Marzyciele i oportuniści stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
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Warszawa
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu [u.a.]
2009
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| Schriftenreihe: | Monografie / Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
48 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Marzyciele i oportuniści |b stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 |c Paweł Jaworski |
| 264 | 1 | |a Warszawa |b Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu [u.a.] |c 2009 | |
| 300 | |a 444 Seiten |b Illustrationen | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Monografie / Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu |v 48 | |
| 500 | |a Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache | ||
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1939-1945 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Außenpolitik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Weltkrieg (1939-1945) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a World War, 1939-1945 |z Poland | |
| 650 | 4 | |a World War, 1939-1945 |z Sweden | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Polen | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Schweden | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Poland |x Foreign relations |z Sweden | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Sweden |x Foreign relations |z Poland | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Schweden |0 (DE-588)4077258-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
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| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Geschichte 1939-1945 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 810 | 2 | |a Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu |t Monografie |v 48 |w (DE-604)BV017143574 |9 48 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1819590014619615232 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | SPIS TREŚCI
Wstęp
..................................................................................................................................... 7
Część I. W kręgu polityki i propagandy
.............................................................................. 15
1.
W przededniu wojny
......................................................................................................... 17
2.
Agresja Niemiec i Związku Sowieckiego na Polskę ze szwedzkiej perspektywy
......... 27
Pierwsze reakcje
................................................................................................................ 27
Relacje z frontu
.................................................................................................................. 34
Obraz wojny totalnej
......................................................................................................... 40
Atak ze wschodu
................................................................................................................ 43
Końcowa faza kampanii
.................................................................................................... 50
Los dyplomatów szwedzkich w Warszawie
...................................................................... 57
Reprezentacja interesów Polski w Niemczech przez Szwecję
.......................................... 59
3.
W obliczu skutków paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow
............................................................ 73
Po klęsce Polski
................................................................................................................. 73
W czasie wojny zimowej
................................................................................................... 83
4.
Umacnianie się hegemonii niemieckiej w Europie
-
polska strategia podtrzymywania
stosunków i szwedzkie uniki
............................................................................................. 93
Zamrożenie kontaktów po ataku Hitlera na Skandynawię
................................................ 93
Fall Barbarossa
i pozorna poprawa w stosunkach polsko-szwedzkich
.............................
Ш
Polskie i szwedzkie koncepcje federacyjne dla powojennej Europy
................................ 128
Wyjście z marazmu w stosunkach dwustronnych po klęsce Hitlera pod Moskwą
........... 136
5.
Ożywienie kontaktów dwustronnych po bitwie stalingradzkiej
.................................... 147
Polskie działania dyplomatyczne w okresie niepowodzeń
Wehrmachtu
.......................... 147
Szwedzka opinia publiczna o sytuacji w okupowanej Polsce i stosunkach
polsko-sowieckich
............................................................................................................. 152
Szwedzka dyskusja o Katyniu
........................................................................................... 167
6.
Powrót Szwecji do ścisłej neutralności a normalizacja stosunków z rządem polskim
.... 178
Wizyta ministra przemysłu, handlu i żeglugi Jana Kwapińskiego w Sztokholmie
(25
kwietnia-
12
maja
1943
r.)
......................................................................................... 178
Zmiana polityki przez rząd w Sztokholmie
....................................................................... 186
Szwecja wobec sprawy polskiej (styczeń-lipiec
1944
r.)
.................................................. 189
Szwedzkie reakcje na narodziny Polski „lubelskiej
....................................................... 205
Działalność Związku Patriotów Polskich w Szwecji
........................................................ 208
7.
Podwójna gra szwedzkiej dyplomacji (od uznania „Lublina
defacto
do ustanowienia stosunków de iure)
................................................................................. 219
Powstanie Warszawskie ze szwedzkiej perspektywy
........................................................ 219
Walka propagandowa o uznanie polskiego prawa do suwerenności i integralności
terytorialnej
........................................................................................................................ 229
Dyplomatyczne szachy
...................................................................................................... 239
Wokół Jałty
........................................................................................................................ 246
Zerwanie stosunków dyplomatycznych Szwecji z rządem polskim
na uchodźstwie
.................................................................................................................. 268
Część
II.
