Bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Crüger, Arwed (VerfasserIn)
Format: Abschlussarbeit Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Berlin Duncker und Humblot 2002
Schriftenreihe:Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften 527
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Table of contents
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a22000008cb4500
001 BV015310204
003 DE-604
005 20030228
007 t|
008 021202s2002 gw d||| m||| 00||| eng d
016 7 |a 965665381  |2 DE-101 
020 |a 3428107411  |9 3-428-10741-1 
035 |a (OCoLC)51700098 
035 |a (DE-599)BVBBV015310204 
040 |a DE-604  |b ger  |e rakddb 
041 0 |a eng 
044 |a gw  |c DE 
049 |a DE-384  |a DE-19  |a DE-12  |a DE-703  |a DE-20  |a DE-521 
050 0 |a HB144.C78 2002 
082 0 |a 519.3 22 
082 0 |a 519.3  |2 22 
084 |a QH 435  |0 (DE-625)141585:  |2 rvk 
084 |a 17  |2 sdnb 
084 |a 27  |2 sdnb 
084 |a 11  |2 sdnb 
100 1 |a Crüger, Arwed  |e Verfasser  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Bargaining theory and fairness  |b a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation  |c by Arwed Crüger 
264 1 |a Berlin  |b Duncker und Humblot  |c 2002 
300 |a 173 S.  |b graph. Darst. 
336 |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |b n  |2 rdamedia 
338 |b nc  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften  |v 527 
502 |a Zugl.: Halle, Univ., Diss., 2000 
650 7 |a Onderhandelen  |2 gtt 
650 7 |a Speltheorie  |2 gtt 
650 4 |a Mathematisches Modell 
650 4 |a Game theory 
650 4 |a Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models 
650 4 |a Decision making -- Mathematical models 
650 4 |a Intrinsic motivation -- Economic aspects 
650 4 |a Crowding out (Economics) 
650 4 |a Fairness 
650 0 7 |a Kooperatives Spiel  |0 (DE-588)4120603-4  |2 gnd  |9 rswk-swf 
650 0 7 |a Verhandlungstheorie  |0 (DE-588)4139583-9  |2 gnd  |9 rswk-swf 
650 0 7 |a Fairness  |0 (DE-588)4153589-3  |2 gnd  |9 rswk-swf 
650 0 7 |a Intrinsische Motivation  |0 (DE-588)4136411-9  |2 gnd  |9 rswk-swf 
655 7 |0 (DE-588)4113937-9  |a Hochschulschrift  |2 gnd-content 
689 0 0 |a Verhandlungstheorie  |0 (DE-588)4139583-9  |D s 
689 0 1 |a Fairness  |0 (DE-588)4153589-3  |D s 
689 0 |5 DE-604 
689 1 0 |a Verhandlungstheorie  |0 (DE-588)4139583-9  |D s 
689 1 1 |a Kooperatives Spiel  |0 (DE-588)4120603-4  |D s 
689 1 2 |a Intrinsische Motivation  |0 (DE-588)4136411-9  |D s 
689 1 |5 DE-604 
830 0 |a Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften  |v 527  |w (DE-604)BV000898852  |9 527 
856 4 |u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy038/2003443764.html  |3 Table of contents 
856 4 2 |m HBZ Datenaustausch  |q application/pdf  |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=010100380&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA  |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis 
943 1 |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-010100380 

Datensatz im Suchindex

DE-19_call_number 0500/QH 435 C955
DE-19_location 70
DE-BY-UBM_katkey 2735341
DE-BY-UBM_local_keycode di
DE-BY-UBM_media_number 41624401610019
_version_ 1823052498470961152
adam_text List of Contents A. Introduction 15 I. Motivation and Research Objectives 15 II. Overview and Contents 17 B. Research on Bargaining Games 19 I. Bargaining Games and Related Games 19 1. The Ultimatum Game 20 2. The Dictator Game 20 3. The Impunity Game 21 4. The Cardinal Impunity Game 21 5. Cardinal Ultimatum Games 22 6. The Best Shot Game and the Best Shot Mini Game 23 7. An Auction Market Game 23 8. Prisoner s Dilemma. 24 II. Comparisons Between Related Types of Games 24 1. Experimental Results on Ultimatum and Dictator Bargaining 26 2. Basic and Advanced Designs for Ultimatum Experiments 27 3. Experiments with Dictator Games and Other Games 31 HI. A Summary of Research Results 36 C. Fairness and Intrinsic Motivation 41 I. The Concept of Intrinsic Motivation 41 II. Experimental Approaches Towards Intrinsic Motivation 42 III. Aspects of Fairness 42 IV. Referring to a Fairness Norm 44 V. Relevant Factors for a Social Norm of Fairness 48 6 List of Contents 1. The Level of Competitiveness 48 2. The Level of Social Distance 49 3. Annoyance as a Key Factor 50 4. Determinants for a Level of Annoyance 52 VI. Another Implementation of Fairness 53 VII. Putting the Factors Together 55 D. Freedom of Choice 58 I. The Basic Concept 58 1. Instrumental and Intrinsic Importance 58 2. Negative and Positive Freedom 59 3. Alternative Spaces, Functionings, and Capabilities 60 4. The Famine Example 60 II. Axiomatic Modeling of Freedom of Choice 63 III. Modeling Freedom of Choice with a Simple Game 63 IV. A Summary on Freedom of Choice 64 E. The Two Games and Their Experimental Realization 66 I. Freedom to Punish 68 1. The Structure of the Game 68 2. The Game Theoretic Solution of the FTP Game 70 II. Right and Choice to Punish 71 1. The Structure of the Game 72 2. The Game Theoretic Solution of the RAP Game 73 III. Differences and Similarities Between the Two Games 74 IV. The Experimental Realization 74 V. The Experimental