Microeconomic theory a concise course
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford University Press
2005
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| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Bergin, James |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Microeconomic theory |b a concise course |c James Bergin |
| 250 | |a 1. publ. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford [u.a.] |b Oxford University Press |c 2005 | |
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| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS XVII 1. DECISION THEORY 1 1.1
INTRODUCTION 1 1.2 PREFERENCES AND OPTIMAL CHOICES 3 1.3 DECISIONMAKING
UNDER RISK 5 1.3.1 VON NEUMANN*MORGENSTERN PREFERENCES 6 1.3.2 OTHER
PREFERENCE SPECIFICATIONS 8 1.4 THE STATE PREFERENCE MODEL 13 1.5
DECISIONMAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 14 1.5.1 OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY 16
1.5.2 OTHER PREFERENCE SPECIFICATIONS 17 BIBLIOGRAPHY 19 2. PREFERENCES,
RISK, AND STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 21 2.1 INTRODUCTION 21 2.2 VON
NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN PREFERENCES AND RISK 23 2.2.1 RISK AVERSION: SOME
RELATIONS 23 2.2.2 RISK AVERSION AND BEHAVIOR: ASSET CHOICE 25 2.3 RISK
AVERSION AND THE STATE PREFERENCE MODEL 27 2.4 STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 29
2.4.1 STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS 29 2.4.2
STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND PREFERENCES 30 2.5 EQUIVALENCE OF DOMINANCE
CRITERIA 30 2.5.1 EQUAL MEANS: MEAN PRESERVING SPREADS 32 CONTENTS 2.5.2
HIGHER ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 33 2.5.3 STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND RISK
AVERSION 33 2.5.4 LIKELIHOOD RATIOS AND HAZARD RATES 34 2.5.5 DOMINANCE
IN TERMS OF SEMIDEVIATIONS 35 2.5.6 CONDITIONAL STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND
MONOTONE LIKELIHOOD RATIOS 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY 38 3. STRATEGIC FORM GAMES 39
3.1 INTRODUCTION 39 3.2 STRATEGIES 40 3.3 SOLUTIONS 41 3.3.1 MAXMIN
CHOICES 41 3.3.2 DOMINANT STRATEGIES 42 3.3.3 RATIONALIZABILITY 43 3.3.4
EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGIES 44 3.4 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 45 3.5 CORRELATED
EQUILIBRIUM 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY 53 4. NASH EQUILIBRIUM*EXISTENCE AND
REFINEMENTS 55 4.1 INTRODUCTION 55 4.2 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 56 4.3 EXISTENCE
OF EQUILIBRIUM 57 4.3.1 FIXED POINTS 58 4.3.2 EQUILIBRIUM 59 4.4 PERFECT
EQUILIBRIUM 60 4.5 PROPER EQUILIBRIUM 61 4.6 PERSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM 63
BIBLIOGRAPHY 64 5. MECHANISM DESIGN 65 5.1 INTRODUCTION 65 5.2
MECHANISMS 66 VIII CONTENTS 5.3 COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENTS 67 5.4 IMPLEMENTATION: COMPLETE INFORMATION 68 5.4.1 DIRECT
MECHANISMS 69 5.5 DOMINANT STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 70 5.5.1 THE
REVELATION PRINCIPLE: DOMINANT STRATEGIES 70 5.5.2 STRATEGY-PROOFNESS 71
5.5.3 THE GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM 72 5.5.4 PREFERENCE DOMAIN
RESTRICTIONS 76 BIBLIOGRAPHY 80 6. IMPLEMENTATION: COMPLETE AND
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 81 6.1 INTRODUCTION 81 6.2 COMPLETE INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENTS 83 6.3 STRATEGIC FORM MECHANISMS (COMPLETE INFORMATION) 83
6.3.1 THE ENVIRONMENT 83 6.3.2 NASH IMPLEMENTATION 84 6.3.3 UNDOMINATED
NASH IMPLEMENTATION 88 6.3.4 VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION 89 6.4 EXTENSIVE
FORM MECHANISMS (COMPLETE INFORMATION) 91 6.5 INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENTS 94 6.5.1 THE FRAMEWORK 94 6.5.2 INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND
PARTICIPATION 94 6.5.3 EX ANTE, INTERIM, AND EX POST CRITERIA 96 6.5.4
STRATEGIC FORM MECHANISMS (INCOMPLETE INFORMATION) 96 6.5.5 NASH
IMPLEMENTATION 96 6.6 OTHER MECHANISMS 98 BIBLIOGRAPHY 99 7. AUCTIONS I:
INDEPENDENT VALUES 101 7.1 INTRODUCTION 101 7.2 AUCTION PROCEDURES 103
7.2.1 FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS 104 7.2.2 SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS 105 7.2.3
ALL-PAY AUCTIONS 106 7.2.4 FIXED PRICE AUCTIONS (TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT
PRICING) 106 7.2.5 THE DUTCH AND THE ENGLISH AUCTIONS 107 IX CONTENTS 73