Kwestie gospodarcze
.............................................................................................. 273
8.
Obecność Szwedów w okupowanej Polsce
...................................................................... 275
9.
Plany polsko-szwedzkiej powojennej współpracy gospodarczej
................................... 295
10.
Misja Brynolfa Enga
....................................................................................................... 329
Część III. Misja humanitarna Szwecji
................................................................................. 335
11.
Los polskich uchodźców
................................................................................................. 337
12.
Szwedzka pomoc humanitarna dla Polski
..................................................................... 353
Działania humanitarne w latach
1939-1944 .................................................................... 353
Plany powojennej pomocy humanitarnej
.......................................................................... 366
Misja
Svena Hellqvista
w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie (jesień
1944
r.)
....................... 371
Szwedzkie transporty humanitarne do Polski „lubelskiej
............................................... 375
Ostatnie rokowania w kwestii przedłużenia pomocy na okres powojenny
....................... 378
13.
Problemy polskich żołnierzy internowanych w Szwecji
.............................................. 381
Marynarze okrętów podwodnych
...................................................................................... 381
Lotnicy
............................................................................................................................... 400
Żołnierze kampanii norweskiej
1940
r.
............................................................................ 405
Zakończenie
............................................................................................................................ 407
Summary
............................................................................................................................... 411
Wykaz skrótów
...................................................................................................................... 417
Bibliografia
............................................................................................................................. 419
Indeks osób
............................................................................................................................. 434
6
SUMMARY
The book Dreamers and Opportunists concerns to the Polish-Swedish relations in
the years
1939-1945.
When Poland regained independence in
1918,
Scandinavia was not a priority area for
the Polish foreign policy and the Swedes, likewise, treated the new partner in the inter¬
national arena with mistrust. Both sides lacked motivation which might encourage closer
political and economic cooperation. A revival of sorts was brought about by the appearance
of Polish coal on the Swedish market in the mid-twenties. However, only minister
Józef
Beck made an attempt to truly intensify mutual contact, based on economic relations and
cooperation in the League of Nations. Common commercial interest and an effort to main¬
tain peace in Europe became the pillars of the good relationship in the Thirties. It can be
concluded that the interwar period was a time of overcoming the Swedish mistrust,
especially the anti-Polish stereotypes instilled by the German propaganda. The common,
though delicate, thread of economic relations and personal contacts paved the way for
more intensive bilateral international relations. The last months of peace and then the war
years put them to a hard test.
In the face of the political tension in Europe, Sweden hid behind the formula of strict
neutrality , drawing from their World War I experience. Poland, in turn, became the main
object of aggression and sought powerful allies. Scandinavia was not a strategic partner
for Poland. The course of military action assigned Sweden the role of an evacuation post,
a haven for the refugees, an important hub of communication with the occupied areas, and
finally
-
being a country which had not suffered from military action
-
Sweden came to
be thought of as a good partner in the economic reconstruction of Poland as the capitula¬
tion of the Third Reich drew on. Sweden considered Poland part of the Central European
trouble, which was closely tracked, although its own commitment was out of the question.
Already in the interwar period, it was plain to see that the Swedish political thinking
horizon (despite significant activity in the League of Nations) was restricted to the Nordic
states and, to a lesser extent, to the Baltic states. During World War
Π
nothing changed.
At the beginning of the war Poland became the theatre of war and, therefore, the
Swedish government and society were highly interested in the Polish affairs. That was
probably the period of the greatest interest in Poland. The Swedish press transmitted re¬
gular information about the fighting on the Polish-German front. The ambition of many
dailies became professional explanation of the course of fighting, with the use of situa-
tional maps and representations of probable scenarios of the future military action. The
ordeal of the civilian population was depicted truthfully. The defeat of the Polish army was
accepted with disappointment. However, it was understood that its reason was the German
411
technological
advantage. The Soviet aggression of
17
September,
1939
was treated as
a natural consequence of the Polish defeat in the fight with the Germans.
