Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments

This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. Using analytically and numerically solved equi...

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Hauptverfasser: Bovenberg, Ary Lans 1958- (VerfasserIn), Goulder, Lawrence H. 1951- (VerfasserIn), Jacobsen, Mark R. (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007
Schriftenreihe:Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13331
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245 1 0 |a Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments  |c A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen 
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520 |a This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we compare the incidence and economy-wide costs of emissions taxes, fuel (intermediate input) taxes, performance standards and mandated technologies in the absence and presence of this compensation requirement. Compensation is provided either through lump-sum industry tax credits or industry-specific cuts in capital tax rates. We decompose the added costs from the compensation requirement into (1) an increase in intrinsic abatement cost, reflecting a lowered efficiency of pollution abatement, and (2) a lump-sum compensation cost that captures the efficiency costs of financing the compensation. The compensation requirement affects these components differently and thus can alter the cost-rankings of policies. When compensation is provided through tax credits, the lump-sum compensation cost is higher under the emissions tax than under performance standards and mandated technologies -- a reflection of the emission tax's higher compensation requirements. If in this setting the required pollution reduction is modest, imposing the compensation requirement causes the emissions tax to become more costly than command and control policies. In contrast, if required abatement is extensive, the emissions tax emerges as the most cost-effective policy because its relatively low intrinsic abatement costs assume greater importance. 
700 1 |a Goulder, Lawrence H.  |d 1951-  |e Verfasser  |0 (DE-588)128841664  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Jacobsen, Mark R.  |e Verfasser  |0 (DE-588)133777553  |4 aut 
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999 |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908562 

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author Bovenberg, Ary Lans 1958-
Goulder, Lawrence H. 1951-
Jacobsen, Mark R.
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spelling Bovenberg, Ary Lans 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)124153933 aut
Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007
44, [10] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm
txt rdacontent
n rdamedia
nc rdacarrier
Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13331
This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we compare the incidence and economy-wide costs of emissions taxes, fuel (intermediate input) taxes, performance standards and mandated technologies in the absence and presence of this compensation requirement. Compensation is provided either through lump-sum industry tax credits or industry-specific cuts in capital tax rates. We decompose the added costs from the compensation requirement into (1) an increase in intrinsic abatement cost, reflecting a lowered efficiency of pollution abatement, and (2) a lump-sum compensation cost that captures the efficiency costs of financing the compensation. The compensation requirement affects these components differently and thus can alter the cost-rankings of policies. When compensation is provided through tax credits, the lump-sum compensation cost is higher under the emissions tax than under performance standards and mandated technologies -- a reflection of the emission tax's higher compensation requirements. If in this setting the required pollution reduction is modest, imposing the compensation requirement causes the emissions tax to become more costly than command and control policies. In contrast, if required abatement is extensive, the emissions tax emerges as the most cost-effective policy because its relatively low intrinsic abatement costs assume greater importance.
Goulder, Lawrence H. 1951- Verfasser (DE-588)128841664 aut
Jacobsen, Mark R. Verfasser (DE-588)133777553 aut
Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13331 (DE-604)BV002801238 13331
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13331.pdf kostenfrei Volltext
spellingShingle Bovenberg, Ary Lans 1958-
Goulder, Lawrence H. 1951-
Jacobsen, Mark R.
Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments
title Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments
title_auth Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments
title_exact_search Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments
title_exact_search_txtP Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments
title_full Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen
title_fullStr Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen
title_full_unstemmed Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen
title_short Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments
title_sort industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments
url http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13331.pdf
volume_link (DE-604)BV002801238
work_keys_str_mv AT bovenbergarylans industrycompensationandthecostsofalternativeenvironmentalpolicyinstruments
AT goulderlawrenceh industrycompensationandthecostsofalternativeenvironmentalpolicyinstruments
AT jacobsenmarkr industrycompensationandthecostsofalternativeenvironmentalpolicyinstruments