Procedure 76 F. Experimental Design for the FTP Game 77 I. Design Approach for the Experiment 78 1. Treatment Variables 79 2. Designs with a Low Proportional Bonus: A and B 79 List of Contents 7 3. The Design Without a Bonus: C 80 i 4. The Design with a Low Constant Bonus: D 81 | 5. The Design with a High Constant Bonus: E 82 6. Designs with a Constant Price: F, G and H 82 II. Alternative Designs 83 G. Experimental Results for the FTP Game 85 I. An Overview of the Decisions in the FTP Game 85 1. The Veto Power Decisions 85 2. The Proposals 87 3. The Acceptance Decisions 93 4. Payoffs and Efficiency 95 II. Design Background and Hypothesis Approach 96 III. Statistical Analysis for the FTP Game 97 1. The Veto Power Decisions 97 a) General Tendencies for the Veto Power Decisions 97 b) Analysis of the Veto Power Decisions 98 c) Graphical Illustration of the Veto Power Decisions 103 2. The Proposals 105 a) General Tendencies for the Demand Decisions 105 b) Analysis of the Demand Decisions 106 c) Graphical Illustration of the Demand Decisions 110 3. The Acceptance Decisions Ill IV. General Results of the FTP Game 113 1. Interpretation of the Behavior Towards Freedom of Choice 113 2. Overall Outcomes of the FTP Game 114 H. Experimental Design for the RAP G»me 116 I. Design Approach for the Experiment 117 1. Treatment Variables 118 2. Design I with a Small Bonus, a Fair and a Greedy Distribution 119 8 List of Contents 3. Design II with a Small Bonus, a Greedy and a Very Greedy Distribution.... 121 4. Design III with a High Bonus, a Fair and a Greedy Distribution 122 5. Design IV with a High Bonus, a Greedy and a Very Greedy Distribution.... 123 6. Playing a Subgame , 124 II. Alternative Designs 125 I. Experimental Results for the RAP Game 127 I. An Overview of the Decisions in the RAP Game 127 1. The Veto Power Decisions 127 2. The Proposals 129 3. The Acceptance Decisions 133 4. The Subgames 135 5. Behavior Types for Proposers and Receivers 136 6. A Strategy Tournament 139 7. Payoffs and Efficiency 144 II. Design Background and Hypothesis Approach , 146 III. Statistical Analysis for the RAP Game 147 1. Differences Between the FTP Game and the RAP Game..... 148 2. The Veto Power Decisions „ 149 3. The Proposals , 151 4. The Acceptance Decisions 158 5. The Subgames . 159 IV. General Results of the RAP Game 161 1. Interpretation of the Behavior Towards a Crowding Out 161 2. Overall Outcomes of the RAP Game 162 J. Summary 164 Bibliography 166 Subject Index 174 List of Figures Figure 1: Suggested Average First Round Ultimatum Demands 39 Figure 2: Determinants of Individual Behavior 57 Figure 3: Income and Life Expectancy in Five Developing Countries 61 Figure 4: Game Tree with Parameters for the FTP Game 69 Figure 5: Payoffs for Demands of C and C e 70 Figure 6: Game Tree with Parameters for the RAP Game 73 Figure 7: Session Overview for Both Games FTP and RAP 75 Figure 8: Design Overview for the FTP Game 78 Figure 9: Design Structure for the FTP Game 79 Figure 10: Game Tree for Designs A and B with a Bonus 8 of 10 % 80 Figure 11: Game Tree for Design C with a Bonus of Zero 81 Figure 12: Game Tree for Design D with a Bonus 8 of DM 0,50 82 Figure 13: Realized and Expected VP Decisions for all FTP Designs 86 Figure 14: Veto Power Decisions for all FTP Designs 86 Figure 15: Expected Veto Power Decisions for all FTP Designs 87 Figure 16: Demands for all FTP Designs 88 Figure 17: Distribution of Demands for all FTP Designs 89 Figure 18: Expected Demands for all FTP Designs 90 Figure 19: Distribution of Expected Demands for all FTP Designs 91 Figure 20: Average Demanded and Expected Shares 92 Figure 21: Average Expected Demands for VP and NV Choices 92 Figure 22: Table of Acceptance Decisions for all FTP Designs 93 Figure 23: Acceptance Decisions for all FTP Designs 94 Figure 24: Expected Acceptance Decisions for all FTP Designs 95 Figure 25: Average Payoff Overview (in DM) 96 Figure 26: Veto Power Choices for all FTP Designs 98 Figure 27: Test Results for Hypothesis H°ftpi 100 10 List of Figures Figure 28: Percentages of NV Choices for all Bonus Types 105 Figure 29: Average Demands for Designs B to H 106 Figure 30: Average Demands for all Bonus Types 110 Figure 31: Distribution of Rejected Offers 112 Figure 32: Design Overview for the RAP Game 117 Figure 33: Design Structure for the RAP Game 119 Figure 34: Payoff Table for Design 1 120 Figure 35: Game Tree with Parameters of Design I with 8 = 5% 120 Figure 36: Payoff Table for Design II 121 Figure 37: Game Tree with Parameters of Design II with 8 = 5 % 121 Figure 38: Payoff Table for Design III 122 Figure 39: Game Tree with Parameters of Design III with 8 = 50 % 122 Figure 40: Payoff Table for Design IV 123 Figure 41: Game Tree with Parameters of Design IV with 8 = 50 % 123 Figure 42: Game Tree for Design ID 124 Figure 43: Game Tree for Design IU 125 Figure 44: Realized and Expected VP Decisions for all RAP Designs 128 Figure 45: Veto Power Decisions for all RAP Designs 128 Figure 46: Expected Veto Power Decisions for all RAP Designs 129 Figure 47: Proposal Decisions for all RAP Designs 129 Figure 48: Demands in the Veto Power Situation 130 Figure 49: Demands in the Situation Without Veto Power 131 Figure 50: Expected Proposal Decisions for all RAP Designs.... 