Almost immediately conjectures began to be put forward in Stockholm about a peace¬
ful agreement among the superpowers at Poland s expense. Favourable attitudes to a pos¬
sibly quick end to the war dominated within the political elites, even though the brutal
German treatment of the Polish people was known. In fact, all the Nordic states and Finland,
in particular, which maintained tense relations with the Soviet Union, were interested in
an end to the conflict between Germany and the Western superpowers. Then-Swedish
Foreign Affairs Minister Rickard Sandier thought, though, that it would be improper for
Sweden to mediate a peace, considering its obligation to protect Polish interests in Germany,
executed from September 1st on the strength of an appropriate pre-war agreement. The
very principle of the peaceful solution assuming the creation of a territorially reduced
Polish state between the former German border and the new Soviet border (along the
Bug) was unquestioned by Sandier.
Later on, the Swedes became indifferent to the lot of their Southern neighbour from
beyond the Baltic, which was pushed into the background when the turmoil of war
approached Swedish borders, especially during the Soviet-Finnish war, commonly known
as the Winter War.
According to the Polish envoy in Stockholm,
Gustaw Potworowski,
in the next dozen
or so months the Swedish press became insipid , as distinctive comments were avoided
not to invite accusations from either side. Especially news from the
Generalgouverne¬
ment
(German-occupied Poland) was not published for being too awkward . Neverthe¬
less, Potworowski, on the basis of several years of his work in Stockholm, stressed that
even so, the press displayed a lot of good will by informing about the activities of the
Polish government-in-exile from time to time , the formation of the Polish Armed Forces
in the West or lastly, about the tragic situation under the German and Soviet occupation.
After Hitler s invasion of Denmark and Norway and the conquest of France in
1940,
the Swedish foreign policy became an
impassionate
policy of adjustment to the circum¬
stances resulting from the wartime events. Its chief aim was to prevent the potential ag¬
gressors from occupying Sweden. As a result, the Swedes caved in to German political
and economic demands. At that time Polish
-
Swedish relations virtually faded away, not
to mention envoy Potworowski
s
meetings with the Swedish diplomacy management to
deal with current matters .
Most important to the Poles was the question of possible attempts to close down the
diplomatic post. Sweden did not send envoy
Lagerberg
to Angers and then to London, but
it did not attempt to close down the Polish diplomatic mission in Stockholm. Despite the
German pressure in this matter it was consequent in protecting the Polish representation.
It should, nevertheless, be stressed that the Swedish police closely monitored the activi¬
ties of the mission and promptly intervened in the cases of breaking the rules of diplomatic
activity, demanding the compromised officials be removed from the mission.
In
1941,
then-Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister Boheman openly informed Potworowski
about the German demands and the Swedish refusal. Boheman reassured Potworowski
that the Swedish government did not intend to break the rule, though after a while he
added diplomatically; unless extraordinary and unforeseeable circumstances come
about . On his part, Boheman asked the Poles not to give the Germans the slightest pretext
412
to put forward similar demands in the future and not to make it hard for him to maintain
the fundamental stance the Swedish government had assumed. Potworowski, in turn,
thought that it was better to voluntarily and temporarily restrict or even suspend certain
areas of activity than to risk a closure of the mission. He himself did not avoid, however,
to be recognized as persona
ingrata
by the Swedish authorities in
1942,
after the Ger¬
mans had exposed a close cooperation between a group of the Swedish citizens and the
Polish underground movement in Warsaw.
There was no significant interest in the Polish cause until the first defeats of the Ger¬
man armies on the eastern front. Earlier, the Swedes used the excuse of pragmatism in this
matter, doubting whether they should inform and protest against the crimes at all if the
protest was to produce no effect. This was aggravated by other circumstances: isolation
from reality and reluctance to admit that with the successive German invasions, all sorts
of ethical standards were violated. Therefore, the commentators, independently from the
censorship guidelines, did not believe in the reports about mass murders and occupation
terror in Poland. After the battle of Stalingrad, the Swedes started to abandon gradually
the policy concessions to Hitler and initiated a closer cooperation with Great Britain and
the USA. Increasingly the press published isolated reports from occupied Poland which
were not treated strictly as literature, but provided information about the realities of life
under occupation in a tempered form.
