Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?

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Hauptverfasser: Rangel, Antonio (VerfasserIn), Zeckhauser, Richard 1940- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. 1999
Schriftenreihe:Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 6949
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MARC

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Datensatz im Suchindex

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Zeckhauser, Richard 1940-
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Zeckhauser, Richard 1940-
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series2 Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
spelling Rangel, Antonio Verfasser aut
Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing? Antonio Rangel ; Richard Zeckhauser
Cambridge, Mass. 1999
33 S. graph. Darst.
txt rdacontent
n rdamedia
nc rdacarrier
Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 6949
Zeckhauser, Richard 1940- Verfasser (DE-588)124565492 aut
National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper series 6949 (DE-604)BV002801238 6949
spellingShingle Rangel, Antonio
Zeckhauser, Richard 1940-
Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?
title Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?
title_auth Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?
title_exact_search Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?
title_full Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing? Antonio Rangel ; Richard Zeckhauser
title_fullStr Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing? Antonio Rangel ; Richard Zeckhauser
title_full_unstemmed Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing? Antonio Rangel ; Richard Zeckhauser
title_short Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing?
title_sort can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing
volume_link (DE-604)BV002801238
work_keys_str_mv AT rangelantonio canmarketandvotinginstitutionsgenerateoptimalintergenerationalrisksharing
AT zeckhauserrichard canmarketandvotinginstitutionsgenerateoptimalintergenerationalrisksharing