Contracting with companies

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1. Verfasser: Griffiths, Andrew (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Oxford [u.a.] Hart 2005
Schriftenreihe:Contemporary studies in corporate law
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_version_ 1819704598886088704
adam_text CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES ANDREW GRIFFITHS SCHOOL OFLAW UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE VII TABLE OFCASES XIX TABLE OFLEGISLATION XXIX 1 ATTRIBUTION AND RISK ASSIGNNTENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL AND 1 ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 1 ATTRIBUTION 1 1.1 THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS TO A COMPANY: 2 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1.2 THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS TO A 6 COMPANY: THE CURRENT POSITION 1.3 THE APPROACH OF THIS BOOK 9 2 SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW 11 GOVERNING ATTRIBUTION 2.1 LACK OF FOCUS ON THE ARTIFICIAL NATURE OF CORPORATE 11 PERSONALITY 2.2 STATUTORY REFORM 13 2.3 COMPETITIVENESS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 15 AND COMPANY LAW 3 ATTRIBUTION AS ASSIGNMENTOF RISK 15 3.1 IMPROVING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THROUGH RULES OF LAW 17 3.2 IMPROVING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THROUGH THE DETAIL 18 OF RULES OF LAW 3.3 RULES OF LAW AND THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 20 2 ASSIGNING RISK: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE LAW GOVERNING 23 CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 1 THE AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER 23 2 AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF RULES OF LAW 24 2.1 THE USE OF ECONOMICS IN THE ANALYSIS OF LAW 24 2.2 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPANY LAW 25 2.3 COMPETITIVE COMPANIES: COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC 27 PROCESS 2.4 DIFFERING APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 28 TO THE FUTURE 3 STANDARDS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 31 3.1 NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31 X CONTENTS 3.1.1 WEALTH MAXIMISATION AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 31 3.1.2 PARETO EFFICIENCY 32 3.1.3 KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY 33 3.1.4 CONTRACTING IN NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 34 3.1.5 THE ROLE OF LEGAL RULES IN NEO-CLASSICAL ANALYSIS 34 3.2 ALTERNATIVES TO NEO-CLASSICAL ANALYSIS 35 3.2.1 THE NEO-INSTITUTIONAV SCHOOLS 35 3.2.2 CONTRACTING IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 36 AND OPPORTUNISTN 3.2.3 INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING 37 3.3 OTHER NOTIONS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 38 3.3.1 PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 38 3.3.2 DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 38 3.3.3 LEGAL INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION 39 3.4 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND INFORMATION 41 3.4.2 INFORMATION AND TRANSACTION COSTS 41 3.4.2 INFORMATION AND THE STIMULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 43 AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF THE COMPANY 43 4.1 THE LEGAL INSTITUTION 43 4.2 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE COMPANY 46 4.2.1 THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS MODEL 46 4.2.2 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OFCORPORATE MANAGEMENT 47 4.2.3 THE SEPARATION OF MANAGEMENT FROM OWNERSHIP 48 4.2.4 VOTING RIGHTS AS A CONTRACTUAL SAFEGUARD 49 FOR SHAREHOLDERS 4.2.5 MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND THE DANGER OF OPPORTUNISTN 50 4.3 DIFFERING ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO THE COMPANY 52 AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 53 5.1 THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF A COMPANY 53 5.2 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 54 5.3 CORPORATE AGENCY 55 AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING 56 THE RULES GOVERNING CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 6.1 LIMITING THE AUTHORITY OF CORPORATE AGENTS 56 6.1.1 THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF LIMITS ON ACTUAL AUTHORITY 56 6.1.2 THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE REMEDY OF INVALIDITY 58 6.2 THE ECONOMIC COST FOR COMPANIES OF OVERRIDING RULES 60 OF ATTRIBUTION 6.2.1 THE RISK OFLOSSFROM UNAUTHORISED CONTRACTS 60 6.2.2 AN INCREASED RISK OFLOSS AND LIMITED LIABILITY 61 6.2.3 FACTORS THAT MITIGATE THE RISK OFLOSSFROM UNAUTHORISED 62 CONTRACTS 6.2.4 TAKING AVOIDING ACTION TO MINIMISE THE RISK OFLOSS 63 6.2.5 THE QUALITY OFCORPORATE AGENTS 64 CONTENTS XI 6.2.6 THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OFTHE REMEDY OFLNVALIDITY 65 6.3 THE COST FOR THIRD PARTIES OF A RISK OF INVALIDITY 66 6.3.2 TRANSACTION COSTS 66 6.3.2 SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THIRD PARTIES 68 6.3.3 AGENTS BEHAVIOUR AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION 68 6.3.4 THIRD PARTIES AS THE LEAST-COST-AVOIDER 70 7 ANALYSING THE LAW GOVERNING CONTRACTING 71 WITH COMPANIES 3 THE POWER TO MAKE CONTRACTS FOR A COMPANY 73 1 THE LEGAL SOURCE OF CONTRACTUAL POWER 73 2 THE CONSTITUNONOFA COMPANY 76 2.1 THE LEGAL ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTION 76 2.2 THE FORMAT OF A COMPANY S CONSTITUTION 77 2.3 THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A COMPANY S CONSTITUTION 78 2.4 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SHAREHOLDERS 81 RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 3 THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTUREOFA COMPANY 82 3.1 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 82 3.2.2 THE BOARD AS A COMPANY S PRINCIPAL ORGAN 82 OF MANAGEMENT 3.1.2 THE BOARD S AUTONOMY AS AN ORGAN OFTHE COMPANY 83 3.1.3 THE OPERATION OFTHE BOARD AS AN ORGAN OFGOVERNANCE 85 3.2 THE SHAREHOLDERS 88 3.2.2 THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 88 3.2.2 THE OPERATION OFTHE SHAREHOLDERS AS 90 A DECISION-MAKING BODY 3.2.3 THE SHAREHOLDERS POWERS OF MANAGEMENT 90 3.2.4 THE ANCILLARY POWERS OF RATIFICATION AND RELEASE 91 3.2.5 SHAREHOLDERS AND MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING 92 3.2.6 THE GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANCILLARY POWERS 93 3.2.7 DECISION-MAKING ON BEHALF OF AN INSOLVENT COMPANY 94 4 THE ACTUAL AUTHORITY OFTHE BOARD TO MAKE 95 CONTRACTS 4.1 THE VESTING OF CONTRACTUAL POWER IN THE BOARD 95 4.2.2 THE VESTING PROCESS 95 4.1.2 IDENTIFYING THE BOARD 96 4.2 THE SPECIFICATION OF THE COMPANY S CONTRACTUAL POWER 97 4.2.2 THE CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY OF A COMPANY 97 4.2.2 CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY AND THE OBJECTS CLAUSE 98 4.3 THE POWERS OF THE COMPANY 100 4.3.2 THE CONSTITUTION S ROLE IN DEFINING THE POWERS OF THE 100 COMPANY 4.3.2 DISTINGUISHING LIMITS ON THE POWERS OFTHE COMPANY FROM 101 LIMITS ON THE POWERS OFTHE BOARD XII CONTENTS 4.4 THE POWERS OF THE BOARD 102 4.4.2 THE LIMITING EFFECT OF THE OBJECTS CLAUSE 102 4.4.2 OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE BOARD S POWERS 103 4.4.3 DIRECTORS DUTIES AS LIMITS ON THE BOARD S POWERS? 