean to do it in
a not binding way. He wanted free hands regarding the future development
of the German minority, Slovakia and
Těšín
territory. On the other hand,
de
Gaulle asked Dejean to prepare more favorable declaration in comparison
with the British one. The original French proposal was not attractive for
369
the Czechoslovaks and
Beneš
rejected it. Dejean presented his own proposal
regarding the Munich Agreement on September
22,1942.
It was more favora¬
ble to the Czechoslovak standpoint and the document was quickly approved
by the Czechoslovak Government. The exchange of letters took place on
September
29, 1942.
In the letter signed by Charles
de
Gaulle and Maurice
Dejean the French National Committee solemnly proclaimed the Munich
Agreement to be null and void from the very beginning as well as all other
acts undertaken in its application or as its consequence. Moreover, the French
National Committee did not recognized any of the territorial changes affecting
Czechoslovakia from September
1938
and supported the re-establishment of
Czechoslovakia in the pre-Munich borders. French representatives also offered
political, military and economical cooperation and a political alliance between
France and Czechoslovakia. The French proclamation opened also the pos¬
sibility of French support of Czechoslovak territorial gains during the Peace
Conference. On the same date the Prime Minister
Šrámek
and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Masaryk
replied that the Czechoslovak Government has never
ceased to consider French people as the ally and friend of Czechoslovak people
and expressed their view that the present trials borne in common will only
strengthen this alliance and friendship . The Czechoslovak Government was
prepared to help to restore France in her strength, in her independence and in
the integrity of her territory both metropolitan and overseas...
French policy was more active in Central European affairs than the British
one and the proclamation on Munich could be regarded as an attempt to restore
French influence in Central Europe. According to
de
Gaulle the Czechoslovak-
French alliance could form a resistance to the Russian influence in the area.
However, the French proclamation on Munich led to severe protests from the
Polish Government-in-Exile. The Prime Minister
Władysław Sikorski
ordered
Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward
Raczyński
to present the French National
Committee a strong protest . The Polish attitude represented yet another
obstacle in the Czechoslovak-Polish relations. Dejean was replaced by
René
Pleven who urged Czechoslovakia and Poland to reach an agreement on the
disputed territory and was not willing to intervene on Czechoslovak side.
The importance of the French proclamation on Munich was weakened by
the attitude of the Polish Exile Government until the summer
1944.
When the
French Provisional Government was established, the Czechoslovak Govern¬
ment was among the first Allied Governments to recognize it in June
1944.
The
Czechoslovak exile representatives planned to use this friendly step also for the
question of repudiation of Munich. The French attitude towards the Munich
Agreement was re-opened and the French Provisional Government repeated
on August
17,1944
the proclamation on the
non-
validity of the Munich Agree¬
ment from the very beginning.
Italy was the last party to the Munich Agreement which changed its attitude
towards Munich during the Second World War. However, it was only after the
Mussolini fascist leadership replacement when the Italian Government pro¬
claimed the Munich Agreement to be null and void from the very beginning in
September
1944.
On September
26,1944
the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Count Carlo
Sforza
announced the unanimously reached decision of the Italian
Government to the Czechoslovak representative Vladimir
Vaněk.
Under the
pressure of Allied conditions of armistice with Italy of September
1943
the Ital¬
ian Government took the most favorable stand towards the Czechoslovak view
on the Munich Agreement and proclaimed also the territorial changes between
Slovakia and Hungary to be null and void as a direct consequence of Munich.
The Italian proclamation on the Munich Agreement had wider conse¬
quences. It influenced the Czechoslovak relations towards the Holly See
and was used as a precedent for the Peace Treaty with Hungary after the end
of WWII. Some other Balkan states like Romania or Yugoslavia were not so
successful as the Czechoslovak diplomacy. The reason was that there were no
direct Italian interests in Central Europe and the attitude towards the Munich
Agreement was used by the new Italian Government also for propaganda aims.
Towards the end of
1943
the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile started
preparations for the post-war Peace Conference. The large proportion of
Czechoslovak claims was based mainly on the Czechoslovak view towards the
validity of the Munich Agreement. On July
25, 1944
the European Advisory
Commission asked the Czechoslovak Government to present the Czechoslo¬
vak conditions for armistice with Germany. The Czechoslovak Government
agreed with the proposal on August
24,1944.
