Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action
"People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and de...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford Univ. Press
2003
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| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Schueler, G. F. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Reasons and purposes |b human rationality and the teleological explanation of action |c G. F. Schueler |
| 250 | |a 1. publ. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford [u.a.] |b Oxford Univ. Press |c 2003 | |
| 300 | |a XII, 174 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 520 | 1 | |a "People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do." "G. F. Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept."--BOOK JACKET. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Handelingstheorie |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Intentionaliteit |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Intentionnalité (Philosophie) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Raison pratique | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Rationaliteit |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Intentionality (Philosophy) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Practical reason | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1819247458016821249 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Schueler, G. F. |
| author_facet | Schueler, G. F. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Schueler, G. F. |
| author_variant | g f s gf gfs |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV014722046 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | B105 |
| callnumber-raw | B105.I56 |
| callnumber-search | B105.I56 |
| callnumber-sort | B 3105 I56 |
| callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
| classification_rvk | CC 4400 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)50560434 (DE-599)BVBBV014722046 |
| dewey-full | 128/.4 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
| dewey-raw | 128/.4 |
| dewey-search | 128/.4 |
| dewey-sort | 3128 14 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV014722046 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-23T15:59:35Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0199250375 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2002034605 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-009976642 |
| oclc_num | 50560434 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-29 DE-703 DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-M468 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-703 DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-M468 |
| physical | XII, 174 S. |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publishDateSearch | 2003 |
| publishDateSort | 2003 |
| publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Schueler, G. F. Verfasser aut Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action G. F. Schueler 1. publ. Oxford [u.a.] Oxford Univ. Press 2003 XII, 174 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references "People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do." "G. F. Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept."--BOOK JACKET. Handelingstheorie gtt Intentionaliteit gtt Intentionnalité (Philosophie) Raison pratique Rationaliteit gtt Intentionality (Philosophy) Practical reason Praktische Vernunft (DE-588)4123977-5 gnd rswk-swf Handlungstheorie (DE-588)4113844-2 gnd rswk-swf Praktische Vernunft (DE-588)4123977-5 s Handlungstheorie (DE-588)4113844-2 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Schueler, G. F. Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action Handelingstheorie gtt Intentionaliteit gtt Intentionnalité (Philosophie) Raison pratique Rationaliteit gtt Intentionality (Philosophy) Practical reason Praktische Vernunft (DE-588)4123977-5 gnd Handlungstheorie (DE-588)4113844-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4123977-5 (DE-588)4113844-2 |
| title | Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action |
| title_auth | Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action |
| title_exact_search | Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action |
| title_full | Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action G. F. Schueler |
| title_fullStr | Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action G. F. Schueler |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action G. F. Schueler |
| title_short | Reasons and purposes |
| title_sort | reasons and purposes human rationality and the teleological explanation of action |
| title_sub | human rationality and the teleological explanation of action |
| topic | Handelingstheorie gtt Intentionaliteit gtt Intentionnalité (Philosophie) Raison pratique Rationaliteit gtt Intentionality (Philosophy) Practical reason Praktische Vernunft (DE-588)4123977-5 gnd Handlungstheorie (DE-588)4113844-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Handelingstheorie Intentionaliteit Intentionnalité (Philosophie) Raison pratique Rationaliteit Intentionality (Philosophy) Practical reason Praktische Vernunft Handlungstheorie |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schuelergf reasonsandpurposeshumanrationalityandtheteleologicalexplanationofaction |