U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win?

"U.S. v. Microsoft and the related state suit filed in 1998 appear finally to have concluded. In a unanimous en banc decision issued in late June 2004, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the remedies approved by the District Court in November 2002. The wave of follow-on pr...

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Hauptverfasser: Evans, David S. 1954- (VerfasserIn), Nichols, Albert L. (VerfasserIn), Schmalensee, Richard 1944- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005
Schriftenreihe:National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: Working paper series 11727
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Datensatz im Suchindex

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Nichols, Albert L.
Schmalensee, Richard 1944-
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Thus, for those who believe that the courts were right in finding that some of Microsoft's actions harmed competition, the constraints placed on its behavior and the active, ongoing oversight by the Court and the plaintiffs provide useful protection against a recurrence of such harm. For those who believe that Microsoft should not have been found liable because of insufficient evidence of harm to consumers, the remedies may be unnecessary, but they avoided the serious potential damage to consumer welfare that was likely to accompany the main alternative proposals. 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spelling Evans, David S. 1954- Verfasser (DE-588)129674435 aut
U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win? David S. Evans ; Albert L. Nichols ; Richard Schmalensee
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005
58 S.
txt rdacontent
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National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: Working paper series 11727
"U.S. v. Microsoft and the related state suit filed in 1998 appear finally to have concluded. In a unanimous en banc decision issued in late June 2004, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the remedies approved by the District Court in November 2002. The wave of follow-on private antitrust suits filed against Microsoft also appears to be subsiding. In this paper we review the remedies imposed in the United States, in terms of both their relationship to the violations found and their impact on consumer welfare. We conclude that the remedies addressed the violations ultimately found by the Court of Appeals (which were a subset of those found by the original district court and an even smaller subset of the violations alleged, both in court and in public discourse) and went beyond them in important ways. Thus, for those who believe that the courts were right in finding that some of Microsoft's actions harmed competition, the constraints placed on its behavior and the active, ongoing oversight by the Court and the plaintiffs provide useful protection against a recurrence of such harm. For those who believe that Microsoft should not have been found liable because of insufficient evidence of harm to consumers, the remedies may be unnecessary, but they avoided the serious potential damage to consumer welfare that was likely to accompany the main alternative proposals. The remedies actually imposed appear to have struck a reasonable balance between protecting consumers against the types of actions found illegal and harming consumers by unnecessarily restricting Microsoft's ability to compete"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Microsoft Corporation Trials, litigation, etc
Nichols, Albert L. Verfasser (DE-588)131457632 aut
Schmalensee, Richard 1944- Verfasser (DE-588)129570230 aut
Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: Working paper series 11727 (DE-604)BV002801238 11727
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11727.pdf kostenfrei Volltext
spellingShingle Evans, David S. 1954-
Nichols, Albert L.
Schmalensee, Richard 1944-
U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win?
National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: Working paper series
Microsoft Corporation Trials, litigation, etc
title U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win?
title_auth U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win?
title_exact_search U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win?
title_full U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win? David S. Evans ; Albert L. Nichols ; Richard Schmalensee
title_fullStr U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win? David S. Evans ; Albert L. Nichols ; Richard Schmalensee
title_full_unstemmed U.S. v. Microsoft did consumers win? David S. Evans ; Albert L. Nichols ; Richard Schmalensee
title_short U.S. v. Microsoft
title_sort u s v microsoft did consumers win
title_sub did consumers win?
topic Microsoft Corporation Trials, litigation, etc
topic_facet Microsoft Corporation Trials, litigation, etc
url http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11727.pdf
volume_link (DE-604)BV002801238
work_keys_str_mv AT evansdavids usvmicrosoftdidconsumerswin
AT nicholsalbertl usvmicrosoftdidconsumerswin
AT schmalenseerichard usvmicrosoftdidconsumerswin