It demanded that Germany (but
also Hungary) should without prejudice to her responsibility, as defined in the
armistice terms recognize
...
(a) nullity of the Munich Agreement of Septem¬
ber
29, 1938
and the so-called Vienna Arbitrary Award of November
2, 1938,
as well as all enactments arising from these Agreements and enactments, or
others connected with them, (b) nullity of enactments regarding the estab¬
lishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, c) sovereignty of the
Czechoslovak Republic over territory within the frontiers before September
29,
1938,
ensuing from the preceding points, and all other consequences ensuing
from them . The Czechoslovak arguments were not officially confirmed and
the final solution was left until the post-war negotiations. On January
11,1945
the European Advisory Commission presented the Czechoslovak Government
its proposal for the unconditional surrender of Germany, which spoke about
the German frontiers as they existed before December
31,1937.
Towards the end of the WWII Czechoslovakia was re-established in
May
1945
in its pre-Munich borders, but with the notable exception of Sub-
Carpathian Ukraine. Czechoslovakia was also re-established as a national state
of the Czechs and Slovaks
-
i.e. Slavonic nations. The majority of the German
minority was either expelled or transferred to Germany and the rest deprived
of virtually all civic rights and freedoms. It could be regarded as a delayed
Czechoslovak response to Munich unjust solution. Moreover the shadow
of Munich heavily influenced especially the Czechoslovak-British relations
and together with distrust of the Western Allies which was widely common
especially within the Czech society, represented an important reason for the
Czechoslovak orientation towards the Soviet Union (which was not a party to
the Munich Agreement) during and after the Second world war.
After the Second World War Czechoslovakia tried to improve its stand¬
point against the initial validity of the Munich Agreement especially during
the Nuremberg trial of Nazi war criminals as well as during the Paris Peace
371
Conference with Hungary. In Nuremberg the Czechoslovak delegation closely
followed especially the arguments that Hitler had no intention to be bound
by the Munich Agreement and it could be regarded as a conspiracy against
the European peace and as a fraud. The Peace Treaty with Hungary explicitly
declared the Vienna Arbitrary Decision on the Czechoslovak territory ceded to
Hungary (seen as a direct consequence of Munich) as null and void. However,
especially the British diplomacy did not see any reason why to change its view
on the validity of Munich from
1940-1942
period.
The Czechoslovak Government prepared its own proposals for the Peace
Treaty with Germany. Not only it demanded the nullity of the Munich Agree¬
ment from the very beginning but also territorial claims against Germany and
Poland in Bavaria, Saxony and Silesia and a series of economical and financial
claims connected not only with the German occupation but also with the
implementation of the Munich Agreement. However, due to the gradual break¬
up of the wartime coalition, no conventional Peace Conference with Germany
was called and the Czechoslovak aims concerning the validity of Munich
and territorial gains as well as the reparations of damages connected with the
Munich Agreement were not formally resolved. However, the Czechoslovak
pre-Munich frontiers with Germany were not challenged.
After the Communist coup in February
1948
the question of Munich became
an important part of the communist propaganda. It was used both in internal
and international relations. In the so-called German question Czechoslovakia
supported the Soviet policy and therefore criticized the establishment of the
Federal Republic of Germany and depicted it as a seat of revenge against social¬
ist countries using the parallel for the Munich Agreement. The Communist
propaganda aimed especially at the activities of the organization of the Sudeten
German expellees
- Landsmannschaft.
Its legal analyses and programs con¬
cerning the Munich Agreement stressed the cession of the territory as a just
solution and claimed that the Munich Agreement and especially its conse¬
quences were initially valid.
Great Britain and France were still held responsible for the Munich disaster
and their treason in Munich was explained as a plan of imperialistic powers
to push Hitler against the Soviet Union. Again this parallel was used for the
post-war situation. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, recognized the
Ger-
man Democratic Republic and in June
1950
concluded the Joint Declaration
denouncing the tragic moments in the history of the Czech-German rela¬
tions. In
1958
the representatives of both states issued a declaration on the
non-validity of the Munich Agreement, where the propaganda in favor of the
Soviet Union played a crucial role. In
1967
the German Democratic Republic
declared the Munich Agreement to be null and void from the very beginning
with all consequences in the new Czechoslovak-German Treaty.