131 Figure 51: Expected Demands in the Veto Power Situation 132 Figure 52: Expected Demands in the Situation Without Veto Power 132 Figure 53: The Acceptance Decisions 133 Figure 54: Acceptance Decisions for High Demands 134 Figure 55: Expected Acceptance Decisions for High Demands 134 Figure 56: The Expected Acceptance Decisions 135 Figure 57: Proposal Decisions for all RAP Subgame Designs 135 Figure 58: The Acceptance Decisions 136 Figure 59: The Expected Acceptance Decisions 136 List of Figures 11 Figure 60: Behavior Types for the Proposer 138 Figure 61: Behavior Types for the Receiver 139 Figure 62: Strategies of the Proposer 140 Figure 63: Strategies of the Receiver 141 Figure 64: Favorite Strategies for Proposers 143 Figure 65: Favorite Strategies for Receivers 143 Figure 66: Average Payoffs for Proposers 144 Figure 67: Average Payoffs for Receivers 145 Figure 68: Efficiency of the RAP Designs 146 Figure 69: High Demands in the Absence of Veto Power 155 Figure 70: High Demands in the Veto Power Situation 156 Figure 71: Percentages of Equal Splits 157 Figure 72: Percentages of Rejections 158 Figure 73: High Demands in Designs I, II, IU, and IIU 160 Figure 74: High Demands in Designs I, II, ID, and IID 160
any_adam_object 1
author Crüger, Arwed
author_facet Crüger, Arwed
author_role aut
author_sort Crüger, Arwed
author_variant a c ac
building Verbundindex
bvnumber BV015310204
callnumber-first H - Social Science
callnumber-label HB144
callnumber-raw HB144.C78 2002
callnumber-search HB144.C78 2002
callnumber-sort HB 3144 C78 42002
callnumber-subject HB - Economic Theory and Demography
classification_rvk QH 435
ctrlnum (OCoLC)51700098
(DE-599)BVBBV015310204
dewey-full 519.322
519.3
dewey-hundreds 500 - Natural sciences and mathematics
dewey-ones 519 - Probabilities and applied mathematics
dewey-raw 519.3 22
519.3
dewey-search 519.3 22
519.3
dewey-sort 3519.3 222
dewey-tens 510 - Mathematics
discipline Mathematik
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
format Thesis
Book
fullrecord <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02665nam a22006738cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV015310204</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20030228 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t|</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">021202s2002 gw d||| m||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="016" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">965665381</subfield><subfield code="2">DE-101</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3428107411</subfield><subfield code="9">3-428-10741-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)51700098</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV015310204</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">gw</subfield><subfield code="c">DE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HB144.C78 2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">519.3 22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">519.3</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QH 435</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141585:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">17</subfield><subfield code="2">sdnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">27</subfield><subfield code="2">sdnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">11</subfield><subfield code="2">sdnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Crüger, Arwed</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bargaining theory and fairness</subfield><subfield code="b">a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation</subfield><subfield code="c">by Arwed Crüger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Berlin</subfield><subfield code="b">Duncker und Humblot</subfield><subfield code="c">2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">173 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften</subfield><subfield code="v">527</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="502" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zugl.: Halle, Univ., Diss., 2000</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Onderhandelen</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Speltheorie</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mathematisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Decision making -- Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Intrinsic motivation -- Economic aspects</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Crowding out (Economics)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Fairness</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Kooperatives