104 4.4.4 THE PROPER PURPOSES DOCTRINE 106 CONTRACTING BEYOND THE LIMITS ON 108 THE BOARD S AUTHORITY 5.1 THE SHAREHOLDERS ANCILLARY POWERS 108 5.1.2 THE NEED TO OVERRIDE THE LIMITS ON THE BOARD 108 5.1.2 THE SHAREHOLDERS POWERS TO OVERRIDE THE LIMITS 109 ON THE BOARD 5.1.3 THE ECONOMIC COSTS OFSETTING LIMITS HO ON THE BOARD S AUTHORITY 5.2. OBTAINING THE SHAREHOLDERS APPROVAL FOR A CONTRACT 111 5.2.2 EXPENSE, DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY 111 5.2.2 MITIGATING THE UNCERTAINTY OF DELAY 112 5.2.3 THE BOARD S AUTHORITY TO GIVE UNDERTAKINGS 113 ABOUT THEIR FUTURE CONDUCT CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 115 6.1 THE RATIONALE OF LIMITING THE BOARD S ACTUAL AUTHORITY 115 6.2 THE BALANDNG EXERCISE 117 6.3 THE SCOPE FOR EVOLVING AN EFFICIENT DIVISION OF POWERS 118 6.4 PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 119 6.5 THE COST FOR THIRD PARTIES 121 4 ISSUESOFLDENTITYANDEXISTENCE 123 1 INTRODUCTION 123 2 THE IDENTIFICATION OF CORPORATE 126 CONTRACTING PARTIES 2.1 SEEKING THE PRESUMED COMMON INTENTION 126 OF THE PARTIES 2.2 CONFUSING THE IDENTITY OF CONNECTED COMPANIES 128 2.3 ENSURING THE ACCURATE USE OF A COMPANY S 130 REGISTERED NAME 3 THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A CORPORATE CONTRACTUAL 132 PARTY: PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS AND OTHER SCENARIOS 3.1 THE RISK OF NON-EXISTENCE 132 3.2 THE COMMON LAW RULES 133 3.3 PLANNING AHEAD OF INCORPORATION 138 4 STATUTORY REFORM 139 4.1 THE FIRST EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE 139 4.2 SECTION 36C OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985 140 CONTENTS XIII 4.2.2 THE TERMS OFTHE PROVISION 140 4.2.2 LEGAL ISSUES ARISINGFROM THE WORDING OFTHE PROVISION 141 5 THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF SECTION 36C 141 5.1 THE PROVISO TO SECTION 36C 141 5.2 THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE CONTRACT GIVEN EFFECT 142 BY SECTION 36C 5.2.2 CAN THE AGENT ENFORCE THE CONTRACT AGAINST 142 THE THIRD PARTY? 5.2.2 THE BRAYMIST CASE: ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY 142 5.2.3 THE COURT OFAPPEAL S JUDGMENT 143 5.2.4 REVIEW OFTHE COURT OF APPEALS JUDGMENT IN BRAYMIST 145 5.3 WHO IS THE PERSON PURPORTING TO ACT FOR THE COMPANY 146 OR AS AGENT FOR IT IN SECTION 36C? 5.3.2 DISTINGUISHING DECISION-MAKING 146 FROM DECISION-IMPLEMENTING AGENTS 5.3.2 THE BRAYMIST CASE: LIMITING SECTION 36C 146 TO DECISION-IMPLEMENTING AGENTS 5.3.3 REVIEW OFETHERTON J S JUDGMENT IN BRAYMIST 147 5.4 CONTRACTING WITH A COMPANY THAT 148 HAS NOT BEEN FORMED 5.4.2 PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS AS PART 148 OF A BROADER CATEGORY 5.4.2 TWO SUB-CATEGORIES OF PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT 148 5.4.3 COMPANIES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN FORMED ? 149 5.4.4 MUST THE NON-EXISTENT COMPANY 150 HAVE BEEN FORMED LATER? 5.4.5 THE PLACE OF INCORPORATION OFA COMPANY 150 SUBSEAUENTLY FORMED 5.4.6 THE EXCLUSION OF POST-DISSOLUTION CONTRACTS 152 5.4.7 REVIEW OFTHE COTRONIC DECISION 155 5.5 CLAIMS FOR A QUANTUM MERUIT FO R WORK DONE 155 6 THE CONTRACTS (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) 156 ACT 1999 6.1 NOVATION AND RATIFICATION AT COMMON LAW 156 6.2 A COMPANY S RIGHT TO ENFORCE 157 PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS 7 CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 158 CONTRACTING WITH THE BOARD 161 1 INTRODUCTION 161 1.1 THE NEED FOR A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 161 FOR THIRD PARTIES 1.2 THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT THIRD PARTIES ENJOY 163 SECURITY OF TRANSACTION XIV CONTENTS OVERRIDING A COMPANY S LIMITED CONTRACTUAL 164 CAPACITY 2.1 THE CURRENT POSITION 164 2.2 THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES 165 2.2.1 THE NATURE OF THE DOCTRINE 165 2.2.2 THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE 166 2.2.3 THE RATIONALE OF THE DOCTRINE 167 2.3 THE NEED FOR REFORM 168 2.4 SECTION 35 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985 169 2.4.2 A PRESUMPTION OF UNLIMITED CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY? 