At home the Communists especially attacked the bourgeoisie and its treason
of ordinary people at the time of Munich to support its takeover and orienta¬
tion towards the only trustful ally
-
the Soviet Union. They also elaborated
scientific arguments that the Soviet Union was ready to help in September
1938
but its assistance was refused by
Beneš
and bourgeoisie who were afraid
of communism.
British diplomacy after the communist coup soon realized, that the com¬
munist Czechoslovakia is attacking the British policy at Munich especially
on anniversaries of the Munich Agreement and WWII. The proposal of the
British Ambassador to Prague Pierson Dixon from September
1948
was not
to mention the theme of Munich in mutual relations while in the same time
maintaining objective and critical view on the policy of appeasement. The
lesson Britain learned in Munich was not to appease any aggressor, including
after
1948
also the USSR and world communism. Attacks against the West in
connection with Munich had to be challenged by allegation that the Soviet
policy towards Czechoslovak independence after
1948
was even more danger¬
ous than the policy of appeasement. Until the 1960 s there was no reason for
the British diplomacy to change its attitude towards the initial validity of the
Munich Agreement.
The situation changed in
1964
in connection with the accession of the new
Labour Government and with the partial liberalization of the Czechoslovak
foreign policy towards Western Europe. When it was proposed, the Foreign
Secretary Michael Stewart could visit Prague, the Czechoslovak diplomacy
renewed again also the question of the new British proclamation on Munich.
The Czechoslovak Ambassador to London together with professor of interna¬
tional law
Jaroslav Žourek
presented the Foreign Office series of arguments
demanding the non-validity of the Munich Agreement from the very begin¬
ning. For many legal and political reasons including the fear that such a prece¬
dent could endanger other international treaties or that the British responsibil¬
ity for Munich could lead to financial claims, the Foreign Office refused such
a far reaching statement. On the other hand, it was prepared to strengthen
the Czechoslovak-British relations and in April Michael Stewart declared the
Munich Agreement to have been detestable, unjust and dangerous, as events
have shown for the peace in Europe . He also added the following: I said that
the agreement was completely dead and had been dead for many years
(...).
The
mere historical fact, that it was once made cannot justify any future claims
against Czechoslovakia. When a time comes for the final determination of the
Germany s frontiers by a peace treaty, the treaty discussions would start from
the basis that the Czechoslovakia s frontiers are not in question . In
1966
the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the
de
Gaulle s statement on the
Munich
Agreement
and added that the French view is that the Munich Agree¬
ment was detestable and was not valid from the outset.
At the same time the question of Munich played its important part in the rela¬
tions of Czechoslovakia towards the West Germany . The British and French
statements strengthened the Czechoslovak position. In
1967
it was agreed to
set up commercial representations with consular powers both in Prague and
Frankfurt. That was seen as the first step towards the full diplomatic relations;
however, the proclamation of the nullity of the Munich Agreement by the Ger¬
man Federal Government was on the top of the Czechoslovak agenda.
On December
13,1966
the Chancellor Kiesinger s big coalition proclaimed
the normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and West Germany
and the elimination of the effects of the Munich Agreement as one of its aims.
It also condemned the Hitler s policy, which was directed towards the
destruc-
373
tion
of the Czechoslovak state . On March
24, 1966,
the German Federal
Government issued also the so-called peace note in which it was stated that
the initially valid Munich Agreement was torn apart by Hitler himself and
had no territorial significance. As it had already stated on several occasions,
the Federal Government therefore had no territorial claims to Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovak Government insisted on an explicit declaration that the
Munich Agreement had been invalid from the beginning.
In
1968
during the Prague Spring the Czechoslovak and German diplomats
started
sondage
negotiations on mutually accepted compromise statement on
the Munich Agreement to be issued on the 30th anniversary of Munich. We
know from archival sources that the compromise concerning the invalidity
of the Munich Agreement was nearly found in the so-called as if formula ,
i.e. that Germany and Czechoslovakia will behave in their mutual relations
as if the Munich Agreement was invalid from the very beginning . What is
even more surprising is that the British diplomacy was informed about such
a proposal by the Federal Government and discussed the possibility to change
the British attitude towards the Munich Agreement. The Foreign Office came
to the conclusion that it would be inevitable to follow the German example and
adopt the similar standpoint. Moreover, the Foreign Office confirmed that the
Michael Stewart s statement and the answers to the parliamentary questions
made between
1965
and
1968
concerning the Czechoslovak pre-Munich fron¬
tiers still represented the British view towards the Munich Agreement. The
Czechoslovak-German frontiers were not opened to discussion, although it was
a British policy to confirm them (together with the Polish frontiers) in the Peace
Treaty with Germany.