REVENUE EQUIVALENCE 107 7A REDUCED FORM AUCTIONS 109 7.4.1 INCENTIVE
COMPATIBILITY 111 7.4.2 REVENUE 112 7.5 THE OPTIMAL AUCTION 113 7.5.1
CANONICAL PRICING 116 7.6 RISK AVERSION 117 7.7 EFFICIENCY AND
OPTIMALITY 120 BIBLIOGRAPHY 120 8. AUCTIONS II: DEPENDENT VALUES 121 8.1
THE FRAMEWORK 121 8.1.1 AFFILIATED (MTP 2 ) RANDOM VARIABLES 122 8.2
AUCTION PROCEDURES 123 8.2.1 FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS 125 8.2.2 FIRST PRICE
AUCTIONS: AN EXAMPLE 128 8.2.3 SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS 131 8.2.4 ENGLISH
AUCTIONS 132 8.2.5 REVENUE COMPARISONS 133 8.3 PRICE AND INFORMATION
LINKAGES 136 8.4 THE WINNER S CURSE 139 8.5 OPTIMALITY: SURPLUS
EXTRACTION 139 8.6 FARKAS LEMMA 145 BIBLIOGRAPHY 146 9. EXTENSIVE FORM
GAMES 147 9.1 INTRODUCTION 147 9.2 DESCRIPTION OI AN EXTENSIVE FORM GAME
147 9.2.1 CHOICES 149 9.2.2 INFORMATION 149 9.3 STRATEGIES 149 9.3.1
STRATEGIES: INFORMAL DESCRIPTION 150 9.3.2 STRATEGIES: DETAILED
DESCRIPTION 152 9.3.3 PERFECT RECALL 153 9.3.4 STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE
WITH PERFECT RECALL 156 BIBLIOGRAPHY 157 CONTENTS 10. EQUILIBRIUM IN
EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES 159 10.1 INTRODUCTION 159 10.2 EXTENSIVE AND
STRATEGIC FORM EQUILIBRIA 160 10.2.1 SUBGAMES AND SUBGAME PERFECTION 161
10.3 PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM 162 10.4 SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 165 10.5
PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM 170 10.6 PROPER AND SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
170 10.7 THE CHAIN STORE PARADOX 171 10.7.1 THE COMPLETE INFORMATION
MODEL 172 10.7.2 THE INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODEL 172 BIBLIOGRAPHY 177
11. REPEATED GAMES 179 11.1 INTRODUCTION 179 11.2 THE FRAMEWORK 180
11.2.1 EVALUATION OF PAYOFF FLOWS 180 11.2.2 STRATEGIES AND EQUILIBRIUM
181 11.2.3 MIXED STRATEGIES 181 11.3 THE IMPACT OF REPETITION 182 11.4
CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS 183 11.4.1 MAXIMAL PUNISHMENTS
AND MINMAX PAYOFFS 183 11.4.2 CONVEXITY, FEASIBILITY, AND OBSERVABILITY
185 11.5 INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH AVERAGING 187 11.6 INFINITELY
REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING 188 11.6.1 THE DIMENSIONALITY CONDITION
190 11.7 FINITELY REPEATED GAMES 191 11.8 FINITE REPETITION AND
DISCOUNTING 192 11.8.1 NO GAIN FROM ONE-SHOT DEVIATION 192 U.8.2 HISTORY
INDEPENDENT PUNISHMENTS 193 11.9 REPEATED GAMES OF INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION 194 11.9.1 STRATEGIC INFORMATION REVELATION 195 11.9.2
EQUILIBRIUM 196 BIBLIOGRAPHY 198 XI CONTENTS 12. INFORMATION 201 12.1
INTRODUCTION 201 12.2 THE FRAMEWORK 202 12.3 INFORMATION AND DECISIONS
203 12.4 UTILITY MAXIMIZATION AND THE VALUE OF INFORMATION 203 12.4.1
FINER INFORMATION 204 12.4.2 GARBLING 205 12.5 MONOTONIC DECISIONS 209
12.6 LIKELIHOOD RATIOS, MTP 2/ AND SUPERMODULARITY 211 12.6.1 MONOTONE
LIKELIHOOD RATIOS: OBSERVATIONS 212 12.6.2 MONOTONE TOTAL POSITIVITY OF
ORDER TWO 214 12.6.3 SUPERMODULARITY AND MONOTONICITY 215 12.7 THE
MULTIPERSON ENVIRONMENT 217 12.7.1 RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 218 12.7.2
NONEXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM 220 12.7.3 RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND NO
SPECULATION 221 12.8 EQUILIBRIUM IN M-PLAYER BAYESIAN GAMES 222 12.9
MULTIAGENT MODELS: INFORMATION STRUCTURES 224 BIBLIOGRAPHY 225 13. THE
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 227 13.1 INTRODUCTION 227 13.2 DETAILS 228 13.3
THE FULL INFORMATION CASE 229 13.3.1 RISK AVERSION AND RISK ALLOCATION
231 13.3.2 EFFICIENCY WITH A RISK NEUTRAL PRINCIPAL 232 13.4 THE
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION CASE 233 13.4.1 THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH 235
13.4.2 VALIDITY OF THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH: SUFFICIENCY CONDITIONS 236
13.4.3 COMMENTS ON THE SUFFICIENCY CONDITIONS 238 13.4.4 INEFFICIENCY
AND THE LIKELIHOOD RATIO 240 BIBLIOGRAPHY 241 14. SIGNALING 243 14.1
INTRODUCTION 243 XII CONTENTS 14.2 SIGNALING GAMES 243 14.2.1 NASH
EQUILIBRIUM 244 14.2.2 SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 244 14.2.3 INTUITIVE
EQUILIBRIUM 246 14.3 EXAMPLES 248 BIBLIOGRAPHY 253 15. SCREENING 255
15.1 INTRODUCTION 255 15.2 SCREENING MODELS 255 15.2.1 THE INSURANCE
MARKET MODEL 256 15.2.2 THE LABOR MARKET MODEL 259 BIBLIOGRAPHY 265 16.