From the beginning of
1943
reports about the increasingly exacerbated Polish
-
Soviet
relations started to appear more and more often. It should be noted here that from the au¬
tumn of
1939
until the breakthrough in the war to the advantage of the Allies, the Swedish
avoided official contact with the London-based government because of the German
stance, and from
1943
they still remained wary in confidential relations with the Polish
diplomats, fearing a negative reaction on the Soviet part. The Swedish policy manifested
a fear of Soviet domination in the Baltic Sea area, so the Swedish tried to maintain as good
relations with Moscow as possible. Poland could be an unnecessary obstacle in preserving
those relations.
Swedish reactions to the question of
Katyń
should be considered in this context. The
Union of South Africa representative, Stephanus F.
N.
Gie, whose opinion was recorded
by the Foreign Office, was probably close to the truth in his judgement of them. According
to Gie, the Swedish commentaries on the Polish
-
Soviet conflict were generally un¬
favourable for Poland. No effect was produced by the German brochure based on the re¬
ports of persons invited to the site of the slaying, entitled:
Nackskottet. Dödskogen vid
Katyn (A Shot in the Neck. The Forest of Death in
Katyń).
Gie
s
Swedish interlocutors
thought that the Polish government should be more strictly controlled by the British in
the matter of official statements. Since the Polish should not raise questions which
could be detrimental to the anti-fascist coalition and which, as they claimed, could not
be explained at the time anyway. Interestingly enough, none of them doubted that it was
the NKVD that committed the crime but, at the same time, everyone was aware of the
sacrifice the Soviet Union was making in the fight against the Germans. Generally, the
opinion that the Polish should arrange their relations with the Soviet Union, even under
duress, was predominant. To the Swedish public opinion, the question of
Katyń
was an un¬
pleasant friction in the relations among the Allies, which was considered risky not so much
in the light of a possible rift in the common front against the Germans, but as a harbinger
413
of deterioration in the relations among the victorious superpowers after the end of the war.
In Stockholm, not only the Soviet interpretation of the
Katyń
question, but also the
Soviet stance in the contention about the border with Poland and in the conflict about the
formation of a new political representation for the Polish people in Moscow in opposi¬
tion to the Polish emigration government were relatively quickly adopted. Therefore,
the propaganda conducted by the Polish Mission in Stockholm had a much harder task
to accomplish and mostly fell on deaf ears. Meant to arouse sympathy or even pity for the
Polish people, it was unable to provide support for political action. In March
1943
Pot-
worowski
s
successor, envoy
Henryk Sokolnicki,
assured the headquarters that the
Swedish press assumed a pro-Polish stance in the conflict with the Soviet Union, although
the Swedish correspondents in London succumbed to the Soviet propaganda and, as
a result, promoted the view that the Poles claimed Ukraine as far as Kiev , accusing
Poland of imperialism and a lack of tolerance towards ethnic minorities. Despite the
strenuous efforts of the Polish press attache s office in Stockholm, the majority of Swedish
columnists agreed with the Soviet propaganda slogans claiming that the eastern Polish
frontier
(Kresy)
was mostly inhabited by non-Polish people and therefore no grounds for
it to belong to Poland. This bias was not changed by the visit of the Minister for Industry,
Commerce and Shipping,
Jan Rwapiński,
in Stockholm at the turn of April and May
1943.
The chief Polish Socialist Party activist hoped that his personal contacts with the leaders
of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, headed by the Prime Minister Per
Albin Hans¬
son,
would ensure Swedish support for the Polish government-in-exile in the interna¬
tional arena. All it came down to were declarations of participation in the reconstruction
of the Polish economy after the end of the war.
