Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending

We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might give rise to them. Our analysis is based on unique data from a large auto sales company that serves the subprime market. We first document the role of short-term liquidity in driving purchasing beha...

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Hauptverfasser: Adams, William (VerfasserIn), Einav, Liran 1970- (VerfasserIn), Levin, Jonathan 1972- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007
Schriftenreihe:Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13067
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Datensatz im Suchindex

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spelling Adams, William Verfasser (DE-588)132985306 aut
Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending William Adams ; Liran Einav ; Jonathan Levin
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007
41 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm
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Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13067
We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might give rise to them. Our analysis is based on unique data from a large auto sales company that serves the subprime market. We first document the role of short-term liquidity in driving purchasing behavior, including sharp increases in demand during tax rebate season and a high sensitivity to minimum down payment requirements. We then explore the informational problems facing subprime lenders. We find that default rates rise significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for lenders to impose loan caps because of moral hazard. We also find that borrowers at the highest risk of default demand the largest loans, but the degree of adverse selection is mitigated substantially by effective risk-based pricing.
Einav, Liran 1970- Verfasser (DE-588)130571709 aut
Levin, Jonathan 1972- Verfasser (DE-588)129325252 aut
Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13067 (DE-604)BV002801238 13067
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13067.pdf kostenfrei Volltext
spellingShingle Adams, William
Einav, Liran 1970-
Levin, Jonathan 1972-
Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending
title Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending
title_auth Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending
title_exact_search Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending
title_full Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending William Adams ; Liran Einav ; Jonathan Levin
title_fullStr Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending William Adams ; Liran Einav ; Jonathan Levin
title_full_unstemmed Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending William Adams ; Liran Einav ; Jonathan Levin
title_short Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending
title_sort liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending
url http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13067.pdf
volume_link (DE-604)BV002801238
work_keys_str_mv AT adamswilliam liquidityconstraintsandimperfectinformationinsubprimelending
AT einavliran liquidityconstraintsandimperfectinformationinsubprimelending
AT levinjonathan liquidityconstraintsandimperfectinformationinsubprimelending