Brute rationality normativity and human action
"This book presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favor of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The disti...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2004
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in philosophy
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Publisher description Table of contents |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV019384937 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20170727 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 040907s2004 xxk |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 010 | |a 2004040403 | ||
| 020 | |a 0521833183 |c hardcover |9 0-521-83318-3 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)54205668 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV019384937 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxk |c GB | ||
| 049 | |a DE-29 |a DE-355 |a DE-12 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a BJ1458.3 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 128/.4 |2 22 | |
| 084 | |a CC 7200 |0 (DE-625)17672: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a 5,1 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Gert, Joshua |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1137332751 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Brute rationality |b normativity and human action |c Joshua Gert |
| 250 | |a 1. publ. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge [u.a.] |b Cambridge Univ. Press |c 2004 | |
| 300 | |a XIII, 230 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in philosophy | |
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 520 | 1 | |a "This book presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favor of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally."--BOOK JACKET. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Besluitvorming |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Ethische aspecten |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Ethik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a aNormativity (Ethics) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a aDecision making |a xMoral and ethical aspects | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Normativität |0 (DE-588)4790832-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Entscheidungsfindung |0 (DE-588)4113446-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Normativität |0 (DE-588)4790832-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Entscheidungsfindung |0 (DE-588)4113446-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | |u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam041/2004040403.html |3 Publisher description | |
| 856 | 4 | |u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam041/2004040403.html |3 Table of contents | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-012847861 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804132830837473280 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Gert, Joshua |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1137332751 |
| author_facet | Gert, Joshua |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Gert, Joshua |
| author_variant | j g jg |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV019384937 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | BJ1458 |
| callnumber-raw | BJ1458.3 |
| callnumber-search | BJ1458.3 |
| callnumber-sort | BJ 41458.3 |
| callnumber-subject | BJ - Ethics |
| classification_rvk | CC 7200 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)54205668 (DE-599)BVBBV019384937 |
| dewey-full | 128/.4 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
| dewey-raw | 128/.4 |
| dewey-search | 128/.4 |
| dewey-sort | 3128 14 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02555nam a2200517zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV019384937</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20170727 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">040907s2004 xxk |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="010" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2004040403</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0521833183</subfield><subfield code="c">hardcover</subfield><subfield code="9">0-521-83318-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)54205668</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV019384937</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxk</subfield><subfield code="c">GB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">BJ1458.3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">128/.4</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 7200</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17672:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5,1</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Gert, Joshua</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1137332751</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Brute rationality</subfield><subfield code="b">normativity and human action</subfield><subfield code="c">Joshua Gert</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1. publ.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge Univ. Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2004</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XIII, 230 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cambridge studies in philosophy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references and index</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"This book presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favor of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally."--BOOK JACKET.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Besluitvorming</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Ethische aspecten</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ethik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">aNormativity (Ethics)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">aDecision making</subfield><subfield code="a">xMoral and ethical aspects</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Normativität</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4790832-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungsfindung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113446-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Normativität</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4790832-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungsfindung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113446-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam041/2004040403.html</subfield><subfield code="3">Publisher description</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam041/2004040403.html</subfield><subfield code="3">Table of contents</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-012847861</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV019384937 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T19:59:04Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0521833183 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2004040403 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-012847861 |
| oclc_num | 54205668 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-29 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-12 |
| physical | XIII, 230 S. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cambridge studies in philosophy |
| spelling | Gert, Joshua Verfasser (DE-588)1137332751 aut Brute rationality normativity and human action Joshua Gert 1. publ. Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2004 XIII, 230 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge studies in philosophy Includes bibliographical references and index "This book presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favor of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally."--BOOK JACKET. Besluitvorming gtt Ethische aspecten gtt Ethik aNormativity (Ethics) aDecision making xMoral and ethical aspects Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd rswk-swf Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 s Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 s DE-604 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam041/2004040403.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam041/2004040403.html Table of contents |
| spellingShingle | Gert, Joshua Brute rationality normativity and human action Besluitvorming gtt Ethische aspecten gtt Ethik aNormativity (Ethics) aDecision making xMoral and ethical aspects Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4790832-4 (DE-588)4113446-1 |
| title | Brute rationality normativity and human action |
| title_auth | Brute rationality normativity and human action |
| title_exact_search | Brute rationality normativity and human action |
| title_full | Brute rationality normativity and human action Joshua Gert |
| title_fullStr | Brute rationality normativity and human action Joshua Gert |
| title_full_unstemmed | Brute rationality normativity and human action Joshua Gert |
| title_short | Brute rationality |
| title_sort | brute rationality normativity and human action |
| title_sub | normativity and human action |
| topic | Besluitvorming gtt Ethische aspecten gtt Ethik aNormativity (Ethics) aDecision making xMoral and ethical aspects Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Besluitvorming Ethische aspecten Ethik aNormativity (Ethics) aDecision making xMoral and ethical aspects Normativität Entscheidungsfindung |
| url | http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam041/2004040403.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam041/2004040403.html |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gertjoshua bruterationalitynormativityandhumanaction |