Spiel</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4120603-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Verhandlungstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4139583-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Fairness</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4153589-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Intrinsische Motivation</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4136411-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113937-9</subfield><subfield code="a">Hochschulschrift</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Verhandlungstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4139583-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Fairness</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4153589-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Verhandlungstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4139583-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Kooperatives Spiel</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4120603-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Intrinsische Motivation</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4136411-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften</subfield><subfield code="v">527</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV000898852</subfield><subfield code="9">527</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy038/2003443764.html</subfield><subfield code="3">Table of contents</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">HBZ Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&amp;doc_library=BVB01&amp;local_base=BVB01&amp;doc_number=010100380&amp;sequence=000002&amp;line_number=0001&amp;func_code=DB_RECORDS&amp;service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-010100380</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
genre (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content
genre_facet Hochschulschrift
id DE-604.BV015310204
illustrated Illustrated
indexdate 2025-02-03T16:57:40Z
institution BVB
isbn 3428107411
language English
oai_aleph_id oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-010100380
oclc_num 51700098
open_access_boolean
owner DE-384
DE-19
DE-BY-UBM
DE-12
DE-703
DE-20
DE-521
owner_facet DE-384
DE-19
DE-BY-UBM
DE-12
DE-703
DE-20
DE-521
physical 173 S. graph. Darst.
publishDate 2002
publishDateSearch 2002
publishDateSort 2002
publisher Duncker und Humblot
record_format marc
series Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften
series2 Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften
spellingShingle Crüger, Arwed
Bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation
Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften
Onderhandelen gtt
Speltheorie gtt
Mathematisches Modell
Game theory
Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models
Decision making -- Mathematical models
Intrinsic motivation -- Economic aspects
Crowding out (Economics)
Fairness
Kooperatives Spiel (DE-588)4120603-4 gnd
Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd
Fairness (DE-588)4153589-3 gnd
Intrinsische Motivation (DE-588)4136411-9 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)4120603-4
(DE-588)4139583-9
(DE-588)4153589-3
(DE-588)4136411-9
(DE-588)4113937-9
title Bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation
title_auth Bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation
title_exact_search Bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation
title_full Bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by Arwed Crüger
title_fullStr Bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by Arwed Crüger
title_full_unstemmed Bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by Arwed Crüger
title_short Bargaining theory and fairness
title_sort bargaining theory and fairness a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation
title_sub a theoretical and experimental approach considering freedom of choice and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation
topic Onderhandelen gtt
Speltheorie gtt
Mathematisches Modell
Game theory
Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models
Decision making -- Mathematical models
Intrinsic motivation -- Economic aspects
Crowding out (Economics)
Fairness
Kooperatives Spiel (DE-588)4120603-4 gnd
Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd
Fairness (DE-588)4153589-3 gnd
Intrinsische Motivation (DE-588)4136411-9 gnd
topic_facet Onderhandelen
Speltheorie
Mathematisches Modell
Game theory
Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models
Decision making -- Mathematical models
Intrinsic motivation -- Economic aspects
Crowding out (Economics)
Fairness
Kooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Intrinsische Motivation
Hochschulschrift
url http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy038/2003443764.html
http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=010100380&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
volume_link (DE-604)BV000898852
work_keys_str_mv AT crugerarwed bargainingtheoryandfairnessatheoreticalandexperimentalapproachconsideringfreedomofchoiceandthecrowdingoutofintrinsicmotivation