It proved to be the last chance to improve the British attitude towards the
Munich Agreement. After the intervention of the Warsaw Pact into Czechoslo¬
vakia which was aimed to crush the reform movement, the Foreign Office saw
no political reason to strengthen the Czechoslovak-British relations and on the
contrary it witnessed the renaissance in the usage of the lessons of Munich by
the Soviet and Czechoslovak propaganda. The only new impetus could come
from the Czechoslovak-German relations.
This proved to be the last chance to chance to improve the British attitude
towards the Munich Agreement. After the intervention of the Warsaw Pact
in Czechoslovakia to crush the reform movement, the Foreign Office saw no
political reason to strengthen the Czechoslovak-British relations and on the
contrary it witnessed the renaissance in the usage of the lessons of Munich by
the Soviet and Czechoslovak propaganda. The only new impetus could come
from the Czechoslovak-German relations.
The Czechoslovak-German negotiations on Munich were closely con¬
nected with the so-called
Ostpolitik
advocated by the German Chancellor
Willy Brandt. After the negotiations with the Soviet Union and Poland,
the Federal Republic of Germany was prepared to open the talks also with
the Czechoslovaks providing the question of the invalidity of the Munich
Agreement is resolved in a way acceptable to both parties. On the other hand
the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of May
1970
stipulated that the
1938
Munich
Agreement was forced on Czechoslovakia under the threat of force and an
aggressive war
...
and therefore that all its consequences are invalid.
After long and hard negotiations in which the Munich Agreement
played a key role for the Czechoslovak diplomacy and its communist rul¬
ers, the compromise was found. It is interesting that the Germans refused
most of the Czechoslovak proposals on the invalidity of Munich using
the British legal point of view. The Czechoslovak diplomacy was in the
end forced to accept the compromise on the Munich Agreement by the
Soviet Union and other states of the Eastern Block because the deadlock
on Munich was blocking the normalization of the relations with Germany
also for Hungary or Romania. The
1973
Treaty on Relations between the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in
the end condemned the Nazi policy leading towards the Munich Agreement
and proclaimed the nullity of the Agreement, but only in mutual relations.
On the other hand, it left aside the question of the property claims and the
German side also secured its legal view on the state citizenship and of the
Sudeten Germans. It also meant that the economic and financial costs of
the Munich Agreement were borne by Czechoslovakia only and, moreover,
in
1982
Czechoslovakia was forced to accept also the repayment of the rest
of the British post-Munich loan! After the ratification of the Treaty which
caused protests from CDU/CSU opposition in the German Parliament, both
countries returned to their original different views on the initial validity of
the Munich Agreement. It enabled more pragmatic relations between the
two countries until
1989.
After the Velvet Revolution and fall of communism it was possible for the
first time after
40
years to express freely the real interests of the Czechoslo¬
vak state in international relations. It was also a good possibility to put the
question of the Munich Agreement finally to rest and to deal with it as with
a historical event only. However, it was possible only after another round of
talks on the question with the original signatories. Czechoslovakia refused
to participate in the preparatory stages of negotiations on the so-called
2+4
Treaty on the reunification of Germany although the Polish Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Krzysztof Skubiszewski
proposed to connect the definitive
recognition of the border along the Oder and Neisse rivers with the question
of the nullity of the Munich Agreement during the talks. The reason was that
the Czechoslovak diplomacy did not believe in success of such a formula on
Munich because of the well known British and German views.
In
1991
the Czechoslovak diplomacy secured the new French proclamation
on the validity of the Munich Agreement which repeated the
de
Gaulle s state¬
ments from
1942
and
1944.
Similar article was prepared also for the new Treaty
with Italy which was not ratified and was signed again by the Czech Republic
in
1996.
That year the British Queen Elisabeth II during her visit to Prague
in March stated she understood that the events which led to the end of the
interwar Czechoslovakia based on the Masaryk s ideas are the only shadow
over our relations and I understand and sympathise with the feelings in this
country over the Munich Agreement .