169 2.4.2 DISTINGUISHING A COMPANY S LIMITED CONTRACTUAL 170 CAPACITY FROM THE LIMITED ACTUAL AUTHORITY OFITS BOARD THE BOARD S ACTUAL AUTHORITY 170 3.1 THE LIMITS ON A BOARD S ACTUAL AUTHORITY 170 3.2 THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A CONTRACT MADE WITHOUT ACTUAL 173 AUTHORITY 3.3 THE OVERRIDING RULES OF ATTRIBUTION APPLICABLE 174 TO CONTRACTS MADE OR APPROVED BY A COMPANY S BOARD 3.3.2 THE COMMON LAW APPROACH 174 3.3.2 THE NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM 177 THE STATUTORY RULES OF ATTRIBUTION 178 4.1 SECTION 36A(6) 178 4.2 SECTION 35A 179 4.2.2 THE NATURE OFTHE STATUTORY REFORM 179 4.2.2 ELABORATION OFTHE TERMS OF SECTION 35A 179 4.2.3 THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW S RECOMMENDATIONS 180 4.2.4 QUALIFICATION BY SECTION 322A 180 4.2.5 ANALYSIS OF SECTION 35A 181 4.3 A PERSON DEALING WITH A COMPANY 182 4.3.2 ANY LEGAL PERSON OTHER THAN THE COMPANY 182 4.3.2 SECTION 35A AND DIRECTORS 183 4.3.3 CERTAIN DIRECTORS CANNOT BE A PERSON DEALING 184 WITH A COMPANY 4.3.4 SECTION 35A AND SHAREHOLDERS 185 4.4 THE POWER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 188 4.4.2 IDENTIFYING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 188 4.4.2 THE RELEVANCE OFPROCEDURAEL REGULATIONS SUCH 188 AS QUORUM REAUIREMENTS 4.4.3 DO PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS DEFINE THE BOARD 189 OR MERELY LIMIT ITS POWERS? 4.4.4 THE APPROACH TO THE ISSUE IN THE HENNIKER-MAJOR CASE 190 4.4.5 REVIEW OFTHE SECOND CONDITION OEFTER 192 THE HENNIKER-MAJOR JUDGMENTS 4.4.6 THE COMPLEMENTARY POWERS OFTHE SHAREHOLDERS 193 CONTENTS XV 5 THE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION 194 5.1 A THIRD CONDITION OF SECTION 35A 194 5.2 THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND 195 5.2.2 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 195 5.2.2 A DUTY TO MAKE FURTHER INQUIRY AS 196 AN EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OFRISK 5.3 REBUTTING THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH 198 5.3.2 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OFTHE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION 198 5.3.2 THE INEFFICIENCY OF KNOWLEDGE AS A QUALIFYING FACTOR 199 5.3.3 GOOD FAITH AND LIABILITYFOR KNOWING RECEIPT 200 5.4 ATTRIBUTING KNOWLEDGE TO A CORPORATE THIRD PARTY 200 5.4.2 THE PROBLEM OF ATTRIBUTING OR IMPUTING KNOWLEDGE 200 TO A COMPANY 5.4.2 DETERMINING THE KNOWLEDGE OFA COMPANY 201 FOR THE PURPOSES OF KNOWING RECEIPT 6 A THIRD PARTY S LIABILITYFOR KNOWING RECEIPT 203 6.1 THE CONDITIONS OF LIABILITY 203 6.2 THE REQUIREMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 205 6.3 A THIRD PARTY S RIGHT TO PURSUE ITS OWN 206 COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 6.3.2 THE DANGER OF AN INEFFICIENT RISK OF LIABILITY 206 6.3.2 THE AKINDELE CASE 208 6.3.3 THE AKINDELE TEST OF UNCONSCIONABILITY 209 6.4 THE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION TO SECTION 35A 212 7 CONTRACTS WITH DIRECTORS OR OTHER 213 DESIGNATED PERSONS 7.1 SECTION 322A 213 7.2.2 THE AMBIT AND EFFECT OF SECTION 322A 213 7.1.2 THE RATIONALE OF SECTION 322A 214 7.2 SECTION 322A AND MULTI-PARTY CONTRACTS 215 8 CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 216 6 CONTRACTING WITH OTHER CORPORATE AGENTS 219 1 INTRODUCTION 219 1.1 THE CASE FOR ENSURING RELIABILITY 219 1.2 THE AUTHORITY OF SUBORDINATE AGENTS 220 1.3 DEALING WITH SUBORDINATE AGENTS 220 1.4 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE OVERRIDING RULES 222 OF ATTRIBUTION APPLICABLE TO SUBORDINATE AGENTS 2 THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LAW 224 2.1 OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 224 2.2 DETERMINING THE OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 225 OF CORPORATE AGENTS 3 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 227 XVI CONTENTS 3.1 THE NATURE OF THE RULE 227 3.2.2 APRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY 227 3.1.2 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF IRREGULARITY 228 3.1.3 STATEMENT OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 229 3.