As representative of the Swedish stance in relation to the Polish -Soviet conflict,
Sven
Grafström
proffered an opinion in a conversation with the Polish press attache
Norbert
Żaba,
explaining in a friendly way that in the present geographical and political situation of Poland
it is impossible to pursue both anti-Soviet and anti-German policy at the same time; it would
be more reasonable not to mention the border problem and not to react to the Soviet activi¬
ties . According to
Żaba,
this belief was relatively widespread in the broad Swedish politi¬
cal circles which supported the Allies. The only solution for Poland was in its opinion of the
choice of a lesser evil, i.e. cooperation with the Soviet Union against the Germans.
Another problem appeared on the political horizon which affected the attitude of the
Swedish public towards Polish affairs. As attache,
Żaba
claimed in a letter to London that
even more dangerous than the communist should be considered the propaganda of the
so-called good Germans, i.e. the German
émigré
community which had, in his opinion,
easier access to the Swedish press than the Soviet agents. A positive stance on Germany
at the moment of their defeat was foreseen much earlier by
Gustaw Potworowski.
Al¬
ready in February
1942,
he informed the headquarters that nowhere in the world could the
good Germans thesis meet with such a favourable response as in Sweden where the
mentality of the society made it willing always to defend the weaker, defeated and thereby,
allegedly aggrieved party . As the time passed, the call for a lenient treatment of the
Germans after the war gained popularity. Towards the end of the war, the pro-German
sympathies, not identified with Nazism but close to the supporters of a European balance,
were still strong. The plans to pass the complete territories of Silesia and
Pomerania
did not
find support in Sweden and were treated as a possible source of new conflicts in the future.
414
Poles, therefore, did not have a real chance to force through their program of defending
the demand for territorial integrity of the Second Republic. The Swedes did not accept the
Polish arguments in the matter of both the eastern and western borders. They assumed the
stance close to the western publicists who thought that Poland was for sure Warsaw and
its vicinities, but father away everything was doubtful . In the opinion of the Polish naval
attaché
in Stockholm Commander Marian
Wolbek,
cold calculation: how to find a way
out the situation risking the least and winning the most got the upper hand. Additionally,
from
1944
the London-based Polish government started striving to maintain its position
as the only representation of the Polish people. Realistically assessing the developments
in Europe, the Swedes anticipated quite early that the Polish government would not re¬
turn to the country. To be sure, they engaged in talks with the Polish mission about the
import of Polish coal after the end of warfare but, as it turned out, this was only to gain
valuable knowledge thanks to the negotiations on the Allies intentions as to the provi¬
sion for the neutral countries and the plans for the post-war reconstruction conducted by
appropriate international organisations appointed for this purpose. Initially, it seemed
there would be a crystallization of common interests specifically on the basis of the re¬
construction of economic relations. However, when the opportunity arose, the Swedes
changed partners in the talks and in the autumn of
1944
they initiated contact with the
representation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Moscow.
On the other hand, Poland could count on a relatively substantial humanitarian aid at
the end of the war. This, treated as an instrument in the foreign policy was a gesture of
good will, in the case of Poland, at the beginning of economic negotiations and an indi¬
cation of the acceptance of the new order created by Stalin in Central Europe. It is certain
that this decision was greatly affected by the tragedy of the Warsaw Rising. Many Swedes
considered the campaign of aid for the inhabitants of the capital as an expression of their
support for the Polish drive towards independence.
The Polish diplomats working in Stockholm viewed the Swedish stance with a lot of un¬
derstanding. They did not overly condemn it for submissiveness to Germany. The oppor¬
tunism in relations with the Soviet Union was accepted with much greater dis-appointment.
In this context, interesting trends in the interpretation of the Swedish policy could be per¬
ceived in the Polish press-in-exile, where between
1939
and
1943
the neutrality policy was
criticised and identified with consent to Hitler s invasions, and between
1944
and
1945
the
caution in the relations with the Soviet Union and willingness to remain out of the allied
camp till the end of the war were accepted. Through the reports about the Swedish human¬
itarian aid on Polish territory and about the good living conditions of Poles, refugees and
internees in Sweden, the positive image of this country was perpetuated in the conscious¬
ness of the Polish reader (although the descriptions of the Swedish welfare could excite
mixed feelings).
