Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets

This paper interprets contagion effects as a perceived increase (triggered by events occurring elsewhere) in the volatility of aggregate shocks impinging on the domestic economy. The implications of this approach are analyzed in a model with two types of credit market imperfections: domestic banks b...

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Hauptverfasser: Agénor, Pierre-Richard 1957- (VerfasserIn), Aizenman, Joshua 1949- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. 1997
Schriftenreihe:National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6080
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520 |a This paper interprets contagion effects as a perceived increase (triggered by events occurring elsewhere) in the volatility of aggregate shocks impinging on the domestic economy. The implications of this approach are analyzed in a model with two types of credit market imperfections: domestic banks borrow at a premium on world capital markets, and domestic producers (whose demand for credit results from working capital needs) borrow at a premium from domestic banks which possess comparative advantage in monitoring the behavior of domestic agents. Financial intermediation spreads are shown to be determined by a markup that compensates for the expected cost of contract enforcement and state verification and for the expected revenue lost in adverse states of nature. Higher volatility of producers' productivity shocks increases both financial spreads and the producers' cost of capital, resulting in lower employment and higher incidence of default. The welfare effects of volatility are non-linear. Higher volatility does not impose any welfare cost for countries characterized by relatively low volatility and efficient financial intermediation. The adverse welfare effects are large (small) for countries that are at the threshold of full integration with international capital markets (close to financial autarky), that is, countries characterized by a relatively low (high) probability of default. 
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Aizenman, Joshua 1949-
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series2 National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
spelling Agénor, Pierre-Richard 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)12408009X aut
Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman
Cambridge, Mass. 1997
23 S. graph. Darst.
txt rdacontent
n rdamedia
nc rdacarrier
National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6080
This paper interprets contagion effects as a perceived increase (triggered by events occurring elsewhere) in the volatility of aggregate shocks impinging on the domestic economy. The implications of this approach are analyzed in a model with two types of credit market imperfections: domestic banks borrow at a premium on world capital markets, and domestic producers (whose demand for credit results from working capital needs) borrow at a premium from domestic banks which possess comparative advantage in monitoring the behavior of domestic agents. Financial intermediation spreads are shown to be determined by a markup that compensates for the expected cost of contract enforcement and state verification and for the expected revenue lost in adverse states of nature. Higher volatility of producers' productivity shocks increases both financial spreads and the producers' cost of capital, resulting in lower employment and higher incidence of default. The welfare effects of volatility are non-linear. Higher volatility does not impose any welfare cost for countries characterized by relatively low volatility and efficient financial intermediation. The adverse welfare effects are large (small) for countries that are at the threshold of full integration with international capital markets (close to financial autarky), that is, countries characterized by a relatively low (high) probability of default.
Kapitaalmarkt gtt
Onvolledige concurrentie gtt
Ökonometrisches Modell
Bank deposits Econometric models
Bank loans Econometric models
Banks and banking, International Econometric models
Capital market Econometric models
Credit Econometric models
Default (Finance) Econometric models
Intermediation (Finance) Econometric models
Aizenman, Joshua 1949- Verfasser (DE-588)124080057 aut
Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6080 (DE-604)BV002801238 6080
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6080.pdf kostenfrei Volltext
spellingShingle Agénor, Pierre-Richard 1957-
Aizenman, Joshua 1949-
Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets
National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
Kapitaalmarkt gtt
Onvolledige concurrentie gtt
Ökonometrisches Modell
Bank deposits Econometric models
Bank loans Econometric models
Banks and banking, International Econometric models
Capital market Econometric models
Credit Econometric models
Default (Finance) Econometric models
Intermediation (Finance) Econometric models
title Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets
title_auth Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets
title_exact_search Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets
title_full Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman
title_fullStr Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman
title_full_unstemmed Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman
title_short Contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets
title_sort contagion and volatility with imperfect credit markets
topic Kapitaalmarkt gtt
Onvolledige concurrentie gtt
Ökonometrisches Modell
Bank deposits Econometric models
Bank loans Econometric models
Banks and banking, International Econometric models
Capital market Econometric models
Credit Econometric models
Default (Finance) Econometric models
Intermediation (Finance) Econometric models
topic_facet Kapitaalmarkt
Onvolledige concurrentie
Ökonometrisches Modell
Bank deposits Econometric models
Bank loans Econometric models
Banks and banking, International Econometric models
Capital market Econometric models
Credit Econometric models
Default (Finance) Econometric models
Intermediation (Finance) Econometric models
url http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6080.pdf
volume_link (DE-604)BV002801238
work_keys_str_mv AT agenorpierrerichard contagionandvolatilitywithimperfectcreditmarkets
AT aizenmanjoshua contagionandvolatilitywithimperfectcreditmarkets