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 229 3.2.2 A CORPORATE AGENT S APPEARANCE OF AUTHORITY 229 3.2.2 THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 230 3.3 CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PUT A THIRD PARTY ON INQUIRY 232 3.3.2 A THIRD PARTY S DUTY TO FIND OUT MORE 232 3.3.2 CIRCUMSTANCES PUTTING A THIRD PARTY ON INQUIRY 233 3.3.3 CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THIRD PARTIES ARE 234 THE LEAST-COST-AVOIDER 3.3.4 FACTORS PUTTING THIRD PARTIES ON INQUIRY 236 3.4 THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 238 3.4.2 THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AS AN INSTANCE 238 OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 3.4.2 THE PROBLEM OFFINDING A REPRESENTATION 239 OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY THE DIPLOCK APPROACH TO CORPORATE AGENCY 240 4.1 ADAPTING AGENCY LAW TO CORPORATE PERSONALITY 240 4.2 THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW IN THE FREEMAN 241 & LOCKYER CASE 4.3 THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 244 4.3.1 THE FOUR CONDITIONS OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 244 4.3.2 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 244 AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS 245 OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 5.1 A REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY 245 5.2.2 REPRESENTING THE AUTHORITY OFA CORPORATE AGENT 245 5.1.2 THE SCOPE OFA REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY 246 5.2 SOMEONE WITH ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO MANAGE 247 THE COMPANY MUST MAKE THE REPRESENTATION 5.2.2 THE REPRESENTATION MUST BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE 247 COMPANY 5.2.2 AUTHORITY TO BE A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 248 FOR THIRD PARTIES? 5.2.3 THE ECONOMIC COST OFNOT HAVING 250 A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 5.2.4 THE AGENT AS A REFERENCE POINT 252 5.2.5 THE AGENT AS A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 253 5.2.6 THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY IN THE LAW 256 5.3 THE REPRESENTATION MUST HAVE INDUCED THE THIRD PARTY 257 TO ENTER THE CONTRACT CONTENTS XVII 5.3.2 THE NEED FOR RELIANCE 257 5.3.2 A THIRD PARTY S SUSPICION MAY NEGATE RELIANCE 258 5.3.3 ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE NEGATES RELIANCE 258 5.4 THE COMPANY HAS THE CAPACITY TO ENTER 260 THE CONTRACT AND TO DELEGATE THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO THE AGENT 6 THE ABOLITION OF THE DOCTRINE 261 OF CONSTRUCTIVE OR DEEMED NOTICE 7 CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 262 7 CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 265 1 INTRODUCTTON 265 1.1 THE MEANING OF SELF-DEALING 265 1.2 THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SELF-DEALING 266 1.3 THE LAW GOVERNING CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 267 1.4 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF REGULATING SELF-DEALING 270 1.5 DISCLOSURE IN A UNITARY BOARD SYSTEM 272 1.6 THE STRUCTURE OF THE LAW 273 2 IDENTIFYING CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 274 2.1 DEFINING A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 274 2.2 THE AMBIT OF THE NO CONFLICT RULE 275 2.3 THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW 276 3 THE EFFECT OF SELF-DEALING ON THE POWER 277 TO MAKE CONTRACTS FOR COMPANIES 3.1 ACTUAL AUTHORITY 277 3.1.2 THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE POWER TO