A sentiment for Poland was generally alien to the Swedish politicians. It should be
stressed that the diplomats who dealt with Polish affairs had a positive attitude towards
Poland even before the war.
Sven Grafström
and Erik Boheman were not only well-versed
in the complicated relations between Poland and its neighbours, but also understood the
motives for the activities of the government-in-exile. However, it is difficult to talk about
any pro-Polish lobby in Sweden. A close group was formed by a few people from the
diplomatic elite and several industrialists who acted discretely. Swedish entrepreneurs
415
representing their firms in the the
Generalgouvernement
cooperated with the Polish re¬
sistance.
Sven Norrman
and
Gösta Gustafsson
especially rendered exceptional services as
couriers of the Polish Underground State and the Home Army. Even years later, they did
not boast of their activities in Poland s interest.
On one hand, there was Polish heroism and dreams of independence as a result of
sacrifice and the fight for the right cause, on the other, Swedish opportunism and striving
for a compromise as a way of weathering the war turmoil. It is hard to unambiguously
evaluate the Swedish policy. It is easy to perceive its delaying tactics, timidity and the
antiheroic attitude of an observer, but, in its realism, there was careful manoeuvring among
the mutually exclusive aspirations of the superpowers. In Sweden s stance on the Polish
cause, it is possible to notice political pragmatism which is best conveyed by the statement
made by
Östen Undén,
the Swedish
pre-
and post-war Minister for Foreign Affairs and
a government adviser during the Second World War: such small countries as ours can
only rarely affect the course of events. Such countries also cannot help others in the event
of war. In this way, the Swedish elites rejected any accusations of unethical conduct and
excused their dissociation from common responsibility for the situation in the Baltic Sea
region.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Jaworski, Paweł 1971- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1156356040 |
| author_facet | Jaworski, Paweł 1971- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Jaworski, Paweł 1971- |
| author_variant | p j pj |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035687076 |
| callnumber-first | D - World History |
| callnumber-label | DK4185 |
| callnumber-raw | DK4185.S8 |
| callnumber-search | DK4185.S8 |
| callnumber-sort | DK 44185 S8 |
| callnumber-subject | DK - Russia, Soviet Union, Former Soviet Republics, Poland |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)463662638 (DE-599)BVBBV035687076 |
| era | Geschichte 1939-1945 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1939-1945 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Polen Schweden Poland Foreign relations Sweden Sweden Foreign relations Poland Schweden (DE-588)4077258-5 gnd Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Polen Schweden Poland Foreign relations Sweden Sweden Foreign relations Poland |
| id | DE-604.BV035687076 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-23T22:07:51Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788376290379 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-017741229 |
| oclc_num | 463662638 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-M352 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-M352 |
| physical | 444 Seiten Illustrationen |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Monografie / Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu |
| spellingShingle | Jaworski, Paweł 1971- Marzyciele i oportuniści stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 Außenpolitik Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 Poland World War, 1939-1945 Sweden |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4077258-5 (DE-588)4046496-9 |
| title | Marzyciele i oportuniści stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 |
| title_auth | Marzyciele i oportuniści stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 |
| title_exact_search | Marzyciele i oportuniści stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 |
| title_full | Marzyciele i oportuniści stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 Paweł Jaworski |
| title_fullStr | Marzyciele i oportuniści stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 Paweł Jaworski |
| title_full_unstemmed | Marzyciele i oportuniści stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 Paweł Jaworski |
| title_short | Marzyciele i oportuniści |
| title_sort | marzyciele i oportunisci stosunki polsko szwedzkie w latach 1939 1945 |
| title_sub | stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939 - 1945 |
| topic | Außenpolitik Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 Poland World War, 1939-1945 Sweden |
| topic_facet | Außenpolitik Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 Poland World War, 1939-1945 Sweden Polen Schweden Poland Foreign relations Sweden Sweden Foreign relations Poland |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017741229&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017741229&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV017143574 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jaworskipaweł marzycieleioportuniscistosunkipolskoszwedzkiewlatach19391945 |