COMMO N KNOWLEDGE 267 16.1 INTRODUCTION 267 16.2 INFORMATION STRUCTURES
268 16.3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 269 16.4 POSTERIOR ANNOUNCEMENTS 271 16.5
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS 272 16.6 COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF AN AGGREGATE STATISTIC
273 16.7 COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EQUILIBRIUM 275 16.8 NO-TRADE THEOREMS 277
BIBLIOGRAPHY 279 17. BARGAINING 281 17.1 INTRODUCTION 281 17.2 AXIOMATIC
BARGAINING 282 17.3 AXIOMATIC BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 283 17.3.1
EGALITARIAN AND UTILITARIAN SOLUTIONS 283 17.3.2 THE NASH BARGAINING
SOLUTION 284 17.3.3 THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY (K-S) BARGAINING SOLUTION 287
17.4 NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING 289 XIII CONTENTS 17.5 ALTERNATING OFFERS
AND NASH BARGAINING 292 17.6 BARGAINING WITH MANY INDIVIDUALS 293
BIBLIOGRAPHY 294 18. COOPERATIVE OUTCOMES 297 18.1 INTRODUCTION 297 18.2
FRAMEWORK 298 18.3 THE CORE 298 18.3.1 BALANCEDNESS 298 18.4
NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY 301 18.4.1 DERIVATION OF THE COALITION FUNCTION
301 18.5 VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN SOLUTIONS AND STABILITY 302 18.5.1
STABILITY 303 18.6 THE SHAPLEY VALUE 304 BIBLIOGRAPHY 308 19. ANONYMOUS
GAMES 309 19.1 INTRODUCTION 309 19.2 FORMULATION OF ANONYMOUS GAMES 310
19.2.1 EQUILIBRIUM 310 19.2.2 AN EXAMPLE 312 19.2.3 PURE STRATEGY
EQUILIBRIUM 312 19.3 STRATEGIES AS FUNCTIONS 313 19.4 DYNAMIC ANONYMOUS
GAMES 313 19.5 SOCIAL PLANNER FORMULATIONS 316 19.5.1 SURPLUS
MAXIMIZATION: AN EXAMPLE 316 19.6 NO AGGREGATE UNCERTAINTY 321
BIBLIOGRAPHY 321 20. EVOLUTION AND LEARNING 323 20.1 INTRODUCTION 323
20.2 FICTITIOUS PLAY 324 20.3 REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 325 XIV CONTENTS 20.4
STOCHASTIC STABILITY 326 20.4.1 MOTIVATION 326 20.4.2 INVARIANT
DISTRIBUTIONS: OVERVIEW 327 20.4.3 BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS: AN EXAMPLE
332 20 A A IMITATIVE DYNAMICS: AN EXAMPLE 336 20.5 REGRET MINIMIZATION
339 20.5.1 APPROACHABLE SETS OF PAYOFFS 339 20.5.2 THE MODEL 340 20.6
CALIBRATION 343 20.7 BAYESIAN LEARNING 344 20.8 APPROACHABILITY 345
BIBLIOGRAPHY 350 INDEX 353 XV
|
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| id | DE-604.BV019757476 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-23T18:10:20Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0199280290 9780199280292 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2004030367 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013083895 |
| oclc_num | 57344012 |
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| owner | DE-703 DE-384 DE-521 DE-83 DE-11 DE-2070s DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-703 DE-384 DE-521 DE-83 DE-11 DE-2070s DE-188 |
| physical | XXI, 356 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
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| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Bergin, James Microeconomic theory a concise course Micro-economie gtt Microéconomie Microeconomics Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4039225-9 (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Microeconomic theory a concise course |
| title_auth | Microeconomic theory a concise course |
| title_exact_search | Microeconomic theory a concise course |
| title_full | Microeconomic theory a concise course James Bergin |
| title_fullStr | Microeconomic theory a concise course James Bergin |
| title_full_unstemmed | Microeconomic theory a concise course James Bergin |
| title_short | Microeconomic theory |
| title_sort | microeconomic theory a concise course |
| title_sub | a concise course |
| topic | Micro-economie gtt Microéconomie Microeconomics Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Micro-economie Microéconomie Microeconomics Mikroökonomie Spieltheorie |
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