AWARD REMUNERATION 277 3.1.2 OTHER SPECIAL LIMITS AFFECTING ACTUAL AUTHORITY 278 3.2 BREACH OF THE DIRECTORS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 280 4 SELF-DEALING AND THE OVERRIDING RULES 281 OF ATTRIBUTION 4.1 SECTION 35A OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985 281 4.2 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 282 4.3 OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY AND THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 284 5 THE ADDITIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE VALIDITY 285 OF CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 6 THE REQUIREMENT TO DECLARE OR DISCLOSE AN 287 INTEREST IN A CONTRACT INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 6.1 THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 287 6.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT S 288 HAVING TWO LEGAL SOURCES 6.3 COMPLYING WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 290 6.4 WHAT MUST A DIRECTOR DISCLOSE TO SATISFY 293 THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT? XVUEI CONTENTS 6.4.1 INADEQUATE DISCLOSURE 293 6.4.2 LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE DISCLOSURE 294 6.4.3 THE LIMITS OF THE REQUIRED DISCLOSURE 295 6.5 THE LEGAL EFFECT ON A CONTRACT OF A FAILURE TO COMPLY 296 WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 6.5.1 THE COMPANY S RIGHT TO AVOID THE CONTRACT 296 6.5.2 AN ELECTION NOT TO RESCIND 297 6.5.3 AN INNOCENT THIRD PARTY 297 6.5.4 UNREASONABLE DELAY OR ACQUIESCENCE 298 6.5.5 IMPOSSIBILITY OF RESTITUTION 299 7 SPECIAL REGIMES UNDER PART X 300 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985 7.1 CONTRACTS INVOLVING AN ENHANCED RISK OF ABUSE 300 7.2 DIRECTORS REMUNERATION 301 8 SECTION 320 OFTHE COMPANIES ACT 1985 303 8.1 SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS 303 8.2 THE RATIONALE OF SECTION 320 303 8.2.1 ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE SHAREHOLDERS 303 8.2.2 SECTION 320 AND THE UNANIMOUS CONSENT RULE 306 8.3 THE CONDITIONS THAT TRIGGER SECTION 320 307 8.3.1 THE STATUTORY CONDITIONS 307 8.3.2 AN ARRANGEMENT 308 8.3.3 NON CASH ASSETS 308 8.3.4 THE VALUE OFTHE NON-CASH ASSET 309 8.3.5 THE COMPANY S ASSET VALUE 311 8.4 CONSEQUENTIAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 322 311 9 CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 312 INDEX 315
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id DE-604.BV021532615
illustrated Not Illustrated
indexdate 2024-12-23T19:17:49Z
institution BVB
isbn 1841131547
language English
lccn 2005472074
oai_aleph_id oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014748941
oclc_num 248889235
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owner DE-M382
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owner_facet DE-M382
DE-526
physical XXXIII, 321 S.
publishDate 2005
publishDateSearch 2005
publishDateSort 2005
publisher Hart
record_format marc
series2 Contemporary studies in corporate law
spellingShingle Griffiths, Andrew
Contracting with companies
Contracts England
Contracts Wales
Commercial law England
Commercial law Wales
title Contracting with companies
title_auth Contracting with companies
title_exact_search Contracting with companies
title_full Contracting with companies Andrew Griffiths
title_fullStr Contracting with companies Andrew Griffiths
title_full_unstemmed Contracting with companies Andrew Griffiths
title_short Contracting with companies
title_sort contracting with companies
topic Contracts England
Contracts Wales
Commercial law England
Commercial law Wales
topic_facet Contracts England
Contracts Wales
Commercial law England
Commercial law Wales
url http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014748941&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
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