Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot

"Even under the best circumstances, reconstruction in counterinsurgency is a difficult endeavor. The most critical tasks are numerous and complex. Many participating agencies must undertake missions that fall well out of their existing core competencies or operate in environments that are compl...

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1. Verfasser: Olson, Eric Todd (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Carlisle, PA Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2010
Schriftenreihe:The Letort papers
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520 |a "Even under the best circumstances, reconstruction in counterinsurgency is a difficult endeavor. The most critical tasks are numerous and complex. Many participating agencies must undertake missions that fall well out of their existing core competencies or operate in environments that are completely unfamiliar to them. The involvement of multiple agencies, which are not accustomed to working together, makes coordination difficult. And all this must take place in an environment where an armed, violent foe, who understands the disadvantage to him of a successful reconstruction effort, is determined to go to almost any length to resist progress or destroy what has been accomplished. If the counterinsurgent understands what needs to be accomplished and to what end, and he has a plan and can mount a coordinated effort to execute that plan, reconstruction can indeed then become one of the array of key weapons that do not shoot that are available to the counterinsurgent. Even as a weapon that does not shoot, reconstruction can end up being dangerous to the hunter as well as the hunted. A coordinated, skillfully executed reconstruction program is essential to a manageable security environment and strong national institutions that have the confidence and the support of the people. But reconstruction that is mismanaged, bungled, and obviously ineffectual not only represents a lost opportunity to advance the cause; it also may well put a weapon in the hands of the insurgent." --P. xiii 
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650 4 |a Civil-military relations 
650 4 |a Military doctrine / United States 
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Datensatz im Suchindex

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spelling Olson, Eric Todd Verfasser aut
Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot Eric T. Olson
Carlisle, PA Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2010
XIV, 139 S. Ill.
txt rdacontent
n rdamedia
nc rdacarrier
The Letort papers
Includes bibliographical references
Summary -- Introduction -- Reconstruction in times of war : a history -- The Marshall Plan -- Reconstruction in "small wars" : the U.S. experience in the Philippines -- A brief history of the writings about COIN and the role of reconstruction -- Reconstruction and the Vietnam War -- The legacy of Vietnam and "nation building" -- The impact of September 11, 2001 -- A doctrinal review -- The army operational concept -- Reconstruction and full spectrum operations --Full spectrum operations, COIN, and reconstruction -- Where the doctrine is strong -- Looming issues for the practitioner -- Conducting reconstruction in counterinsurgency : an exercise -- The scenario -- Observations -- Discussion of key tasks, priorities, and responsibilities -- Related conclusions -- A framework for reconstruction in counterinsurgency -- The framework : a concept for reconstruction -- Purpose of reconstruction -- Essential elements of reconstruction -- A scheme of reconstruction -- Responsibilities -- Assessment -- Organizing and managing the reconstruction effort -- Organizing the U.S. Government for reconstruction in COIN operations : the policy level -- Organizing the reconstruction effort in the COIN theater -- The level of execution -- Conclusion -- Enhancing army capabilities for reconstruction in counterinsurgency -- Preparation -- Reconstruction preparation of the battlefield -- Training -- Adding reconstruction capabilities to deploying army units -- Capabilities required -- Money as a weapons system -- Army capabilities to set conditions for the success of the civilian effort -- Reconstruction reconnaissance -- Direct assistance to humanitarian relief operations -- Systems to manage reconstruction in COIN : situational awareness -- Systems to manage reconstruction in COIN : decision support -- Tactics for combined reconstruction operations -- Provincial reconstruction teams -- Conclusions
"Even under the best circumstances, reconstruction in counterinsurgency is a difficult endeavor. The most critical tasks are numerous and complex. Many participating agencies must undertake missions that fall well out of their existing core competencies or operate in environments that are completely unfamiliar to them. The involvement of multiple agencies, which are not accustomed to working together, makes coordination difficult. And all this must take place in an environment where an armed, violent foe, who understands the disadvantage to him of a successful reconstruction effort, is determined to go to almost any length to resist progress or destroy what has been accomplished. If the counterinsurgent understands what needs to be accomplished and to what end, and he has a plan and can mount a coordinated effort to execute that plan, reconstruction can indeed then become one of the array of key weapons that do not shoot that are available to the counterinsurgent. Even as a weapon that does not shoot, reconstruction can end up being dangerous to the hunter as well as the hunted. A coordinated, skillfully executed reconstruction program is essential to a manageable security environment and strong national institutions that have the confidence and the support of the people. But reconstruction that is mismanaged, bungled, and obviously ineffectual not only represents a lost opportunity to advance the cause; it also may well put a weapon in the hands of the insurgent." --P. xiii
United States / Army / Civic action
United States / Army / Stability operations
Postwar reconstruction
Counterinsurgency
Nation-building
Integrated operations (Military science)
Interagency coordination / United States
Civil-military relations
Military doctrine / United States
DIME (Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) elements
Elements of national power
Wiederaufbau (DE-588)4065958-6 gnd rswk-swf
Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd rswk-swf
Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd rswk-swf
Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd rswk-swf
USA
USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf
USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g
Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 s
Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 s
Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 s
Wiederaufbau (DE-588)4065958-6 s
DE-604
Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.) Sonstige (DE-588)1046371-9 oth
spellingShingle Olson, Eric Todd
Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
United States / Army / Civic action
United States / Army / Stability operations
Postwar reconstruction
Counterinsurgency
Nation-building
Integrated operations (Military science)
Interagency coordination / United States
Civil-military relations
Military doctrine / United States
DIME (Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) elements
Elements of national power
Wiederaufbau (DE-588)4065958-6 gnd
Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd
Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd
Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)4065958-6
(DE-588)4039305-7
(DE-588)4112701-8
(DE-588)4003554-2
(DE-588)4078704-7
title Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
title_auth Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
title_exact_search Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
title_full Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot Eric T. Olson
title_fullStr Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot Eric T. Olson
title_full_unstemmed Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot Eric T. Olson
title_short Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
title_sort some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
topic United States / Army / Civic action
United States / Army / Stability operations
Postwar reconstruction
Counterinsurgency
Nation-building
Integrated operations (Military science)
Interagency coordination / United States
Civil-military relations
Military doctrine / United States
DIME (Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) elements
Elements of national power
Wiederaufbau (DE-588)4065958-6 gnd
Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd
Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd
Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd
topic_facet United States / Army / Civic action
United States / Army / Stability operations
Postwar reconstruction
Counterinsurgency
Nation-building
Integrated operations (Military science)
Interagency coordination / United States
Civil-military relations
Military doctrine / United States
DIME (Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) elements
Elements of national power
Wiederaufbau
Militär
Bekämpfung
Aufstand
USA
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