The main focus was on the negotiations on the Czechoslovak-German
treaty. They proved that the mutual relations were still influenced by the
shadows caused by the
1938
Munich Agreement, the consequences of German
occupation and the post-war transfer of the Sudeten Germans. The Treaty
between Germany and Czechoslovakia which was signed on February
27,1992
dealt with the evaluation of the common past, particularly in its
preambule.
However, the Czechoslovak demands for a new declaration on the invalidity
of the Munich Agreement from the very beginning were not agreed and the
question was dealt with in the same way as in the
1973
Prague Treaty.
After the break-up of Czechoslovakia a new impetus was given to the
Czech-German relations by the already mentioned President Havel s speech on
February
17,1995
which dealt not only with the difficult past of the Czech-Ger¬
man relations but also with the Czech view on their future. It set limits to the
Sudeten German demands on the restitution of property and clearly repeated
also the responsibility of the Sudeten Germans for Munich and the dissolu¬
tion of the Czechoslovak state. After difficult negotiations following the Klaus
Kinkeľs
reaction on Havel s speech the Czech-German declaration on mutual
relations and their future development was adopted in January
1997.
The key
passages in articles II-IV stated that there was a connection between the German
guilt for the developments in
1938/1939
period with the development during
and after the Second World War. The Czech side after that expressed its excuse
for atrocities made during the expulsion. Article IV explicitly formulated the
will of both parties that they will not burden their relations with political and
legal questions arising out of the past , while each side will be bound by its own
legal system and respect that the other side has different opinions. Although it
did not bring anything new for the position towards the Munich Agreement, it
fulfilled its main task. It helped the Czechs and Germans to look more towards
the future including the accession of the Czech Republic to the
EU,
than back
to the painful and unsecure past.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Kuklík, Jan 1967- Němeček, Jan 1963- Šebek, Jaroslav 1970- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)133005631 (DE-588)128817852 (DE-588)124692214 |
| author_facet | Kuklík, Jan 1967- Němeček, Jan 1963- Šebek, Jaroslav 1970- |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Kuklík, Jan 1967- |
| author_variant | j k jk j n jn j š jš |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV039763235 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)772956254 (DE-599)BVBBV039763235 |
| edition | Vyd. 1. |
| era | Geschichte gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Tschechoslowakei (DE-588)4078435-6 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Tschechoslowakei |
| id | DE-604.BV039763235 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-24T02:29:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788087284186 |
| language | Czech |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-024624377 |
| oclc_num | 772956254 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-M457 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-M457 |
| physical | 390 S. Ill. |
| psigel | DHB_JDG_ISBN_1 |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publishDateSearch | 2011 |
| publishDateSort | 2011 |
| publisher | Auditorium |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Edice 20. století |
| spellingShingle | Kuklík, Jan 1967- Němeček, Jan 1963- Šebek, Jaroslav 1970- Dlouhé stíny Mnichova mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo Münchener Abkommen 1938 September 29 (DE-588)4170659-6 gnd Auswirkung (DE-588)4112646-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4170659-6 (DE-588)4112646-4 (DE-588)4078435-6 |
| title | Dlouhé stíny Mnichova mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo |
| title_auth | Dlouhé stíny Mnichova mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo |
| title_exact_search | Dlouhé stíny Mnichova mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo |
| title_full | Dlouhé stíny Mnichova mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo Jan Kuklík ; Jan Němeček ; Jaroslav Šebek |
| title_fullStr | Dlouhé stíny Mnichova mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo Jan Kuklík ; Jan Němeček ; Jaroslav Šebek |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dlouhé stíny Mnichova mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo Jan Kuklík ; Jan Němeček ; Jaroslav Šebek |
| title_short | Dlouhé stíny Mnichova |
| title_sort | dlouhe stiny mnichova mnichovska dohoda ocima signataru a jeji dopady na ceskoslovensko |
| title_sub | mnichovská dohoda očima signatářů a její dopady na Československo |
| topic | Münchener Abkommen 1938 September 29 (DE-588)4170659-6 gnd Auswirkung (DE-588)4112646-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Münchener Abkommen 1938 September 29 Auswirkung Tschechoslowakei |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024624377&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024624377&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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